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Humour is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, the nature of which has eluded authors from 
Classical Antiquity to contemporary modernity. This dissertation explores some of the most 
important writings on humour to date, in an attempt to provide a well-rounded, critical approach to 
its most relevant characteristics, such as its relation to play, incongruity, relief, and superiority. 
These characteristics, and in particular the fact that humour seems to be deeply embedded in the 
tragic existential aspects of the human condition, then form the theoretical backbone of the 
subsequent analysis of three short stories by Saki, Monty Python’s Life of Brian and The 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy by Douglas Adams, mostly through a practice of close reading. 
Each of these works, it is argued, reveal a particular outlook on the human condition through the 
exploration of its inherent incongruities – both on a social and individual level. They are also 
shown to, in the face of tragedy, encourage the adoption of a detached perspective that derives 
enjoyment from these incongruities, in what ultimately seems to be a life-affirming practice that 
seeks solace in the bleakest aspects of our existence. Keywords: Humour, Incongruity, Existential, 
Relief, Superiority, Saki, Monty Python, Douglas Adams, Laughter. 
 
 
O humor é um fenómeno complexo e multifacetado cuja natureza tem vindo a iludir pensadores 
desde a Antiguidade Clássica até à modernidade. Esta dissertação explora alguns dos escritos mais 
imporantes sobre humor, numa tentativa de providenciar uma análise crítica e completa das suas 
características mais relevantes, como a sua relação com “o lúdico”, a incongruência, o alívio e a 
superioridade. Estas características, e em particular o facto do humor parecer estar tão 
profundamente enraízado nos aspectos trágicos da condição humana, informam a análise 
subsequente de três contos de Saki (Hector Hugh Munro), d’A Vida de Brian, dos Monty Python, e 
d’À Boleia Pela Galáxia de Douglas Adams, análise essa que é feita maioritariamente através de 
uma prática de close reading. Nesta dissertação argumenta-se que cada uma destas obras revela 
uma visão específica da condição humana através da exploração das incongruências que lhe são 
inerentes – tanto a nível social como individual. Argumenta-se também que, face à tragédia, 
encorajam a adopção de uma perspectiva que retire prazer destas incongruências, no que acaba por 
ser uma prática que procura consolo nos aspectos mais sombrios da existência. Keywords: Humor, 
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1. Introduction – Humour and Culture Studies 
 
The word “culture” has a variety of different meanings and definitions. In order to 
understand the relevance of humour in relation to this concept and Culture Studies in 
general, it is imperative to clarify which of these definitions will be used and how they 
relate to the field. 
In her Introduction to Cultural Studies, Aleida Assman explores what she considers the 
six main concepts one can derive from the word “culture”. Of these six, three “involve 
value judgements and three do not” (Assman, 2012: 12).  These include: “cultivation in the 
sense of optimizing and upgrading a thing or an act”, which is close to its Latin 
etymological origin of “colere”; a term for geographical and political entities, describing a 
“national character”; an ethnographic concept describing the entirety of human activity, 
past, present and future; a normative concept, synonymous with “high culture”; a similarly 
normative concept, synonymous with “progress” and civilization” as opposed to 
“barbarism”; and finally, a third normative concept, mainly indebted to the Frankfurt 
School, representing the almost “sacrosanct” character of a civilization and artistic 
production at odds with the mass production of the “culture industry” (ibid.: 13-16). 
This veritable palette of meanings has a repercussion in the field of Cultural Studies, 
which is commonly referred to as interdisciplinary to a fault: “Cultural studies – and this is 
both their positive and their negative character – do not have any clear-cut definitions. 
They simply study culture. Culture is everything that is made or done by humans” (ibid.: 
18). In this sense, of course, it would be easy to justify the relevance of humour to the field 
of Culture Studies – humour is a distinctly human activity. Animals, as far as we can tell, 
do not engage in humour. This, however, may not be explanation enough for why humour 
is a relevant slice of culture to the point of warranting research and analysis. This is where 
the broadest definition of culture becomes troublesome: “[w]ith the complete removal of 
all cultural boundaries and distinctions between major and minor, high and low, comes the 
danger of a complete levelling of value and relevance. If everything is culture, the meaning 
of the term implodes and is reduced to a hollow tautology” (ibid.: 13). It suffices to remark 
that humour is deeply engrained in the way we communicate, however, to make its 
relevance clear. Any one person’s daily life is probably strewn with instances of humour, 
such as jokes, puns, witticisms and any other accidental occurrences that one may find 
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humorous. When it comes to artistic production, authors from Mark Twain to P. G. 
Wodehouse are commonly referred to as humourists; stand-up comedians such as George 
Carlin and Lenny Bruce have been involved in some of the most controversial debacles 
concerning free speech of the 20
th
 century, and “satire” is quite consensually considered an 
essential genre in Western Literature (e.g. Gulliver’s Travels and Catch-22). It therefore 
seems relatively clear that humour, in both a social and an artistic dimension, plays an 
essential role, the nature of which many have tried to narrow down to one particular trait. 
According to Chris Barker, “[c]ulture is concerned with questions of shared social 
meanings, that is, the various ways we make sense of the world. However, meanings are 
not simply floating ‘out there’; rather, they are generated through signs, most notably those 
of language” (Barker, 2003: 7). Although humour is certainly not limited to language, it 
does seem deeply related to our sense of normalcy – to both thrive on and challenge our 
shared social meanings and, as Barker’s citation of Stuart Hall highlights: “the 
contradictory forms of common sense which have taken root in and helped to shape 
popular life” (Hall, 1996: 20). It is of course not clear what exactly humour does to 
individuals and societies. Maybe humour, even at its Hobbesian cruellest, can only help us 
further the species, as Nietzsche
1
 would remind us, perhaps by hurling injurious laughter at 
our shortcomings in order to correct them, in keeping with Bergson’s theory. Perhaps it is 
merely the stuff of joy which Max Beerbohm praised, or the expression of repressed 
desires Freud described in The Joke and its Relation to the Unconscious. Whatever its true 
role(s) may be, analysing humour means analysing how we react to our limitations as 
human beings, to each other, and to the fundamental awkwardness of human interaction. In 
this sense the subject is profoundly at home in Culture Studies.  
Clifford Geertz, writing within the context of ethnography, claimed that when 
producing work one should aim to achieve a “thick description” (cf. Geertz, 1973) of the 
subject at hand – one that recognises the many layers inherent in any observable 
phenomenon, as well as the many interpretations such a phenomenon may lend itself to. 
One of the aforementioned advantages of Culture Studies is the breadth of perspectives and 
subjects it encompasses and allows for. Humour, while the subject of a great wealth of 
                                                          
1
“Even the most harmful person may actually be the most useful when it comes to the preservation of the 
species, for he nurtures in himself or through his effects on others drives without which humanity would long 
since have become feeble or rotten. Hatred, delight in the misfortunes of others, the lust to rob and rule, and 
whatever else is called evil: all belong to the amazing economy of the preservation of the species,” 
(Nietzsche, 2001: 27). 
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analysis throughout history, is nevertheless not a traditional subject. It is also particularly 
complex, and one that clearly benefits from the contributions of a multitude of different 
fields: psychology, sociology, philosophy, biology, to name a few. While the scope of this 
dissertation cannot allow for the depth of analysis that an inquiry into the nature of humour 
requires, in the first half of my thesis I will attempt to move towards a thick description of 
humour that spans several different fields, in an effort to provide a well-rounded and 
critical approach to the current state of affairs of humour theory. In this sense a disclaimer 
is due: each of the many texts written about humour throughout history are not necessarily 
as systematic or dogmatic as their subsequent analyses may claim. Many are strewn with 
very well-rounded and far-reaching remarks about humour and its characteristics, rather 
than intend to give a single answer to the question of its nature. While it is impossible to 
give each of these authors their due credit in this dissertation, it is important to make this 
clear. 
In the second half of my thesis I will analyse three different works, highlighting the 
many roles which humour performs in each, as well as the particular characteristics they 
share: the fact that they were (mostly) written by white Englishmen in the early-to-late 20
th
 
century, and mainly, that they provide a humorous look at some of the most tragic aspects 
of the human condition. These works are a selection of three short-stories by Hector Hugh 
Munro (Saki): “Esmé”, “The Unrest-Cure” and “Tobermory”; the first instalment of 
Douglas Adams’s Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy series, and Monty Python’s Life of 
Brian. All of these evince our idiosyncratic relationship with ourselves and each other 
through relentless, uncompromising humour, as well as offer keen, existential insight, 
while at the same time inducing the comforting, pleasurable effect inherent in comedy. 
Together, they go a long way towards proving what is also the partial point of this thesis: 
that humour is deeply relevant and deeply serious. 
Before the analyses themselves, a brief methodological note is in order: while these 
works share similarities, as stated above, they differ in format: three are short stories 
penned by Saki (“Esmé”, “Tobermory”, “The Unrest-Cure”); one is a feature film by 
Monty Python, and the latter is a novel. Consequently, the methods used for analysing 
these works must naturally also differ. While Saki’s short-stories have a subtlety and 
intricacy of detail that absolutely require a close-reading, both Life of Brian and The 
Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy do not require such a detailed approach. For the purposes 
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of this thesis, the former will instead be interpreted with the aid of a laxer form of close-
reading adapted to visual artefacts, and the latter will be read chiefly for its themes, to the 
sacrifice of lengthy plot-exposition. 
 
1.1 Humour, Towards a Thick Description 
 
1.1.1 The origins of the word humour 
 
Etymologically, the word “humour” derives from the Old North French humour, which 
means liquid or dampness, and which itself has its origin in the Latin humor 
(Latin hūmor, ūmor moisture, fluid, bodily fluid or discharge, fluid in plants, sap, liquid, 
OED). In ancient and medieval physiology, what we may now refer to as physical and 
psychological health was thought to be indebted to the balance of the “four body fluids”: 
blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. An excessive quantity of any of these fluids 
would lead to physical ills and the adoption of a certain temperament: 
 
The Human body contains blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile. These are the 
things that make up its constitution and cause its pains and health. Health is primarily 
that state in which these constituent substances are in the correct proportion to each 
other, both in strength and quantity, and are well mixed. Pain occurs when one of the 
substances presents either a deficiency or an excess, or is separated in the body and 
not mixed with others. (Lloyd, 1983: 262) 
 
The theory of the four temperaments: phlegmatic, choleric, sanguine and melancholic, 
as devised by Hippocrates and developed by many scholars since (though considered 
pseudoscience today), provided us with a typology of temperaments, which were 
considered to derive from the proportion of these bodily fluids unique to each individual at 
any given time. It has been speculated that these temperaments themselves began to be 
referred to as “humours”, something which can today be observed in both the French 
(humeur) and Portuguese (humor) languages, for example.   
The term then grew to encompass something like what we would more commonly 
refer to as a “mood” today, which is frequently considered volatile, capricious or an 
indulgent mental disposition or temperament (OED: 15th cent.; the senses ‘temporary state 
of mind or feeling, mood, temper’ and ‘caprice, quirk’ appear to be attested later in French 
than in English: 1555 and 1614, respectively).  
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It is interesting to think how the word evolved into its current usage, which 
generally refers to a broad spectre of comic phenomena. In his Humour: A Very Short 
Introduction, Noël Carroll provides an explanation which, although simple, nevertheless 
sheds some light on this evolution: 
 
‘[H]umour’ became associated with the idea of a person whose temperament deviates 
from the norm. Such people were regarded as eccentric; by the 16
th
 century they were 
seen as ridiculous and, thereby, a fit subject for mimicking by comic actors. As a 
result, ‘humour’ evolved into what humourists did. (Carroll, 2014: 5) 
 
This position is of course partially influenced by Carroll’s own thoughts on the 
nature of humour, and by the theory of incongruity in particular, about which more will be 
said further below. However, it does make a point which seems consensual to most modern 
and historical thinkers who have expressed their views on the nature of the concept: 
humour is very closely related to the unusual – to the unordinary. Whether or not it has to 
do with what is empirically unusual is another matter, but it does seem to be keenly related 
to perceiving something as such. The idea that people who are dominated by their moods 
are ridiculous and comical can be traced back to Plato in Philebus, through the voice of 
Socrates: “[the ridiculous] is always a failing, one that takes its name from a state of 
character, and is that specific form of failing with the characteristic quite opposed to what 
the oracle at Delphi recommends” (Plato, 1975: 47). It follows that someone is ridiculous if 
they do not “know themselves”. People who are excessively choleric, for example, can be 
said to, on occasion, be “beside themselves” or to have “forgotten themselves”. This 
generally means that they are not acting in accordance to exterior perceptions of who they 
are or should be. It is perhaps in this sense that we can make a connection between being 
dominated by one’s mood and being ridiculous or humorous. 
Having established the possible etymological origin of the word, however, it is 
nevertheless important to clarify what I will be referring to when talking about humour. 
Many of the essential texts on the subject, such as Freud’s Jokes and their Relation to the 
Unconscious and Bergson’s Le Rire, do not deal explicitly with the word “humour” as the 
main subject of analysis. Even when referring to humour, the authors’ usage of the word 
may still be somewhat on the etymological path between the humour of the ancients and 




In the eighteenth century [humour] had a much more restricted meaning. Writers 
conventionally treated wit and humour as distinctly different phenomena. Wit 
involved playing with ideas or words, whereas humour occurred when the object of 
the laughter was a person. The word ‘humour’ derived from the psychological 
terminology of the age. The ‘humours’ were the bodily fluids whose admixtures 
supposedly provided people with their individual temperaments. A ‘humorist’ was not 
originally a comical writer but a person with an extreme character that seemed to 
comprise a single humour rather than a balance of various humours. (Billig, 2005: 61-
62) 
 
Vestiges of these (and other) differences between wit and humour remain in both of 
the early 20
th
 century works mentioned above, much like in most of the ones that came 
before them. There is, of course, an incommensurable richness to the shapes that humour 
can assume and to the amount of different things one may find funny. Dealing with each of 
them separately would be extraneous to this thesis, however. For its purposes, humour will 
be considered an umbrella term for all other concepts which it is closely related to, but 
which it has been differentiated from in the past. Concepts such as: wit, jokes, comedy, 
slapstick, irony, sarcasm, dark humour, invective, raillery, etc. will all be grouped under 
the banner of humour. This is not to say that they are not different things – they are, and 
some of their unique properties will be discussed, but only in passing, and not in a way 
which could truly do them justice. Kierkegaard famously wrote his doctoral thesis on the 
subject of irony; in order to get closer to the heart of each of these ramifications of humour, 
if one can consider them as such, a doctoral dissertation for each would certainly be the 
bare minimum. Another purpose is at stake here: that of tackling the relevance and 
characteristics of “that which is funny.” 
 
1.1.2 Humour and Laughter 
 
An easy way to define humour would be through its association with laughter; 
where there is humour there is usually laughter, and vice-versa. The possibility that 
laughter is a sufficient condition for the existence of humour could prove immensely 
valuable: 
 
Laughter deserves that much attention because it is an important clue to the presence 
of the feeling. The feeling itself is a subjective, internal experience that cannot be 
observed directly by anyone except the person experiencing it. Laughter, on the other 
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hand, can be observed by other people, and so it provides public evidence that the 
feeling is there. (Chafe, 2007: 2) 
  
 The presence of laughter, in short, could potentially be decisive when it comes to 
classifying something as humorous by providing unequivocal, observable evidence. Humour could 
be, in that sense, simply defined as “that which provokes laughter”. However, and particularly as 
of recent, scholars have questioned the strength of laughter’s ties to this subjective, internal 
experience, or “comic amusement,” in Noël Carrol’s terminology (see below): 
 
When theorists have studied humour, they often assumed that laughter was either a 
necessary or a sufficient condition of humor. It is neither. Although humorous events 
usually evoke laughter, they do not do so invariably. Humor may evoke smiles or 
smirks which fall short of laugher. Thus it is not a necessary condition. Nor is it a 
sufficient condition. People may laugh because they are uncomfortable (nervous 
laughter), they may laugh at someone (derisive laughter), they may laugh because they 
are insane or mentally imbalanced (hysterical laughter) or they may laugh because 
they are physiologically induced to do so (as when someone tickles them relentlessly) 
(Lafollette, Shanks, 1993: 329) 
 
The very existence of wit, sarcasm and irony, if one is to assume they are different 
forms of humour, could perhaps be the first significant dent in the laugher-argument. These 
three forms of humour may provoke uproarious laughter, but more often than not will be of 
the subtler kind, and may only elicit contented smiles or smirks. In The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, Lord Henry Wotton describes Lady Brandon as a “peacock in everything but 
beauty” (Wilde, 1997: 9); in his autobiography, Memoirs of a Professional Cad, George 
Sanders, after observing that many actors differ from their onscreen personas, writes: “I 
mention all the foregoing examples merely in order to make it easier for you to understand 
that whereas on the screen I am invariably a sonofabitch, in life I am a dear, dear boy” 
(Sanders, 2015 :73); while it is possible to laugh out loud at these quotes, the reaction most 
expected is closer to a smile or a faint snigger. This, along with the fact that laughter has 
causes other than humour (tickling, nitrous oxide, hysterical laughter), would of course 
indicate that laughter is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition of humour.  
A strict definition of what laughter is and is not can perhaps do more harm than good 
to this discussion, however. While it is easy to see that one will not always laugh when one 
finds something funny, Lafollette and Shanks’ observation that humour may “evoke smiles 
and smirks which fall short of laughter” (Lafollette, Shanks, 1993: 329) seems to recognise 
that there tends to be a physical reaction to humour.  
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In The Importance of Not Being Earnest, Wallace Chafe claims that laughing 
expresses a feeling of “nonseriousness” which may have origins other than humour, but 
nevertheless seems to underlie it. His argument is deeply steeped in biology: he begins by 
observing that the act of laughter, which he claims is “parasitic on breathing” (Chafe, 
2007: 17), happens primarily in the vocal tract and “consists of sudden, spasmodic 
expulsions of air from the lungs, and those expulsions often have significantly greater force 
than those found in either breathing or speaking” (Chafe, 2007: 17). The physical 
properties of laugher, what laughter makes our body do, Chafe claims, is deeply tied to this 
feeling of nonseriousness:  
 
The thesis of this book is that laughter hinders the person who is laughing from 
performing serious physical or mental activity. Laughter is physically disruptive. Not 
only does it interfere with breathing, it destroys the rigidity of the torso that is 
necessary for various physical acts. It makes sense that feeling nonserious should be 
associated with physical disablement. Furthermore, the fact that laughter is audible, 
especially when it is voiced, lets others know that the person laughing is indeed 
experiencing this feeling, so that it contagiously elicits the same feeling in them as 
well. Laughter, in short, is a hindrance to physical activity and simultaneously a 
communicative sign that the laugher is experiencing the emotional state with which 
we are concerned. (Chafe, 2007: 23) 
 
It seems to follow that, among other things, laughter is partially responsible for the 
feeling of pleasurable lightness or relaxation one generally associates with humour, as well 
as for humour’s social aspect (see below). Even when laughter stricto sensu is not 
concerned, but instead smiling or smirking are present, these too can be said to contribute 
to the same result: 
 
If happiness is a basic component of the feeling of nonseriousness, smiling serves to 
express that component. In many cases it is the only component of nonseriousness that 
is publicly observable, so long as the feeling fails to rise to a threshold where it 
produces overt laughter. (Chafe, 2007: 54) 
 
There is the possibility, as Chafe himself seems to conclude above, that in the face of 
humour smiling is merely the first stage of a reaction which, at its strongest, culminates in 
overt laughter. This would allow us to ascribe smiling and laughing to the same physical 
reaction, albeit with different intensities, which would in turn lead to the conclusion that 
laughter may not be a sufficient condition for the existence of humour, but is nevertheless a 
necessary one. While this aspect is far too complex to be adequately explored in this 
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dissertation, it provides an important premise for the understanding of humour: that 
laughter is certainly deeply – almost inexorably – related to humour, and that humour is 
thus deeply related to characteristics associated with laughter, such as lightness, pleasure 
and play. Another important point which the relationship between laughter and humour 
foreshadows, to be explored below, is the latter’s relation to the body. 
Laughter is not a sufficient condition for the presence of humour. This begs the 
question: is there one sufficient condition for the presence of humour? Wittgenstein was 
clearly sceptical of the possibility of finding the true nature of any linguistic concept, 
illustrating this with the aid of the rope metaphor:  
 
And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs 
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. But if someone 
wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions—namely the 
disjunction of all their common properties"—I should reply: Now you are only 
playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole 
thread— namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres. (Wittgenstein, 1986: 32) 
 
I agree with Wittgenstein in this respect. I do not intend to find the “nature” of the 
concept of humour: firstly because that is not the purpose of this dissertation; secondly 
because it is a task that far exceeds my abilities, and thirdly because I am not sure there is 
one. What I believe exists and intend to examine is Wittgenstein’s “complicated network 
of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes 
similarities of detail” (ibid.: 32) between the phenomena we find funny, in order to shed 
light on the “state of the art” of humour studies and the phenomenon itself; but more than 
that, on why we find certain things funny: on what we are thinking (assuming, as most 
have, that there is a cognitive aspect involved), when we find something funny. This is 
what I believe will provide us with a thick description of humour. The conclusions will 
then influence the analysis of the humorous objects indicated above.  
 
1.1.3 Comic Amusement 
 
So what is this state which is induced by humour that tends to manifest itself through 
laughter? Noël Carroll defines it as “comic amusement” (Carroll, 2014: 1) – amusement: 
“5. The pleasurable occupation of the attention, or diversion of the mind (from serious 
duties, etc.); passing from a. (in early use) Idle time-wasting diversion, or 
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entertainment; through b. (generally) Recreation, relaxation, the pleasurable action upon 
the mind of anything light and cheerful; to c. (esp.) Pleasant excitement of the risible 
faculty by anything droll or grotesque, tickling of the fancy.” (OED). A connection with 
laughter remains, but there is more to it: does comic amusement provoke laughter, or does 
laughter provoke comic amusement? Does one, when finding something funny, feel 
“comically amused” and then proceed to express this by laughing? It is best, I think, to 
leave this matter unresolved, and instead merely recognise that when witnessing something 
humorous multiple things happen: most characteristically, one feels a certain degree of 
pleasure, which points towards Wallace Chafe’s use of “happiness” and “nonseriousness”. 
As per Noël Carrol: 
 
[T]here is, nevertheless, at least typically in creatures like us, a palpable feeling of 
lightness, a tendency to quicken and then relax. It involves at least a psychological 
feeling of being unburdened – of tightening up (as in ‘uptight´) in the face of a 
potential difficulty, and then letting go. (Carroll, 2014: 58) 
 
This description, while apt in its solemnity, is missing a certain much needed touch 
of enthusiasm which, I believe, expresses the joy of laughter or comic amusement:  
 
There is laughter that goes so far as to lose all touch with its motive, and to exist only, 
grossly, in itself. This is laughter at its best. A man to whom such laughter has often 
been granted may happen to die in a workhouse. No matter. I will not admit that he 
has failed in life. (Beerbohm, 1921: 42) 
 
I have up to this point been referring to nonseriousness on par with comic 
amusement for one reason only: it highlights Chafe’s convincing argument that humour 
has at least an apparent levity to it – a touch of the playful tongue-in-cheek, as opposed to 
solemn earnestness. However, comic amusement seems more appropriate than 
nonseriousness for the following reason: it is neutral. Nonseriousness suggests, much like 
Chafe literally does, that while under the spell of humour one cannot perform “serious 
physical or mental activity”. While laughter may be physically debilitating to an extent, 
humour and its perception are certainly not mindless affairs. “Nonseriousness” often 
suggests irrelevance, and this is exactly what is wrong with some academic and cultural 
discourse on humour: the idea that “drama” is serious and humour is not. Humour, I would 
suggest, much like John Cleese has (Cleese, 24:10-26:10), is very serious. It is, however, 
not solemn. Solemnity and seriousness are different things. As we will see in the analysis 
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of Saki’s short stories, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy and Monty Python’s Life of 
Brian, dealing with extremely serious subjects: namely death, misery and purposelessness 
is at the very heart of humour. Humour is not averse to making serious points – it simply 
does not do it solemnly. The difference between humour and solemnity is in that sense a 
matter of tone and not a matter of relevance. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
Kierkegaard writes of objective thinking and direct communication as invalid means to 
achieving an existential truth. He instead explores the alternate idea of “becoming 
subjective”
2
 as a means to achieving “the truth” through a practice of spiritual inwardness 
instead of abstract, objective thought: “[f]or subjective reflection the truth becomes 
appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the thing is precisely, in existing, to deepen 
oneself in subjectivity” (Kierkegaard, 2010: 161). While a matter such as this could seem 
by its very nature inimical to something as light-hearted as humour, Kierkegaard writes 
that “[h]umour is the last stage in existence-inwardness before faith” (ibid.: 244), and that 
“an existing humorist is the closest approximation to one who is religious” (ibid.: 375). 
This is because, Kierkegaard claims, “the humorist grasps suffering’s meaning in relation 
to existence but he does not grasp the meaning of suffering. But it is then that the humorist 
makes the treacherous turn, revoking the suffering in the form of jest” (ibid.). While the 
religious man understands, Kierkegaard seems to suggest, that the nature of existence is 
pain and then chooses to endure it; the humourist instead recognises the inevitable 
suffering and seeks relief in humour: “[i]n the pain, he touches the secret of existence, but 
then he goes back home” (ibid.). For those of us who do not believe in God, and thus 
cannot easily conceive of a religious, existential purpose behind a lifetime of suffering, 
perhaps humour is the last stage of this existence-inwardness: the last stage when it comes 
to knowing ourselves – to the truths of inwardness and subjectivity. This seems as 
traditionally serious an effect as any. 
Another crucial point about comic amusement lies in Noël Carroll’s discussion of 
whether or not it is an emotion or a feeling. The author attributes several characteristics to 
the concept of “emotion”, namely: that it should provoke bodily alterations; have a formal 
object; be controllable to a degree; influence our cognition/mood; be “contagious”; require 
a belief and serve vital human interests. The discussion on the nature of emotions is 
lengthy and fraught with difficulty. The main concern lies in whether emotions are merely 
                                                          
2
 “[T]he highest task set for a human being” (ibid.: 107). 
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the by-products of physiological changes induced by external phenomena, or if they also 
include elements of cognition
3
. In order to strictly qualify comic amusement as an emotion, 
I would have to take a stand in this debate which, if not empirically backed, is merely 
semantical. I choose, then, not to proceed with this qualification, but instead to explore, 
like Noël Carroll, what the effects of humour are and what they express, whether or not it 
is an emotion.  
I have previously argued that whenever one perceives something as humorous, one 
will, to whatever extent, react physically to it. If this is true, then humour provokes a 
physiological change. However, the question remains if this act of perception involves 
cognition. For the time being, I think it is useful to claim that comic amusement involves 
both bodily alterations (in its inception or as a repercussion) and a cognitive evaluation of 
the humorous phenomenon. When Noël Fielding sings, while doing the corresponding 
dance: “I’m made of milk, you’re made of milk, we’re both made of milk, but we’re living 
in separate glasses” (Fielding, 6:12-6:21), it is not quite clear what we are laughing at. 
Milk, perhaps. It would be easier to attribute finding this humorous to a knee-jerk reaction 
– an automatism. However, when in his song “Leftovers” Jarvis Cocker sings “I met her in 
the museum of Palaeontology/And I make no bones about it” (Cocker, 0:15-0:25), the 
wordplay being somewhat straightforward, it is easier to point at the source of the humour 
– the idiom returning to its literality
4
. There is undeniably something cognitive in the 
recognition of wordplay. 
 The cognitive aspect of humour can in some cases perhaps be described as what 
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner referred to as “conceptual blending.” According to the 
authors, conceptual blending is not a feature unique to humour: 
 
We will focus especially on the nature of integration, and we will see it at work as a 
basic mental operation in language, art, action, planning, reason, choice, judgment, 
                                                          
3
While Noël Carroll seems to use “emotion” as a complex blend of mental and physical processes with the 
particularities mentioned above, other authors use the word differently, such as neuroscientist António 
Damásio: “[f]eelings are mental experiences that accompany a change in body state. External changes 
displayed in the exteroceptive maps of vision or hearing are perceived but largely not felt directly in the sense 
of feeling we adopt in this text. However, they may lead to feelings indirectly by triggering an action 
programme that causes a change in body state and is subsequently felt. […] Thus ‘fear’ can refer to either an 
emotion (the set of programmed physiological actions triggered by a fear-inducing stimulus) or a feeling (the 
conscious experience of fear)” (Damásio, Gil, 2013: 144). 
4
Even this instance, however, is more complicated than it seems. The wordplay itself is virtually skilless. 
However, Cocker’s self-deprecating persona (this is a man who entitled a collection of his lyrics “Mother, 




decision, humor, mathematics, science, magic and ritual, and the simplest mental 
events in everyday life. (Fauconnier, Turner, 2002: 15) 
 
However, the mere fact that it may also be at work in humour is a step towards 
recognition of its cognitive aspects. Comic amusement and laughter are certainly more or 
less immediate responses which leave little room for the existence of conscious 
forethought. In other words, we rarely have the time to sit down and go through why a joke 
is funny before evaluating it logically as such and then reacting accordingly. 
Notwithstanding, this does not necessarily imply that something equally immediate is not 
happening in our brains: the perception of a humorous blending of concepts, perhaps. But 
what exactly is conceptual blending? The process is aptly described as “invisible to 
consciousness” (ibid.: 18), and seems to encompass both the processes of metaphor and 
analogy. Conceptual blending at its most basic, according to Fauconnier and Turner, makes 
use of two different concepts and blends them, thus creating a third – a new reality.  Noël 
Fielding’s milk dance can, surprisingly, be interpreted as a parody of a “solemn” metaphor. 
He begins by saying that himself and a member of the audience are made of milk – an 
absurd statement, exacerbated by the accompanying physical gestures. After hearing and 
seeing this, the spectator does not expect a conclusion, but Noël then continues: “but we’re 
living in separate glasses.” We then realise that being made of milk became the premise of 
a metaphor whose inner workings are not much different than: “We are the hollow 
men/We are the stuffed men/Leaning together/Headpiece filled with straw” (Eliot, 1962: 
79). We are being told that two people are made of milk but are living in separate glasses. 
This means that something stands between them. On one level, this is a metaphor for 
loneliness or for the impossibility of true communication. However, it is also funny, which 
adds other layers to it – it deflates the medium by parodying the solemn metaphor while 
also providing us with the humbling prospect of being comparable to two glasses of milk.  
 Within his taxonomy of joke-techniques, Freud includes the metaphor. It is not 
immediately clear to him, he claims, whether or not there is a different mechanism in place 
other than the ones he had previously mentioned. Nevertheless, some of the metaphors 
which he analyses bear similarities to Jarvis Cocker and Noël Fielding’s contraptions. The 
first of these is Lichtenberg’s assertion that “[i]t is almost impossible to carry the torch of 
truth through a crowd without singeing someone’s beard” (Freud, 2002: 71). The 
humorous element is similar to Jarvis Cocker’s “Museum of Paleontology” joke in the 
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sense that it consists in using a well-known idiom literally, thus toying with the hearer’s 
expectations: “[w]hile we scarcely notice the metaphor in ‘the torch of truth’ any longer, in 
Lichtenberg’s version it is restored to its full original force, for he builds on it further and 
draws a conclusion from it” (Freud, 2002: 71-72). However, as Freud himself remarked, 
the torch of truth is a clichéd metaphor, which is what allows the hearer to form 
expectations regarding its meaning. It is the logical, but unexpected conclusion that 
Lichtenberg derives from the literal aspect of the expression that makes it humorous. This, 
Freud describes as a separate technique of the joke: “[t]aking faded phrases in their full 
meaning” (Freud, 2002: 72). In Noël Fielding’s case, what we have is a new metaphor – 
we are milk poured into separate glasses.  
Another of Lichtenberg’s quotes: “[i]t is a pity that we cannot see into the entrails of 
writers’ learning to find out what they have eaten,” which I can only presume must have 
been funnier in German, bears more of a similarity to the milk metaphor; first because of 
what Freud describes as a “representation by means of absurdity” (ibid.: 72) or rather, 
because “entrails of learning” is an unusual metaphor, much like the milk one; and second, 
because they have “[a] characteristic that is not to be found in all good, i.e., apt metaphors. 
They are to a large extent ‘degrading’ […] they juxtapose a thing from a high category, an 
abstraction […] with something very concrete, and itself of a low sort” (ibid.: 74). This 
remark is of course greatly influenced by Alexander Bain’s claim that the cause of laughter 
is “the degradation, direct or indirect, of some person or interest – something associated 
with power, dignity, or gravity” (Bain, 1888: 250), and Herbert Spencer’s observation that 
“[l]aughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares transferred from great 
things to small – only when there is what we may call a descending incongruity” (Spencer, 
1904: 7570), about which more will be said below.  
In both “the entrails of learning” and “I’m made of milk, you’re made of milk, we’re 
both made of milk but we’re living in separate glasses,” we understand the grim, 
metaphorical meaning but we cannot exactly let go of the fact that we are talking about 
entrails and milk, so the metaphor becomes awkward to the point of being a parody of the 
medium: 
 
We also find ourselves moved to laughter by an overstraining of wit, by bringing 
resemblances from subjects of a quite different kind from the subject to which they are 
compared. When we see, instead of the easiness, and natural resemblance, which 
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constitutes true wit, a forced straining of a likeness, our laughter is apt to arise”. 
(Hutcheson, 1973: 110) 
 
 Having said this, whether it is conscious or not, it seems that the cognitive aspect of 
comic amusement is difficult to deny. In the “Museum of Paleontology” joke this is 
apparent – we clearly understand what Cocker is doing while finding it funny. In examples 
such as these, finding something humorous almost seems akin to puzzle solving: we are 
consciously aware of X, and this X makes us laugh. The following limerick is illustrative 
of this fact:  
 
A man hired by John Smith & Co. 
Loudly declared he would tho 
Man that he saw 
Dumping dirt near his store. 
The drivers, therefore, didn’t do. (Clapham, Gray, 2009: 101) 
 
 It only becomes possible to utter a muffled squeal of self-satisfied laughter once the 
reader understands that “tho” and “do” should be read like “Co.”, which is the abbreviation 
for Company. The result is then: 
 
A man hired by John Smith & Company 
Loudly declared he would thump any 
Man that he saw 
Dumping dirt near his store. 
The drivers, therefore, didn’t dump any. (ibid.) 
 
The realization that this is what lies beneath the façade of the earlier format, 
however, is what lends it its admittedly unfashionable humour. This is undeniably 
cognitive, and seems to be consciously so. 
 In other situations, like Noël Fielding’s “Milk Dance”, we certainly laugh without a 
clear notion of what we are laughing at. However, especially if we can claim that 
conceptual blending is afoot, this does not necessarily mean that the joke’s many facets did 
not strike us simultaneously and unconsciously. The fact that we can, at the cost of some of 
its humour, deconstruct the joke and find hidden mechanisms common to other jokes 
within it shows us that there is, even in these cases, something cognitive to humour. 
  




Comic amusement, in its mixture of cognition and physicality, is subjective in the 
sense that it relies heavily on an individual’s experience of it; on their perception of 
something as humorous. On this subject, Hugh Lafollette and Niall Shanks, whose theory 
of humour relates it deeply to belief, have written: 
 
Humour is inherently relational – no event, person or thing is intrinsically humorous. 
It is context dependent. It depends upon the circumstances, the teller (if there is one), 
the current beliefs of the listeners (or viewers), and the relationship (if any) between 
the teller and the listener. (Lafollette, Shanks, 1993: 332) 
 
 The variables are tremendous. Without delving too much into the nature of humour 
yet, one can immediately understand this. There is no single instance of humour which, 
decontextualized, will always retain its “funniness”, just like there is nothing which will 
consistently remain unfunny regardless of context. This has a lot to do with, among other 
things, the subject matter of the joke. It is particularly easy to understand when applied, for 
instance, to topical jokes from the past: “why aren't there any good jokes about the 
Jonestown, Guyana mass murder-suicide? The punchlines are too long.”
5
 If we happen not 
to know that the Jonestown massacre, otherwise known as the Kool-Aid massacre, 
consisted in the deaths of over nine-hundred people through the drinking of poisoned 
Kool-Aid, a fruit punch, the joke is impossible to understand. 
 Comic amusement does not depend solely on the presence of a funny joke, 
however. There are, as per Lafollette and Shanks, other variables which may influence the 
listener of a joke and prevent him from experiencing comic amusement, namely: the mood 
of the listener and his relation to the content of the joke. This poses a complicated problem 
for a thesis which must occasionally resort to examples of humour: if humour is so 
inherently context dependent, there is a great chance that the reader will not find said 
examples funny, and if that is the case, understanding my point may become all too 
difficult. However, while one can hardly speak of any kind of objectivity when it comes to 
instances of humour, there seems to be a certain glimmer of transversality to it; one rooted 
in our inevitable common ground as human beings. 
At the outset of his examination of the techniques of humour, Freud observes that 
the humour resides in the way the joke is worded and not necessarily in the thought behind 
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 This joke is scattered across the Internet. I was unable to find its true origin. 
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it. He proves his point by rewording the jokes into longer, more explicative versions which 
tend to lose all of their humour – by, in his words, “reducing” them. For example, Herr. N, 
a famous wit of Freud‘s time, once remarked of someone: “I travelled tête-a-bête with 
him” which Freud renders into both “I travelled tête-a-tête with X., and X. is a stupid ass” 
and “I travelled tête-a-tête with that stupid ass X” (Freud, 2002:  19), which in this context 
read not necessarily as humour, but as mere insults. While it is hasty to claim that the 
thought behind a humorous statement need not be funny, Freud makes an extremely 
relevant point: form is absolutely essential to humour. It is for this reason that he decided 
to launch into a catalogue of joke techniques, and it is for this reason that there may be a 
glimmer of transversality to be found in humour – if there are joke mechanisms, then this 
surely means that we tend to find something funnier if it is worded or delivered this or that 
way. The limerick format is a particularly good example: while its rhyming scheme may 
not have necessarily been created for the purposes of humour
6
, it has since been shown to 
be singularly suited to that purpose.  
When it comes to the actual subject of a joke, however, there is a particular rule of 
thumb that, while not necessarily dictating that a joke is funny, is an important 
characteristic of humour: “emotional detachment” – what Bergson referred to as 
“l’insensibilité qui accompagne d’ordinaire le rire” (Bergson, 1969: 3) and “une anesthésie 
momentanée du coeur” (ibid.: 4): 
 
Essayez, un moment, de vous intéresser à tout ce qui se dit et à tout ce qui se fait, 
agissez, en imagination, avec ceux qui agissent, sentez avec ceux qui sentent, donnez 
enfin à votre sympathie son plus large épanouissement : comme sous un coup de 
baguette magique vous verrez les objets les plus légers prendre du poids, et une 
coloration sévère passer sur toutes choses. Détachez-vous maintenant, assistez à la vie 




In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard claims that “[f]rom the point of 
view of pathos, a single second has infinite value; viewed comically, 10,000 years are but a 
                                                          
6
 “While the limerick is a largely Anglo-American phenomenon, it is sometimes claimed that the first 
limerick was composed by Italian philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274)” (Clapham, 
Gray, 2009: 7). 
7
 An opinion voiced earlier by Schopenhauer: “If we turn from contemplating the world as a whole, and, in 
particular, the generations of men as they live their little hour of mock-existence and then are swept away in 
rapid succession; if we turn from this, and look at life in its small details, as presented, say, in a comedy, how 
ridiculous it all seems! It is like a drop of water seen through a microscope, a single drop teeming 
with infusoria; or a speck of cheese full of mites invisible to the naked eye. How we laugh as they bustle 
about so eagerly, and struggle with one another in so tiny a space! And whether here, or in the little span of 
human life, this terrible activity produces a comic effect” (Schopenhauer, 1908: 39, italics in the original). 
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foolish trick” (Kierkegaard, 2009: 78). This is the kind of detachment that a comic 
perspective provides us with: it allows us to observe a situation with a certain emotional 
detachment. This does not mean, of course, that we feel nothing when laughing – this 
would be simplistic. Carroll, referring to Bergson’s “anesthésie momentanée du coeur,” 
addresses this as follows:  
 
Yet I do not think that this should be understood to mean that comic amusement is 
altogether alien to emotion, but only that certain emotions – such as sympathy – are 
disengaged either by distracting our attention away from that which might enlist our 
sympathies for the characters in question, or by de-emphasising the apparent degree of 
danger and/or pain that threatens them, or by portraying them as antipathetic, or by 
portraying them as other-than-normal humans, such as clowns and, therefore, not 
subject to the injuries to which flesh is heir. (Carrol, 2014: 30) 
 
In short, humour relies somewhat on its abilities to distract us from the depths of an 
individual’s suffering – it does not intend to make us fear for them, as Noël Carroll 
observes. The Monty Python sketch “Sam Peckinpagh’s Salad Days” (cf. Monty Python, 
2016) is perhaps the best example of this. The jaunty scenery is peopled by characters so 
stereotypically upper class and buoyant that one cannot help but feel they are not real 
people such as oneself. When the sheer sunniness ultimately becomes an accidental 
massacre, during which getting hit by a tennis ball in the eye makes Michael Palin’s 
character squirt blood out of his socket and accidentally impale a lady with a tennis racket, 
we are not thinking about the repercussions of this terrible event on the characters and their 
families – this is because they are not real, but more than that, they are not meant to be 
realistic, so the element of danger is not strong enough to inhibit our comic amusement
8
. 
Our attention is being instead drawn from their humanity to the contrast between the tone 
of the setting and its characters, to the deflating of the medium by frustrating our 
expectations of how a scene like that generally pans out. There is, of course, perhaps a 
subtext as well: these settings are usually safe and cheery because upper class people tend 
to be isolated and sheltered from true dangers. By upsetting the scene this radically in the 
violent manner of Sam Peckinpagh’s Westerns, Monty Python are also evincing this. What 
they were not doing was inspiring fear (a mainstay of horror) and compassion in the public. 
The underlying theme, in fact, seems to be the idea that Sam Peckinpagh, even when 
                                                          
8
 This explains why we might laugh when, outside the realm of fiction, someone truly hurts themselves, but 
would be less inclined to if it were clear that their health was truly in danger. 
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directing an uncharacteristically sunny Edwardian period film, cannot help but switch to a 
tone he is more familiar with – explicit violence. 
A parody of this very characteristic of humour can be found in another Python sketch 
typically referred to as “The Man Who Makes People Laugh” (cf. Monty Python, 2009). 
The sketch explores the middling misery of an ordinary man whose every sentence makes 
people burst into uncontrollable fits of laughter. There are perhaps only two ways in which 
this distance is created: through rendering the man as stereotypically ordinary and middle-
class as possible (bowler hat, glasses, moustache, etc.) and through the hysterical laughter 
of the others. The notoriously social influence of laughter – its “infectious” side – works 
wonderfully, along with the oddity of the premise: it seems absurd that the man should be 
hilarious, but we laugh, and we end up laughing at his and his family’s outright misery and 
downfall. 
Other comedies thrive especially on engendering a character’s downfall, prompting 
us to laugh at how consistently cruel life can be to one particular character. Louis C.K.’s 
Louie is an example: a video promoting the first series depicted a desperate Louis C.K. 
visiting a pornographer for a heart-wrenching purpose: his career is failing and he wants a 
last shot at making some money in order to provide for his daughters. A viable solution 
seems to be making a gruesome pornographic video that exploits his minor celebrity status. 
The antics the pornographer then suggests putting Louis through in order to fulfil his wish 
become systematically worse and worse, while he finds himself unable to say no because 
he wants to provide for his children. In the end, he manages to refuse doing the video, but 
only because he receives a call telling him he has succeeded in securing a new show: 
Louie. As he leaves, the pornographer says “he’ll be back” (cf. C.K, 2009). The outcome is 
bleak, yet the humour is clear, and it lies in the exaggeratedly awful things the fictional 
Louis will have to be put through if he wants to make a decent living. However, the 
detachment does not necessarily reach the point of indifference. The humour lies partially 
in our empathy for Louis and in his self-deprecation, about which more will be said below. 
A degree of detachment can then be said to be a transversal feature of humour: it must be 
somewhat imbued within the technique of the “joke”, and if the listener is for some reason 
particularly emotionally invested in its subject, he may not perceive it as funny. 
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 Freud’s aforementioned taxonomy of joke techniques is yet another step in the 
direction of transversality
9
. While, as it often happens with categorisations, it may not be 
all encompassing, and while the categories themselves may be questionable, they 
nevertheless provide valuable insight into the inner workings of shaping a thought into a 
joke, thus shedding light on the transversal aspects of humour. Freud divides his joke 
techniques into several broad categories which are then subsequently divided into various 
subcategories.  
The first broad category is “condensation”. Behind it lies the Shakespearian adage: 
“brevity is the soul of wit” (Shakespeare, 1996: 682). Freud observes that there is a 
tendency towards brevity and “economisation” in some humour, resorting to a quote by 
Theodor Lipps: “[t]he joke says what it says, not always in a few, but always in too few 
words, that is, in words which in strict logic or in the ordinary way of thinking and 
speaking are not sufficient to say it. It is ultimately able to say it outright, by not saying it 
at all” (apud Freud, 2002: 7). 
 The mechanism of condensation is the culmination of an idea of economisation or 
brevity. The fundamental ways in which it works, according to Freud, are the following: 
through fusing two words together, thus deriving a third (eg. the alcoholidays), or by 
modifying an expression slightly in order to change its original meaning (eg. “vanity is one 
of his four Achilles’ heels”). Freud calls these processes “condensation with formation of a 
composite word” and “condensation with slight modification,” but finally acknowledges 
that “[b]oth the formation of a composite word and modification are subordinate to the 
concept of substitute-formation, and, if we wish, we can also describe the composite 
formation as a modification of the basic word by the second element” (ibid.: 21). Freud 
then goes on to give us particular examples of condensation, such as plays on words, 
double entendres or puns. 
 It is when veering from the broad technique of condensation into others that 
distinctions become more difficult to make, with Freud often acknowledging that there is a 
great fluidity in these categories. Bearing this in mind, it seems only appropriate to share a 
few of what seem like the most distinct categories from the idea of brevity and 
condensation. The first is perhaps the idea of “displacement”. One of the examples of 
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 Bergson too, in Le Rire, gives several examples of humorous “mechanisms”, in a much more literal, 




displacement which Freud provides is the “salmon mayonnaise joke”, a classic joke with 
apparent Jewish origins:  
 
An impoverished man borrowed 25 florins from a well-to-do acquaintance, assuring 
him at some length of his distress. On the very same day, his patron comes upon him 
in a restaurant with a plate of salmon with mayonnaise before him. He reproaches 
him: “What, you borrow money from me, and then you go and order salmon with 
mayonnaise. That’s what you used my money for?” “I don’t get it,” answers the 
accused, “when I’ve got no money I can’t eat salmon with mayonnaise; when I’ve got 
money, I mustn’t eat salmon with mayonnaise, So tell me, when can I eat salmon with 
mayonnaise”.(apud ibid.: 41-42, italics in the original) 
 
 The technique of displacement, Freud argues, is the first where the actual thought 
behind the form is evidently the source of the humour: “we have seen that a displacement 
joke is to a large extent independent of its linguistic expression. It does not depend on 
words, but on the train of thought” (ibid.: 43). This, Freud argues, is because the only way 
to convey the joke’s meaning without using its original form is to have the subject reply to 
the question directly. The displacement lies in the impoverished man’s apparent train of 
thought: he cannot see, or is taking advantage of that fact, that while it is logical that he 
should be able to have salmon mayonnaise if he can pay for it, it is not appropriate for him 
to buy a rich man’s meal with money he has borrowed from someone under the pretext of 
being in dire straits. Referring to this very joke, Freud remarks that what is happening is 
the covering up of a “flaw in thinking” (ibid.: 49) by cobbling together an “appearance of 
logic” (ibid.: 51) which makes apparent sense but fails to apply to the situation at hand. 
 By contrast, Freud mentions the technique of absurdity, which puts before us a 
piece of apparent nonsense wherein lies some actual sense: Noël Fielding’s milk song 
could be an example, as mentioned above. Freud’s most illustrative example, perhaps, 
would be that of the army officer who chides a lazy soldier: “Issy, you are no good for us. 
I’ll give you some advice. Buy yourself a cannon and make yourself independent,” (ibid.: 
48). Interpreted literally the idea is absurd, but one quickly realises that the officer is only 
showing Issy an impossibly exaggerated version of a solution to his sloth, which is 
compromising his service and affecting the army. The “flaw in thinking” is here only 
apparent, it can only be deemed as such if the remark is taken literally. 
 Displacement, in its many forms, seems to play on an element of apparent or real 
flaws in thought. Freud gives several examples of Schadchen (marriage-broker) jokes. 
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They almost always consist of an unwilling man, an unattractive prospective bride and a 
very insistent marriage broker who either refuses to concede that the marriage is not very 
advantageous to the point of absurdity, or is somehow tripped up by his own stubbornness 
due to a slip of the tongue. Freud refers to these jokes in particular as boasting “sophistical 
flaw[s]” (ibid.: 53). In one of the jokes, a marriage broker attempts to convince a man that 
he is better off marrying a woman with one leg shorter than the other, because this way he 
will never have to worry about a healthy wife somehow having an accident and becoming 
disabled – his crippled prospective wife is, he claims, already “ready-made.” In another of 
the jokes the man complains that his prospective bride’s mother is malicious and stupid 
and that her daughter is old, ugly and poor. The broker convinces him that all these 
apparent flaws are irrelevant, until the man mentions that the woman is also hunchbacked, 
to which the broker replies: “Now what are you after? So she’s not to have a single fault?” 
(ibid.: 52). In these stories, Freud claims: 
 
A person who has reacted the same way several times in succession continues this 
way of speaking on the next occasion too, where it becomes incongruous and 
contradicts their intentions. They are failing to adapt to the requirements of the 
situation, succumbing to automatic habit. (ibid.: 55) 
 
We must not forget that Freud’s work refers specifically to joke techniques, although 
“joke”, having been translated from Witz, should be interpreted in the broadest sense of the 
word – “humour” is the object of a shorter essay from 1927, which I will later discuss. 
However, if one considers the “joke” as inherently belonging to the broad spectre of 
humour, and it would be particularly strange not to, it is only natural to find the techniques 
behind their creation relevant towards remarking that there are transversal elements to 
humour. Freud’s reference to the exposure of an automatism evinces this: “[t]he exposure 
of psychic automatism belongs to the technique of the comic, as every [act of] unmasking 
or self-betrayal does” (ibid.: 56). Freud mentions this in order to admit he has not found the 
particular essence of “the joke”, but instead an array of characteristics which are difficult 
to define and separate. These characteristics and the specific mention of automatism are 
nevertheless what is truly valuable towards finding the aforementioned glimmer of 
transversality in humour: they suggest that Freud has read Bergson’s 1901 essay Le Rire, 
which he acknowledges and I will later discuss. Freud’s use of the word incongruity will 
also prove a valuable segue into the next subchapter.  
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Finally, Freud mentions two other mechanisms: “representation by the opposite” and 
“indirect representation”. Briefly, the purest instance of the first is perhaps irony; it 
consists of “the replacement of the appropriate ‘no’ by a ‘yes’” (ibid.: 61). Indirect 
representation, however, is more intricate, but can be boiled down to the general category 
of the simile. 
There is yet another hint at transversality to be mentioned. While Freud at first 
rejects the importance of the subject matter of the joke as essential to its comic value, his 
later division of jokes into “innocuous jokes” and “tendentious jokes” leads him to say 
otherwise: “[s]ometimes the joke is an end in itself and serves no particular purpose; at 
others it does put itself in the service of such a purpose; it becomes tendentious. Only the 
joke that has a tendency or intentions run the risk of coming up against persons who do not 
want to listen to it” (ibid.: 87, emphasis in the original). According to Freud, tendentious 
jokes are par excellence either hostile jokes or obscene jokes (ibid.: 94). These jokes, 
Freud claims, are the ones that provoke the strongest reaction – both positive and negative: 
 
The pleasurable effect of an innocuous joke is mostly a moderate one; a distinctly 
agreeable feeling, a slight smile, is usually all it is able to provoke in the listener, and 
part of this effect can probably be put down to thought-content, as we have seen in 
appropriate examples […]. An un-tendentious joke scarcely ever achieves those 
sudden outbursts of laughter that make tendentious jokes so irresistible. As the 
technique can be the same in both, we may find the suspicion stirring that a 
tendentious joke has sources of pleasure at its disposal – by virtue of its tendency – to 
which innocuous jokes have no access. (ibid.: 93-94) 
 
The motive behind Freud’s observation will be discussed further below. For now, 
however, it will suffice to say that there seems to be a tendency for jokes with a 
controversial or taboo subject matter to elicit a stronger response – whether or not making 
something ruder or more controversial is the recipe for humour –: “[i]n general, it has also 
been found that people will enjoy jokes more about taboo topics than about non-taboo ones 
[…]” (Billig, 2005: 158). As well as revelling in a number of successful instances of joke 
techniques, it seems that people tend to enjoy jokes which deal with taboo topics.  
Lastly, if humour is deeply context dependent, a more glaring cross-cultural 
approach would perhaps be the best way to discover if there is anything to an idea of 
transversality. It was in an effort to provide this approach that Chafe investigated instances 
of humour in the Navajo, Iroquois, Chinese and Japanese cultures. He found that in the 
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Navajo, Iroquois and Chinese cultures there was a common element of wordplay and 
misunderstanding, illustrated mainly through the figure of a grandmother that misuses or 
misunderstands dubious language and/or new cultural practices. In Japanese culture, Chafe 
underlines the relevance of “kyoka”, a genre of poetry developed in the Japanese Edo 
period, which mainly consists in spoofing the tanka genre – which is similar in structure to 
the haiku but with two extra 7 syllable verses – by playing off its solemnity, introducing 
incongruous elements that jar with the reader’s expectation of a tanka: “[w]hereas tanka 
achieve aesthetic effects by evoking nature and nature-related emotions, kyoka are light-
hearted and often nonsensical” (Chafe, 2007: 132-133). While, if exposed to this kind of 
humour without any interpretative aid, we may be unable to see why it should be funny, 
when we are properly contextualised the mechanisms become at once familiar. In the first 
three (Navajo, Iroquois and Chinese) cases, wordplay and the general trope of the mistake 
or the idiot are more than common throughout the whole of Western culture. In the second, 
Japanese example, it seems clear that it is the mainstay of parody, of toying with 
expectations, that animates the creation of kyoka. 
Noël Carroll offers an example which sheds further light on apparent cultural 
differences in humour: he recalls that the first time he heard a Newfie joke, he did not 
know that “Newfie” referred to people from the Canadian province of Newfoundland, but 
was nevertheless able to laugh at it. Newfie jokes, he claims, are just “moron jokes, 
localized” (Carroll, 2014: 99). The Newfie is simply a humour token, such as the blonde or 
the Schadchen: a character which, through endless retellings and numerous jokes, has 
become associated with a particular kind of folly that the audience begins to expect to see 
enacted in new, fun ways. While the token itself may often change, from Newfie to Polish, 
Martians, or Blondes, the root remains the same: laughing at fools. It is only the context 
that varies. 
Through Freud’s taxonomy of joke techniques I believe I was able to illustrate that 
there are mechanisms one can put in place in order to tentatively increase a joke’s 
“funniness”, despite any subjectivity of taste and experience. More than that, I believe that 
with the aid of a few cross-cultural examples it has become clear that there are common 
elements to humour between cultures as vastly different such as the European, Japanese, 
Chinese and Iroquois. If these techniques exist, then perhaps humour is not a strictly 
subjective experience, and has instead something not objective, but transversal to it, owing 
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  When explaining the humorous aspect behind displacement – a flaw in thinking of 
some sort, Freud referred to the concept of incongruity. The word, as defined by the OED, 
is pregnant with meaning:  “1 a. Disagreement in character or qualities; want of 
accordance or harmony; discrepancy, inconsistency […] b. (with pl.) An instance or point 
of disagreement; a discrepancy, an inconsistency […] 2 a. Want of accordance with what is 
reasonable or fitting; unsuitableness, inappropriateness, absurdity […] 3. Want of harmony 
of parts or elements; want of self-consistency; incoherence. Also (with pl.) something 
incoherent or not self-consistent […] †4. Grammar. Violation of the rules of concord; 
grammatical incorrectness; solecism. Obs.”. The general idea seems to be of something 
which is not in accordance with something else. The reference to an accordance with “what 
is reasonable or fitting”, as we will later see, is essential to the concept of humour, because 
it suggests a pre-existent conception of what is reasonable or fitting and what is not. The 
mention of harmony is also telling, as is the grammatical aspect: it points towards the 
deception of strict rules. Violation of concord and solecism are especially relevant because, 
outside of a grammatical context, they also mean, respectively, a lack of agreement and a 
breach in “good” manners: all of it consistent with the idea of incongruity as a mainstay of 
humour. 
Centuries of writing on the subject of humour has led academics such as Noël 
Carroll and Michael Billig to group authors and their thoughts into several different 
theories of humour. Namely: the relief theory, the superiority theory, the play theory and 
finally, the incongruity theory. Each of these theories is intended to supply the question of 
the nature of humour with a particular answer. According to the incongruity theory, for 
example, all humour is rooted in incongruity. The burden of this statement is such, 
however, that it can become easy to refute it and then cease to acknowledge incongruity’s 
true relevance. It seems unwise to continuously discard these theories because they fail to 
provide one unique answer to all of humour’s intricacies. These intricacies, I believe, 
would perhaps be better explained by employing each of these theories in tandem; by 
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exploring their different contents as characteristics that highlight the many different 
aspects of humour, instead of attempting to provide us with one limited answer. 
 The superiority theory, which shall be discussed further below, is generally held to 
be the earliest of theories on humour; its tenets were voiced in Classical Antiquity by Plato 
and Aristotle, before culminating, in the 17
th
 century, in its most recognisable formulation: 
that of Thomas Hobbes. The theory of incongruity is said to have emerged later, in the 18
th
 
century, through the pen of Francis Hutcheson and his essay “Reflections upon Laughter”, 
as a response to Hobbes. However, there is already an element of incongruity to be derived 
from our investigation of humour’s etymological origin – that of the ridiculous. As 
Michael Billig has written: “[i]nstead of seeking the origins of laughter within the motives 
of the person who laughs, incongruity theories have sought to identify those incongruous 
features of the world that provoke laughter” (Billig, 2005: 57). This does not exclude the 
presence of incongruity in purported superiority theorists such as Plato, Aristotle or 
Hobbes’ observations, however. While they were clearly more concerned with the more 
controversial aspects of our laughter and with the motives behind it – in that sense they 
were suitable precursors to the relief theory –, they nevertheless seemed to be making an 
essential point about incongruity in humour: the ridiculous person, the humourist in the 
physiological sense of the word, is incongruous. He is discrepant. He deviates from the 
norm. Whether or not we laugh at what is incongruous because we find ourselves superior 
to it is another question, to be examined further below.  
The question, of course, lies in the nature of this incongruity.  In his essay, Francis 
Hutcheson states:  
 
That then which seems generally the cause of laughter is the bringing together of 
images which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the 
principal idea: this contrast between ideas of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, 
and ideas of meanness, baseness, profanity, seems to be the very spirit of burlesque; 
and the greatest part of our raillery and jest is founded upon it. (Hutcheson, 1973: 109) 
 
 Hutcheson’s description calls to mind both the idea of “conceptual blending” and 
Freud’s examinations of the mechanisms behind humorous metaphors. It is perhaps too 
specific in mentioning that incongruity always consists in the “bringing together of images 
which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the principal idea”, 
however. Vaguer, simpler incongruities can also be a source of humour, such as a man 
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falling down a flight of stairs. In his summary of the incongruity theory, Noël Carroll 
refers to it as positing that “what is key to comic amusement is a deviation from some 
presupposed norm – that is to say, an anomaly or an incongruity relative to some 
framework governing the ways in which we think the world is or should be,” (Carroll, 
2014: 17). This evinces an essential point. In Bergson’s Le Rire, the author claims that: 
“[n]otre rire est toujours le rire d’un groupe” (Bergson, 1969: 5). The comic perception of 
incongruities is tied to this idea, in that the discrepancy or deviation relates to norms which 
have mainly to do with the experience and the established rules of a particular community. 
This is part of the reason why humour is such an intersubjective experience – it varies from 
individual to individual, but always within a social context: “[i]ncongruity is a comparative 
notion. It presupposes that something is discordant with something else. With respect to 
comic amusement, that something else is how the world is or should be” (Carroll, 2014: 
18). The requisite is then that something be incongruous with someone’s general 
expectations of normalcy, expectations which are influenced by the larger infrastructure of 
the culture they inhabit and the communities they belong to. As per Bergson:  
 
Pour comprendre le rire, il faut le replacer dans son milieu naturel, qui est la société ; 
il faut surtout en déterminer la fonction utile, qui est une function sociale […] Le rire 
doit répondre à certaines exigences de la vie en commun. Le rire doit avoir une 
signification sociale. (Bergson, 1969: 6) 
 
Plato’s ridiculous people fit neatly into this line of thought. They differ from their 
particular community’s expectations of normalcy, and are thus susceptible to cause 
laughter. 
Even the most verbal of jokes can be included in the incongruity theory. In a pun 
such as “did you hear about the Mexican train robber? He had loco motives”
10
, the humour 
resides in how similar “loco motives” is to “locomotives”. This incongruity lies in the 
fundamental flaws inherent in any language – in the ambiguities we inadvertently incur in, 
but also in the misunderstandings intrinsic to the existence of several different languages. 
Uttering the same sounds, in this case, leads to the expression of two different things which 
nevertheless apply to the descriptor of “Mexican train robber”: he now owns locomotives, 
and he had “crazy (loco) motives”. It especially plays off of the fact that there are two 
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languages at stake: Spanish and English, thus multiplying the amount of possible 
misunderstandings, but narrowing the public down to speakers of both English and 
Spanish. To complicate matters, in this case, as is the case with many puns, the humour 
also resides in the partial ineptitude of the wordplay; or rather, in how facile and 
unelaborate it is.  
 The question to follow would be what exactly the relationship between humour and 
incongruity is. Bergson’s essay on laughter is valuable in this respect. We have already 
discussed two of his foundational claims: that “laughter”
11
 requires a degree of emotional 
detachment and that it must have social significance. There remain two other claims: the 
first is that laughter is inherently human. By this Bergson means that we are the only 
animal that laughs and is laughed at. When we laugh at animals or inanimate objects we 
imagine them endowed with humanity: “On rira d’un chapeau ; mais ce qu’on raille alors, 
ce n’est pas le morceau de feutre ou de paille, c’est la forme que des hommes lui ont 
donnée, c’est le caprice humain dont il a pris le moule” (Bergson, 1969: 3). An amusing 
hat is amusing because it exudes a quirky personality; the famous grumpy cat is amusing 
because we imagine it to be grumpy much like we can occasionally be – not because, as far 
as we know, it has that ability. If it had that ability, merely displaying it would hardly be 
amusing, only natural. Simpler things, like an object falling when we did not expect it to, 
still seem to play off our own overreaction to it. To Bergson’s credit, it is difficult to find 
an example where there is nothing remotely human behind our laughter. 
 Bergson’s second and final claim is perhaps the most valuable: he believed that 
when we laugh at incongruous behaviour we are laughing at instances of rigidity in human 
behaviour: “une certaine raideur de mécanique là où l’on voudrait trouver la souplesse 
attentive et la vivante flexibilité d’une personne” (ibid.: 8, italics in the original). He 
attributes this rigidity to a “distraction”, which could also be translated as 
absentmindedness. Bergson’s argument is relatively simple: life requires us to adapt to our 
circumstances constantly. Failing to adapt momentarily, as in someone who falls down a 
flight of stairs because they were not looking; or generally, as in someone who lacks any 
and all social skills, is proof of a certain kind of rigidity. The mechanical aspect of 
Bergson’s theory is perhaps a product of the mechanical anxiety of his time – machines, in 
our day, are usually taken to be remarkably skilled at adapting themselves, comparatively. 
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However, it is also quite illustrative: when we fail to act according to our exterior 
circumstances we are similar to a machine. In this sense, a man bumping his head against a 
wall he did not seems like a sports car trying to fry an egg – a machine performing a task it 
was not made to perform. Bergson’s argument is that we, unlike the sports car, are able to 
adapt our actions to the circumstances, instead of doing only one thing which is suitable in 
one given occasion. Consequently, Bergson remarks: 
 
Toute raideur du caractère, de l’esprit et même du corps, sera donc suspecte à la 
société, parce qu’elle est le signe possible d’une activité qui s’endort et aussi d’une 
activité qui s’isole, qui tend à s’écarter du centre commun autour duquel la société 
gravite, d’une excentricité enfin. Et pourtant la société ne peut intervenir ici par une 
répression matérielle, puisqu’elle n’est pas atteinte matériellement. Elle est en 
présence de quelque chose qui l’inquiète, mais à titre de symptôme seulement, — à 
peine une menace, tout au plus un geste. C’est donc par un simple geste qu’elle y 
répondra. Le rire doit être quelque chose de ce genre, une espèce de geste social. 
(ibid.: 15) 
  
 His claim is simple: that laughter is society’s response (or one of them) to the 
individual’s lack of adaptation – to his inattention or absentmindedness, the “activité qui 
s’endort” (ibid.). Laughter is then, in Bergson’s terminology, a social corrective: “Le rire 
est cette correction même. Le rire est un certain geste social, qui souligne et réprime une 
certaine distraction spéciale des hommes et des événements” (ibid.: 67). In this case, 
accidental humour, humour which derives from an accidental situation (such as someone 
tripping and falling) is the expression of an absentmindedness that is then corrected by the 
vexing experience of being laughed at: 
 
Mais, d’autre part, même au théâtre, le plaisir de rire n’est pas un plaisir pur, je veux 
dire un plaisir exclusivement esthétique, absolument désintéressé. Il s’y mêle une 
arrière-pensée que la société a pour nous quand nous ne l’avons pas nous mêmes. Il y 
entre l’intention inavouée d’humilier, et par là, il est vrai, de corriger tout au moins, 
extérieurement. (ibid.: 104) 
 
Intentional humour, on the other hand, becomes a way of creating stock characters, 
of creating “types” which we are invited to laugh at due to their inability to adapt – their 
antisocial tendencies, their unwavering stubbornness, etc. For Bergson, then, the reason 
why we laugh at incongruity is to maintain the cohesiveness of our society: the production 
of intentional humour is only a way to reinforce that same purpose. This seems like a 
slightly ruthless and utilitarian theory of humour, but the element of correction is indeed 
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present in many instances of humour: satire is a case in point, for it actively denounces 
perceived mistakes and wrongdoings in the hope that they will be corrected. The very act 
of pointing out incongruities and making us aware of them, even if laughter is not 
somehow a humiliating force, fights the absentmindedness of both the butt of the joke and 
the listener. Bergson’s theory bears a remarkable similarity to the superiority theories in 
this sense, finding at the heart of humour not a Hobbesian selfishness, but a biological 
imperative to fight for the perpetuation of (social) life. 
 There are limitations to this idea of humour and laughter as a corrective force, 
however. Bergson claims that laughter is pleasurable almost as a biological ploy to make 
us indulge in it often, thus reinforcing our societal rules just as often – like sex, perhaps. 
But if Humanity, as Bergson himself claims
12
, is willing to squeeze laughter out of every 
possible occasion, are we not encouraged to fabricate incongruities ourselves in order to 
laugh at them? This is of course what happens in intentional humour: we produce a 
collection of incongruities, some of which would never see the light of day, such as my 
example of the sports car trying to fry an egg. In his HBO special Jammin’ in New York, 
George Carlin performs a routine called “Little Things We Share.” It consists in pointing 
out a number of situations which are typically Bergsonian in the sense that they consist of 
little mistakes, little flaws in judgement that we all find ourselves engaging in at times:  
“do you ever look at your watch and then you don’t know what time it is? And you have to 
look again! And you still don’t know the time. So you look a third time and someone says: 
‘what time it is?’ And you say ‘I don’t know!’” (Carlin, 1:25-1:40); “you know when 
you’ve been eatin’ ice cream too fast and you get that frozen spot in the back of your throat 
but you can’t do anything about it because you have to reach it to rub it, you just have to 
kind of wait for it to go away? And it does? Then what do you do? Eat more ice cream! 
What are we, fucking stupid?” (ibid.: 6:05-6:21) While Carlin is pointing out incongruities, 
he seems to be treating them as inevitable – the humour lies in exactly that: the fact that we 
will occasionally commit one of these mistakes, no matter what. There is no wish to 
correct anyone because it is not possible. What Carlin is doing is making us aware of these 
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incongruities whilst simultaneously approving of them as the things that we share, the 
things that unite us – the things that make us human. 
Frances Hutcheson, in “Reflections Upon Laughter”, wrote:  
 
We generally imagine in mankind some degree of wisdom above other animals, and 
have high ideas of them on this account. If then along with our notion of wisdom in 
our fellows, there occurs any instance of gross inadvertence, or great mistake, this is a 
great cause of laughter. (Hutcheson, 1973: 110-111) 
 
In Bergson’s case, this view is particularly clear. According to Billig:  
 
Bergson constantly argued against materialists who viewed humans as just bodily 
machines. In Bergson’s philosophy, life is not comprised purely of material elements: 
the world of the spirit, or the intangible force of life, has equal reality. Bergson’s 
theory of comedy rules out the possibility that humans can merely be physical 
automata. (Billig, 2005: 129-130) 
 
 In Le Rire, we find the expression of two fundamental discomforts: that of the soul 
within the body and that of the individual within society. The inherent dignity that 
Hutcheson claimed we usually assume mankind to be endowed with
13
 is limited by the 
awkwardness of our actual physical existence:  
 
Du mécanique plaqué sur du vivant, voilà encore notre point de départ. D’où venait ici 
le comique ? De ce que le corps vivant se raidissait en machine. Le corps vivant nous 
semblait donc devoir être la souplesse parfaite, l’activité toujours en éveil d’un 
principe toujours en travail. Mais cette activité appartiendrait réellement à l’âme plutôt 
qu’au corps. Elle serait la flamme même de la vie, allumée en nous par un principe 
supérieur, et aperçue à travers le corps par un effet de transparence. Quand nous ne 
voyons dans le corps vivant que grâce et souplesse, c’est que nous négligeons ce qu’il 
y a en lui de pesant, de résistant, de matériel enfin ; nous oublions sa matérialité pour 
ne penser qu’à sa vitalité, vitalité que notre imagination attribue au principe même de 
la vie intellectuelle et morale. Mais supposons qu’on appelle notre attention sur cette 
matérialité du corps. Supposons qu’au lieu de participer de la légèreté du principe qui 
l’anime, le corps ne soit plus à nos yeux qu’une enveloppe lourde et embarrassante, 
lest importun qui retient à terre une âme impatiente de quitter le sol. Alors le corps 
deviendra pour l’âme ce que le vêtement était tout à l’heure pour le corps lui-même, 
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 “Again, any little accident to which we have joined the idea of meanness, befalling a person of great 
gravity, ability, dignity, is a matter of laughter, for the very same reason; thus the strange contortions of the 
body in a fall, the dirtying of a decent dress, the natural functions which we study to conceal from sight, are 
matter of laughter when they occur to observation in persons of whom we have high ideas. Nay, the very 
human form has the ideas of dignity so generally joined with it, that even in ordinary persons such mean 
accidents are matter of jest; but still the jest is increased by the dignity, gravity, or modesty of the person, 
which shows that it is this contrast, or opposition of ideas of dignity and meanness, which is the occasion of 
laughter” (Hutcheson, 1973: 110). 
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une matière inerte posée sur une énergie vivante. Et l’impression du comique se 
produira dès que nous aurons le sentiment net de cette superposition. (Bergson, 1969: 
38) 
 
 The idea of our bodies as crude, heavy garments that tether us to the ground seems 
to somewhat echo the views of Arthur Schopenhauer, who dubbed the incongruity between 
our finiteness versus the infinity of things “the vanity of existence”
14
 – the vanity being 
that we tend to (foolishly, Schopenhauer observes) rebel against the idea that our life is 
brief and meaningless: “[t]he heart rebels against this, and feels that it cannot be true” 
(Schopenhauer, 1908: 34).  
Whether or not there is such a thing as a soul, the claim that we are more than mere 
bodies is a common one, and the supposed inherent dignity of humanity rests on that 
presupposition. We, Bergson claims, are more than machines – more than bodies. When 
we malfunction, we act like machines. This is incongruous, and while correction does not 
always seem to be the immediate aim of laughter or humour, we are clearly made aware of 
these incongruities through them. This basic existential discomfort spreads itself to society, 
the ceremonial side of which, Bergson claims, is merely a puppet show when observed 
detachedly – it is an awkward mechanism encrusted upon us, much like our body itself: 
 
Le côté cérémonieux de la vie sociale devra donc renfermer un comique latent, lequel 
n’attendra qu’une occasion pour éclater au grand jour. On pourrait dire que les 
cérémonies sont au corps social ce que le vêtement est au corps individuel : elles 
doivent leur gravité à ce qu’elles s’identifient pour nous avec l’objet sérieux auquel 
l’usage les attache, elles perdent cette gravité dès que notre imagination les en isole. 
De sorte qu’il suffit, pour qu’une cérémonie devienne comique, que notre attention se 
concentre sur ce qu’elle a de cérémonieux, et que nous négligions sa matière, comme 
disent les philosophes, pour ne plus penser qu’à sa forme. […] Dès que nous oublions 
l’objet grave d’une solennité ou d’une cérémonie, ceux qui y prennent part nous font 
l’effet de s’y mouvoir comme des marionnettes. (Bergson, 1969: 34) 
  
Bergson, of course, does not seem to believe that life is merely a puppet-show or a 
masquerade, but instead that viewed from a certain perspective, the most formal and rigid 
aspects of social life become comic in the sense that they appear to be an artificial disguise 
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 “This vanity finds expression in the whole way in which things exist; in the infinite nature of Time and 
Space, as opposed to the finite nature of the individual in both; in the ever-passing present moment as the 
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forced on “Nature” – it is here that he recognises the discomfort. Bureaucracy is a fitting 
example, and Bergson quotes a situation where its counterproductive rigidity is obvious: 
that of the survivors of a shipwreck near Dieppe who, when met by custom officers, were 
immediately asked if they had anything to declare (ibid.: 35-36). When Bergson lays 
emphasis on the idea of correction, however, the suggestion seems to be that these are 
rigidities that can and need be corrected through ridicule. This is, in part, something that 
humour does: it breaks with conventionality and points towards incongruities. What 
Bergson does not seem to suggest, unlike George Carlin, is that while we should perhaps 
always strive to lessen our discomfort and keep everyone alert or aware, a rigidity of some 
kind will always be present. It is only considered incongruous because our expectations are 
otherwise. We are creatures of incongruity. Laughing at someone who trips and falls flat 
on his face does not correct anything at that moment or truly prevent the situation from 
occurring in the future – it will happen again. It will happen because we are not omnipotent 
or omnipresent. It seems to be a great part of experiencing a body that it should localise, 
influence and limit our mind’s designs; of society, that its many benefits should be upheld 
and delivered by rigid, at times meaningless ceremonies – such as bureaucracy. Humour 
seems, to a great extent, to evince this – to stress our limits and, if not urge us to change 
the more burdensome of these mechanisms, to at least be aware of them and delight in their 
ineptitude. In doing this, it delivers fundamental insight into the difficult and troublesome 




Bergson’s theory, in its defence of laughter as a social corrective, bears hints of the 
superiority theory. Towards the end of Le Rire, Bergson writes:  
 
En ce sens, le rire ne peut pas être absolument juste. Répétons qu’il ne doit pas non 
plus être bon. Il a pour fonction d’intimider en humiliant. Il n’y réussirait pas si la 
nature n’avait laissé à cet effet, dans les meilleurs d’entre les hommes, un petit fonds 
de méchanceté, ou tout au moins de malice. Peutêtre vaudra-t-il mieux que nous 
n’approfondissions pas trop ce point. Nous n’y trouverions rien de très flatteur pour 
nous. (ibid.: 151) 
 
 The immediate takeaway seems to be a Darwinistic form of natural selection 
through laughter: “Le rire châtie certains défauts à peu près comme la maladie châtie 
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certains excès, frappant des innocents, épargnant des coupables, visant à un résultat général 
et ne pouvant faire à chaque cas individuel l’honneur de l’examiner séparément” (ibid.:  
83). The prospect of laughter as a disease that weeds out both those who produce 
incongruities and those who do not, for the sake of a common good, seems to bear 
alarmingly eugenic overtones. Thomas Hobbes, though subtler in his description of 
laughter as an expression of superiority, is nevertheless extremely critical:  
 
Sudden glory, is the passion which maketh those grimaces called LAUGHTER; and is 
caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the 
apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they 
suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of 
the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own 
favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. (Hobbes, 1998: 38) 
 
 According to Hobbes, we laugh after performing some action that pleases us or 
when we are clever enough to detect a flaw in someone else. Laughing stems from a sense 
of triumph over others, or in the case of self-deprecation, a sense of triumph over 
ourselves. This is not out of tune with Hobbes’ view of humanity, as per Billig:  
 
Hobbes was to rework the same elements of psychology and politics into Leviathan. 
Hobbes argued that humans could not be trusted to control their selfish instincts. 
[…].The apparently innocent joy of laughter is not so innocent. It indicates an 
unpleasant feeling that strikes at social relations. A society filled with laughter would 
not be a happy place. It would be a place of mockery where each is trying to outdo 
everyone else in the competitive game of life – a place where human bears are baited 
unmercifully. (Billig, 2005: 53) 
 
 Unlike Bergson, Hobbes feared laughter served no purpose but to bolster egos for 
reasons unworthy of merit: “[a]nd therefore much laughter at the defects of others, is a sign 
of pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others 
from scorn; and compare themselves only with the most able” (Hobbes, 1998: 38). While 
Bergson thought humour and laughter served a cruel but necessary purpose, Hobbes was, 
like Plato, suspicious of laughter.  
 The idea of bolstering egos is of course not strange to humour. It is difficult to deny 
that at times jokes are made at another person’s expense, whether or not they intend to 
cause harm. There is something of this idea in Freud’s 1927 essay “Humour”, written 




Like jokes and the comic, humour has something liberating about it; but it also has 
something of grandeur and elevation, which is lacking in the other two ways of 
obtaining pleasure from intellectual activity. The grandeur in it clearly lies in the 
triumph of narcissism, the victorious assertion of the ego’s invulnerability. The ego 
refuses to be distressed by the provocations of reality, to let itself be compelled to 
suffer. It insists that it cannot be affected by the traumas of the external world, it 
shows, in fact, that such traumas are no more than occasions for it to gain pleasure. 
(Freud, 1961: 162) 
  
 To some extent, then, humour is “the triumph of narcissism,” the preservation of 
the ego. Freud’s paradigmatic example is that of the criminal being led to the gallows who 
remarks: “Well, the week’s beginning nicely”. The criminal is of course viciously aware of 
his imminent, violent death. His use of irony at that moment is not a refusal to recognise 
the obvious, but a momentary bout of flippancy in the face of the ultimate horror – death. 
He knows he will not live to see the rest of the week, but refuses to acknowledge it 
barefacedly, therefore preserving his dignity by showing, instead of fear, a defiant 
nonchalance. There is an undeniable expression of superiority in this – a rising above our 
human limitations. However, it is not the kind of mean-spirited, selfish superiority Hobbes 
refers to – it is not necessarily achieved at the expense of others. 
 In The Crying of Lot 49, Thomas Pynchon writes of an executive who had worked 
for Yoyodyne, “one of the giants of the aerospace industry” (Pynchon, 1996: 15). At 39, 
the executive is made redundant and, having been vigorously trained to do nothing else, 
begins to ponder the idea of suicide. However, his “previous training got the better of him: 
he could not make the decision without first hearing the ideas of a committee” (ibid.: 78). 
He decides to place an ad on a newspaper to try to see if anyone who has ever been in a 
similar situation has come up with a good reason to kill themselves, relying on the fact that 
no successful suicides would ever reply – they would be hard pressed to. As a result, he 
receives letters from “suicides who had failed, either through clumsiness or last-minute 
cowardice. None of them, however, could offer any compelling reasons for staying alive” 
(ibid.: 79). As he finally decides to immolate himself, inspired by a Buddhist monk in 
Vietnam who had done the same, “the very efficiency expert at Yoyodyne who had caused 
him to be replaced by an IBM 7094” (ibid.) enters the house with the executive’s wife, 
who had left him, and begins to have sex with her. The executive sniggers, his laughter 
alerting the other elements to his presence. He tells them he was about to “do the Buddhist 
monk thing”, and the efficiency expert replies: “Nearly three weeks, it takes him […] to 
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decide. You know how long it would’ve taken the IBM 7094? Twelve microseconds. No 
wonder you were replaced.” (ibid.). The joke is relevant in this respect: the executive is 
portrayed as clueless, but undeserving of the amount of sheer misery which has befallen 
him. We empathise with him for this. Nevertheless, he is partially the butt of the joke. 
There are, potentially, two joke-tellers involved: the unnamed narrator of The Crying of 
Lot 49 and the efficiency expert. It is unclear if the expert intends his remark to be 
humorous, but it can be interpreted as such, and in that situation he would be amusing 
himself at the cost of the executive’s inability and misery – this is what Hobbes seemed to 
be referring to. However, from the point of view of the narrator, there is a certain twist to 
the humour: the sequence of events is so grotesquely cruel and the remark of the expert 
betrays such an absurd lack of empathy and knowledge of human nature that we, like the 
executive, laugh: we detach ourselves from the situation and contemplate it for the piece of 
absurdity it really is. The fact that the executive was fired and that the expert who fired him 
then interrupts his attempt at suicide by having sex with his wife, and on top of that derides 
him once again for being indecisive about his suicide, is such perfectly coherent evidence 
that life is absurd – or that life is against him – that we laugh. We become partially 
detached and enjoy both the incongruity and the criticism of savage capitalism, while at the 
same time nourishing an original empathy for the executive who, albeit incompetent, was 
underserving of his fate. There is no particular idea of superiority on our behalf, though 
there might be on the executive’s: by laughing he is preserving himself. 
 While Hutcheson’s criticism of Hobbes was radical, even he did not deny that there 
were instances of superiority to be found in humour: 
  
It is pretty strange that the authors whom we mentioned above have never 
distinguished between the words laughter and ridicule: this last is but one particular 
species of the former, when we are laughing at the follies of others; and in this species 
there may be some pretence to allege that some imagined superiority may occasion it. 
(Hutcheson, 1973: 106) 
 
But again, the efficiency expert was, arguably, merely observing that the executive 
was incompetent: it is unclear whether or not he was attempting to be humorous. On the 
other hand, the humour of this episode certainly also lies in the executive’s actual, 
incredible incompetence: a man who, out of habit, must consult a committee before killing 
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himself almost forces itself as a funny idea to the reader – but not necessarily a funniness 
based on our feelings of superiority towards him.  
In Hobbes’ defence, there are of course situations which consist purely of this kind of 
ridicule. In an episode of Blackadder, the television series, when Baldrick, Captain 
Blackadder’s dim-witted servant, claims that he is carving his name on a bullet so as to 
avoid ever being shot, Blackadder replies “[y]our brain […] is so minute, Baldrick, that if a 
hungry cannibal cracked your head open, there wouldn’t be enough to cover a small water 
biscuit” (Curtis and Elton, 1:42-1:52). The remark is of course just as cruel as the 
executive’s, but Baldrick, far from deserving the invective, happens to be tremendously 
stupid, and we cannot help but laugh at his colossal stupidity this articulately expressed – 
especially because it seldom seems to affect Baldrick at all. As per Carroll: “Much laughter 
is nasty, directed at foolishness, and the superiority theory ostensibly explains why this is 
so. Here, laughter is a sign of pleasure, and the pleasure we take in the foolishness of 
others is putatively the recognition that we are better than they are” (Carroll, 2014: 11). 
Behind Captain Blackadder’s quip lie unmistakable ideas of superiority towards Baldrick, 
but even in the case of barefaced ridicule, this need not necessarily be so. In Kurt 
Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five, Vonnegut writes of a group of ragged German reservists 
towards the end of the war who dread a mission that consists in guarding hundreds of 
American POW’s. He describes their reaction to the state of the American prisoners: 
 
The eight ridiculous Dresdeners ascertained that these hundred ridiculous creatures 
really were American fighting men fresh from the front. They smiled, and then they 
laughed. Their terror evaporated. There was nothing to be afraid of. Here were more 
crippled human beings, more fools like themselves. Here was light opera. (Vonnegut, 
2000: 123) 
 
The Dresdeners laughed at the American soldiers not because they found them 
inferior, but because they recognised their own ridiculousness in them; they saw that the 
Americans too were only human, subject to the same rigidities and misgivings. More fools 
like themselves; so they ceased to be afraid and were instead relieved. 
In conclusion, there are notorious instances of superiority behind the use of humour 
and laughter, but it seems daring to claim, like Hobbes, that humour is always such a 
Darwinistic game of winning and losing. At times, such as in George Carlin’s “Little 
Things We Share”, the only ego-bolstering that occurs is that of the self-awareness of 
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one’s own failings met with the laughter of those who identify. At others, such as in 
Slaughterhouse-Five, it is the realization that there is nothing to fear, not because we are 
superior, but because the “other”, too, is only human – only another fool. 
 
1.1.7 Release/Relief  
 
 The idea of a physiological release or relief inherent in comic amusement owes 
much to 19
th
-century Victorian England and the writings of Alexander Bain and Herbert 
Spencer. Even then, however, it was not a new thought. Writers such as the Earl of 
Shaftesbury had, a century before, written about the value of wit and raillery in its 
disruption of solemnity:  
 
They know very well, that as Modes and Fashions, so Opinions, tho ever so ridiculous, 
are kept up by Solemnity: and that those formal Notions which grew up probably in an 
ill Mood, and have been conceiv’d in sober Sadness, are never to be remov’d but in a 
sober kind of Chearfulness, and by a more easy and pleasant way of Thought. 
(Cooper, 2001:14) 
 
 It was Shaftesbury’s opinion that “[t]here are certain Humours in Mankind, which of 
necessity must have vent” (ibid.: 15). In humour lay a way for humanity to vent some of its 
“humours”, to achieve some sort of relief. Shaftesbury, of course, did not delve into the 
physiological particulars of this line of thinking; it was Bain and Spencer that ultimately 
did so. Both of these authors rejected incongruity as the sole cause of laughter. Alexander 
Bain in particular underlined the malevolent aspects of laughter, harkening back to a 
Hobbesian account of superiority and degradation in humour. However, he also developed 
the idea of “ludicrous degradation as a mode of release from constraint” (Bain, 1888: 249). 
Bain’s claim was that solemnity or “seriousness” requires a certain rigidity and constraint, 
which if relieved suddenly provokes hilarity: 
 
We are sometimes obliged to put on a dignity which we perhaps do not feel, as in 
administering reproof or correction to inferiors; and still oftener have we to assume an 
attitude or respect and reverence that does not possess our inward feelings. Both the 
one and the other situation is a fatiguing tension of the system, and we have the 
pleasure of a “blessed relief” when anything happens to give a relaxation. (ibid.: 251) 
  





The element of the genuine comic is furnished by those dignities that, from some 
circumstance or other, do not command serious homage. False or faded deities and 
dignities; splendour and show without meaning; […] vanity and coxcombry; all the 
windings of the hypocrisy that aims at seeming greater than the reality […] are among 
the things that commonly induce laughter, when brought into the embrace of 
meanness and degrading inferiorities. (ibid.: 251) 
 
 In short, Bain found that humour is a means of disrupting solemnity (especially if it 
is unwarranted), thus eliminating the effort of constraint and rigidity, and that the 
mechanism through which it operates is the degradation of that which commands 
solemnity. The overall effect of this degradation is laughter, mirth, etc. and with it comes a 
relief or release of tension. This idea of releasing tension was further developed by 
Spencer, who criticised Bain’s account of the process behind laughter. Spencer prefaced 
his digression into humour by claiming that “[n]ervous excitation always tends to beget 
muscular motion; and when it rises to a certain intensity, always does beget it” (Spencer, 
1904: 7562). Sometimes, he argued, the muscular motion which nervous excitation 
expresses itself through is laughter. In what humorous laughter is concerned – and Spencer 
also observes that not all laughter is humorous – it is because it arises from a descending 
incongruity: “[l]aughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares transferred 
from great things to small – only when there is what we may call a descending 
incongruity” (Spencer, 1904: 7570). The nervous excitation arises from the apprehension 
of the great thing and the anticipation of something greater to follow. When this 
anticipation is suddenly frustrated, Spencer argues, the build-up of nervous excitation 
needs to be expended through muscular motion – the “purposeless” convulsions of 
laughter. Spencer is therefore expanding Bain’s explanation of the phenomenon, but 
disagreeing with him on one fundamental point: there need not be an unpleasant solemnity 
for one to upset – only the expectation of a certain expenditure of energy. 
 In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, Freud’s approach to “tendentious 
jokes” has its own contours of relief or release. As mentioned above, Freud claimed that 
innocuous jokes are comedy at its purest, bearing no animus other than making someone 
laugh. Tendentious jokes, on the other hand, have insidious intents, and tend to conceal 
either sex or hostility. When it comes to sex, Freud examines the role of pure bawdry as an 
aggressive display of sexuality against an unwilling woman – a form of catcalling, perhaps. 
However, he observes that in “cultivated society” (Freud, 2002: 97), “[t]he bawdry 
40 
 
becomes witty, and is tolerated only if it is witty” (ibid.).  Freud then proceeds to explain: 
“[h]ere at last we can understand what a joke can do for its tendency. It makes the 
satisfaction of a drive possible (be it lustful or hostile) in the face of an obstacle in its way; 
it circumvents this obstacle and in doing so draws pleasure from a source that the obstacle 
had made inaccessible” (ibid.: 98). The obstacle, Freud claims, is repression – both an 
external mechanism and an internal one: 
 
Through our culture’s work of repression, primary possibilities of enjoyment, now 
spurned by the censorship within us, are lost. But all renunciation is very difficult for 
the human psyche, and so we find that tendentious jokes provide a means of reversing 
[the process of] renunciation and of regaining what was lost. When we laugh at an 
indecent joke we are laughing at the same thing that causes the bumpkin to laugh in a 
coarse obscenity. (ibid.: 99) 
 
 When it comes to hostility, the case is the same. Freud yet again illustrates his point 
through Herr N. and his tendency for witty raillery: beneath it, he concludes, lies a desire 
to insult others. However, “his high degree of personal cultivation makes it impossible for 
him to give vent to these judgements of his in this form. That is why they have recourse to 
jokes, for jokes will ensure them a reception with the listener which, despite the truth they 
might well contain, they would never find in an unjoking form” (ibid.: 101). The 
repression in question may of course have many natures and origins: authority would of 
course be one. One would use humour more readily than a direct insult against a King, 
especially because it may go unnoticed. Somewhat similarly to Spencer, Freud suggests 
that the pleasure in bypassing this repression results from saving the “psychical 
expenditure” needed to abide by an internal or external repression.  
There is, of course, much credit to these authors in their recognition of the 
relationship between mind and body in the context of humour, and in their description of 
the palpable sense of pleasurable relief that can accompany laughter and humour – a relief 
from the various solemnities demanded by most social occasions. However, the concept of 
accumulating and expending nervous or “psychical” energy seems obscure, and has 
attracted criticism from authors like Carroll, who accuses these relief theories of 
presupposing “hydraulic views of the mind which are highly dubious” (Noël Carroll, 2014: 
38).  
 Carroll offers an alternative: a relief that comes from the frustration of our 
collective and individual expectations of normalcy – from incongruity. However, this also 
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suggests that there is always some sort of build-up and a release, when the details of such a 




The difference between tendentious and innocuous jokes, according to Freud, is 
that the first betray the need to obtain some sort of satisfaction that one ordinarily could not 
obtain due to an external or internal repression, while the second reveals no such tendency. 
It becomes difficult to think of examples of innocuous jokes in these terms, apart from 
puns: in the “loco motives” joke, the teller is hardly doing anything more than playing with 
words – the frailty inherent in their disparate meanings and their similarity of sound and 
spelling. Perhaps puns really are innocuous in this sense. However, writing on the 
psychological origins of the joke, Freud claims that they lie in childhood – in play. 
 
Prior to any joke or witticism there is something we may call play or ‘fun’. Play – let 
us keep to this name – makes its appearance in children while they are learning to use 
words and put thoughts together. This play is probably complying with one of the 
drives that compel children to exercise their capacities (Groos). As they do so they 
come upon the pleasurable effects arising from the repetition of what is similar, the 
rediscovery of what is familiar, similar sounds, etc. […]. It is not surprising that these 
pleasurable effects encourage children in the habit of playing, and cause them to carry 
on with it regardless of the meaning of the words or the coherence of their sentences 
[…]. This play is brought to an end by the strengthening of a factor that deserves to be 
called an attitude of criticism, or rationality. Play is now rejected as being meaningless 
or plainly absurd. (Freud, 2002: 125) 
 
Having been denied by society the pleasure inherent in play, in toying with words –
whether or not rediscovering what is familiar is at hand – the adult tries to regain it by 
attempting to “evade the criticism and to find a substitute for the mood” (ibid.: 126). The 
substitute, Freud claims, is the joke. What Freud does not seem to explicitly explore, 
however, is the fact that in this case, much like in the case of tendentious jokes, there is 
also a bypassing of a(n) (external) repression: that of adult society, which no longer 
approves of nonsense and play, in order to obtain pleasure from a source from which one, 
due to that repression, ordinarily cannot. Innocuous jokes, in a sense, are just as 
tendentious as tendentious jokes – they reveal a desire to play. 
 The idea of playfulness is certainly at the heart of humour as a pleasurable activity. 
More than that, it seems to shed light on the idea of detachment: after all, there is a 
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simulation aspect to playful activity which suggests that it is not real or is not taking place 
in the real world. When cartoon characters are crushed by anvils or when the characters in 
“Sam Peckinpagh’s Salad Days” are mauled in the most grotesque ways, there is no real 
danger. In that sense, it is merely play. I claimed above that one way to achieve 
detachment is to render a character in as much of a stereotypical way as possible. This is 
because something which is stereotypical lacks depth and ultimately seems like a parody of 




 Humour is a paradigmatically multifaceted phenomenon. Between its effects, its 
motivations, its function, its nature, there are numberless things to be analysed. With this 
chapter I have attempted only to do two things: to provide for a modest, yet well-rounded 
and critical summing up of centuries of literature on humour, and to convey two essential 
points. Firstly, that humour should be taken seriously: it is a complex, essential element in 
the way we communicate, interpret and cope with reality which, while naturally not 
beyond any moral reproach, is often misunderstood and vastly underappreciated by 
academics and laymen alike. Secondly, that there seems to be, at the very root of humour, a 
remarkable insight into the contradictions and incongruities inherent in human nature, as 
well as a deep cherishing and revelling in those incongruities, the foundations of which are 
fascinating to say the least. Ludovic Dugas once wrote that “toute théorie du rire porte 
l’empreite d’une philosophie, se rattache à une conception systèmatique de la vie et vaut 
exactement ce que peut valoir une telle conception” (Dugas, 1902: 138) Perhaps every 




2. The Humour of Saki, Monty Python’s Life of Brian and The Hitchhiker’s Guide to 
the Galaxy 
 
2.1 Englishness – A Brief Introduction 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I have mentioned that these works share a humorous 
look at some of the most tragic aspects of the human condition. A quick amount of 
researching, however, will reveal that that is not all they share. They were also mostly
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produced by white Englishmen in the 20th century: Saki’s work (mostly) in Pre-WWI, 
Edwardian England, and Life of Brian and Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy in 1979, 
Thatcherite, mid-oil crisis Britain. The two periods, sixty years apart, bear one striking 
similarity: both are imbued with a sense of impending conflict. However, they are on the 
whole remarkably different – the society lampooned in Saki’s works had long disappeared 
before Monty Python or Douglas Adams began their careers. Despite this, it does seem to 
have remained vivid within the English culture and imagination. Indeed, it could be argued 
that, in their works, all three of these authors operate on the basis of a very particular kind 
of stereotypical “Englishness”, some aspects of which can be traced back to the Edwardian 
period and the Victorian period before it. The concept is of course elusive, but has 
nevertheless often been subject to inquiry. An in-depth exploration of the English national 
character, however (if one can speak of it in such unified terms) would be extraneous to 
this thesis. Instead, a brief account of stereotypical Englishness, which so-called “English 
humour” – and these works in particular –, seems to base itself on, is in order. 
 A notorious example of such an account is George Orwell’s “England, Your 
England,” an essay about English culture included in The Lion and the Unicorn, where 
Orwell provides the reader with “a couple of generalizations about England that would be 
accepted by almost all observers” (Orwell, 1982: 38). It is important to mention that this 
essay was written in 1941, during WWII, and specifically during the Blitz – a time when 
national feeling and fervour were naturally reinforced, as well as negative attitudes towards 
foreigners (particularly the enemy, of course)
16
. Among these generalizations, Orwell 
claims, are a profound anti-intellectualism, a widespread lack of artistic talent, strong 
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community values, a love of privacy, an unwavering belief that the law is “above the State 
and above the individual” (ibid.: 44); a hypocritical anti-militarism combined with a love 
for the Empire, and an absence of definite religious belief (cf. Orwell: 1982). The 
combination of these characteristics seems to have bred a (perhaps now dying) particular 
sense of national identity which eschews all that is “hoity toity” and prizes pragmatism and 
simplicity. A suitable example would be the following excerpt from “England, Your 
England”:  
 
[T]he English working class are outstanding in their abhorrence of foreign habits. 
Even when they are obliged to live abroad for years they refuse either to accustom 
themselves to foreign food or to learn foreign languages. Nearly every Englishman of 
working-class origin considers it effeminate to pronounce a foreign word correctly. 
[…] At bottom it is the same quality in the English character that repels the tourist and 
keeps out the invader. (ibid.: 49-50) 
 
While this seems like a particularly serious case of intolerance and ignorance, it is 
illustrative of a characteristic which is fertile breeding ground for the creation of humour: a 
very strict and deeply engrained sense of cultural normalcy – of what should and should 
not be, in social terms. It then becomes easy to both poke fun at what is considered 
deviating from the norm and, on the other hand, to find what is funny about having such 
rigid, established convictions. The former leads to the aforementioned eviscerating of 
anything perceived as maudlin sentimentality and pretentiousness, and the latter to the 
questioning of this very same instinct and the hypocrisy inherent in it. Both of these 
tendencies are driving forces behind the humour of all the works examined below, but 
more than that, make them prime examples of a humorous look at the problematic aspects 












2.2 Saki and the Ceremonial Farce 
 
Having suffered from the convention which dictates that art can turn something too 
horrible to contemplate into something acceptably comedic, Saki exploited it, and 
constantly tested, and transgressed, the boundaries of acceptability and taste. (Byrne, 
2007: 5) 
 
The late Victorian, Edwardian and early Georgian
17
 eras in the United Kingdom 
produced a particular brand of disenchantment among the middle and upper-classes that 
George Steiner, referring to the Europe of the time, would famously describe as “the Great 
Ennui”: a “perverse longing,” and an “itch for chaos,” (Steiner, 1971: 11), best exemplified 
by Théophile Gaultier’s famous cry of “la bárbarie plutôt que l’ennui!” The “long 
summer” that followed the end of the French Revolution and the fall of the French Empire 
in 1815 and which stretched until the brink of World War I, Steiner claimed, was a period 
of comparative stability and rapid progress, but also one of great frustration: “[f]or every 
text of Benthamite confidence, of proud meliorism, we can find a counterstatement of 
nervous fatigue” (Steiner, 1971: 12). The voracious revolutionary upheaval of the French 
Revolution and the disputes of the Napoleonic Wars had ended with a spiritless fizz, and in 
the period that followed came: “a long spell of reaction and stasis” (Steiner, 1971: 16). The 
liberal stability maintained by a bourgeoisie who was less than keen to yet again suffer the 
excesses of the French Revolution was fruitful and not without strife, but bore little in the 
way of excitement when compared to the raucous upheavals of the late 18
th
 century. 
Imprisoned by the gargantuan mediocrity of the rising megalopolises and stiff bourgeois 
morality: “the Romantic generation was jealous of its fathers” (Steiner, 1971: 17). The 
generations that followed would subsequently be jealous of their grandfathers and great-
grandfathers. While this is particularly true of continental Europe, and of France in 
particular, it nevertheless also applies to The United Kingdom, the literature of which was 
likewise rife with fantasies of the macabre and cynical Byronic heroes. By 1900, Steiner 
avers, “[w]hether the psychic mechanisms involved were universal or historically 
localized, one thing is plain: […] there was a terrible readiness, indeed a thirst for what 
Yeats was to call the ‘blood-dimmed tide.’” (Steiner, 1971: 24). The question is naturally 
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Symbolic relationships were, however, not hard currency in foreign affairs, any more 
than were royal cousinship or marriage ties. Nineteenth-century Europe had produced 
no solid instruments of inter-state co-operation or of diplomatic mediation. The 
"Concert of Europe," which had been Napoleon's unintended creation, had withered; 
so, too, had the anti-revolutionary League of the Three Emperors. It is commonplace 
to say that Europe in 1914 was a continent of naked nationalism: it was true all the 
same. (Keegan, 2000: 16-17) 
 
 The fear of a modern warfare irrevocably changed by a galloping industrialization 
as well as tensions surrounding colonial matters and embedded cultural antipathies 
contributed heavily to the outbreak of the conflict of 1914-1918. Steiner seems to claim 
that the conflict was truly inevitable, however, because at the root of these exterior 
manifestations of growing frustration and sizzling aggression lay a latent ennui which, at 
its worst, sought salvation in outright chaos. In the end, beneath the veneer of urbanity and 
moral irreproachability: “[i]ntellect and feeling were, literally, fascinated by the prospect 
of a purging fire” (Steiner, 1971: 24). 
 It would be easy to describe Saki, or Hector Hugh Munro (1870-1916), as the living 
embodiment of the conflicts of his class in that day and age; a man whose stories are 
strewn with disenchanted upper-class-pranksters and whose sister first remembers him 
chasing her with a lighted hearth brush screaming “I’m God! I’m going to destroy the 
world!” (Munro, 1929: 3). The fact that the outbreak of World War I made a 44-year old 
Saki lie about his age in order to enlist and that both his letters home from that period and 
the accounts of his fellow soldiers betray an unmistakable enthusiasm for the war would 
also seem to point to a strain of sadism lurking beneath a repressed exterior
18
. 
 However, Saki’s work (and perhaps his nature) is more complicated than this view 
would allow. The sense of ennui is of course pervasive. At times, such as in “The 
Mappined Life” and “Sredni Vashtar”, there is a keen sense of helplessness and despair in 
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 “During that spring, Munro wrote several letters to Ethel describing the ‘fun’ and ‘rags’ of camp life, and 
his duties as a hut orderly and, subsequently, as a Corporal. In March 1915, he reports that ‘most of us find 
the life very jolly’ and that they ‘have a good deal of fun, with skirmishing raids at night with neighbouring 
huts, and friendly games of footer’. He adds significantly: ‘it is like being boy and man at the same time’” 
(Byrne, 2007: 268); “‘All the same I wish we could count on going away soon; it is a poor game to be 
waiting when others are bearing the brunt and tasting the excitement of real warfare’ (letter to Ethel Munro 
dated 5 March 1915 […])” (ibid.: 269). 
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the face of different forms of repression: that of city life and that of an unhappy family life, 
respectively. “Sredni Vashtar” in particular is violently vengeful, a theme which is also 
common in Saki’s work.  
 While the image of a four-year-old Munro proclaiming to be a God hell-bent on 
world destruction coupled with the violence in Saki’s oeuvre
19
 may suggest something of a 
sadistic pleasure to be derived therefrom, sadism itself – pleasure derived from inflicting 
pain and suffering on others – is something he rarely depicts. Instead, we are treated to 
several instances of a more innocent violence – that of animals and children: “Saki depicts 
bellicosity as normal and natural, and any attempt to curb it as ridiculous and doomed” 
(Byrne, 2007: 46). This is particularly true of his story “The Toys of Peace”, where an 
attempt to replace children’s war toys with “peace toys” nevertheless leads to a simulation 
of war. Saki’s animals, being animals, are blameless in their violence, while the children 
show a propensity for mischief and pranking. This mischief and pranking is more often 
than not directed at adults and is frequently portrayed as a justifiable way of smiting them 
for their hypocrisy and repression of their childish instincts: “Saki youths take on 




 Slightly older protagonists, such as Clovis Sangrail and Reginald (who are of an 
undefined age but usually described as young men) retain, much like Saki himself did
21
, a 
Peter Pan-esque aura to them which manifests itself through their savage use of humour 
and constant need to upset the order of things to escape their own utter boredom: 
“Reginald and the other effectively orphaned Saki youths are social autodidacts who 
become both prematurely aged, or precociously knowing, and obsessed with staying 
young” (Byrne, 2007: 26). The Freudian themes are at once apparent here: humour as a 
manifestation of a child’s need to play, and as a veneer for achieving relief through 
invective and pranking. In this need to insult or prank lies also a hint of Bergson’s 
correction.  
                                                          
19
 Best exemplified by the death of a child’s oppressive aunt at the hands of a vengeful deity in “Sredni 
Vashtar”; the violent end of Tobermory at the hands of a rival cat in “Tobermory”; the death of a gipsy child 
at the hands of a hyena in “Esmé” and the hyena’s subsequent death after being run over by a motorcar; and 
the death of a child at the hands of a werewolf in “Gabriel-Ernest”.  
20
 Suitable examples are that of “The Boar Pig”, where a child extorts money from two women who are 
attempting to infiltrate a garden party uninvited, and “Sredni Vashtar”, where a child takes vengeance against 
his oppressive aunt by praying to a deity that subsequently kills her. 
21
 “At 40, settled in London, he was best known as a well-dressed bridge player at the Cocoa Tree club, but 
still given to childish pranks and extreme prejudices” (Byrne, 2007: 6). 
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Saki’s use of humour is at once hilarious and extremely intricate. Byrne’s assertion 
that he transgressed the boundaries of acceptability and taste seems to suggest that at times 
Saki tried and failed to be funny and was instead only cruel or inappropriate. This is hardly 
ever the case, as Byrne herself admits: “Saki can force a guilty laugh out of readers even 
when the humour is directed against a serious and worthy cause” (Byrne, 2007: 8-9). In 
Saki’s work, humour is neither a clear moralising force, nor is it merely Freud’s 
“narcissistic” need to achieve relief and assert oneself above all others. It is instead a 
complicated whole through which Saki destroys the foundations of conventionality whilst 
simultaneously cherishing its existence, in an almost Nietzschean conception of morality, 
providing the Dionysian in a time of Apollonian torpor. Reginald, in “Reginald at the 
Carlton” and “Reginald at the Theatre” respectively, is a perfect example: “[s]candal is 
merely the compassionate allowance which the gay make to the humdrum. Think how 
many blameless lives are brightened by the blazing indiscretions of other people” (Munro, 
1922: 48); “[o]f course I accept the Imperial idea and the responsibility. After all, I would 
just as soon think in Continents as anywhere else” (Munro, 1922: 21). Reginald is not 
against the British Empire, he merely refuses to be deceived, instead choosing to point out 
the hypocrisy behind the idea of clear-cut morality and of the unimpeachable moral 
rectitude of the British Empire: “And even your philanthropy, practised in a world where 
everything is based on competition, must have a debit as well as a credit account” (ibid.: 
22). In “Reginald at the Theatre”, moments later, after Reginald further challenges the 
innocence of the Duchess’s imperial views, she replies: “[o]h you’re simply exasperating. 
You’ve been reading Nietzsche till you haven’t got any sense of moral proportion left. 
May I ask if you are governed by any laws of conduct whatsoever?” (ibid.). Reginald 
replies: 
 
There are certain fixed rules that one observes for one’s comfort. For instance, never 
be flippantly rude to any inoffensive grey-bearded stranger that you may meet in pine 
forests of hotel-smoking rooms on the Continent. It always turns out to be the King of 
Sweden. (ibid.: 23) 
 
The laws of conduct that govern Reginald are immediately apparent: those of his 
convenience. Furthermore, it is instead due to having read Nietzsche that Reginald has a 
sense of proportion – one measure of flippancy for each measure of self-seriousness. There 
is, in Saki’s work, a curious appetite for contradiction and ambiguity wherefrom sprouts a 
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peculiar sensation of a wisdom beyond limits; a wisdom that lives apart from the world of 
politics and exists only in the dalliances of one simultaneously oppressed by, and 
appreciative of the world around him. Munro, of course, had his political and cultural 
antipathies – some of them outdated and prejudiced –, but even in alluding to them the 
humour bears little to be criticised. 
 While a thorough analysis of Saki’s oeuvre would be extraneous to this thesis, I 
have chosen three short-stories which I believe are both representative of his sense of 
humour, due to the common themes of violence, hypocrisy and mischief, as well as steeped 




Esmé is a short story by Saki published in 1911 as part of the Chronicles of Clovis 
collection. It is presented as a tale told by “the Baroness” to Clovis Sangrail, one of the 
cynical and mischievous youngsters that people Saki’s narratives, and perhaps his most 
famous, along with Reginald.   
The story begins with Clovis’s remark that “all hunting stories are the same,” 
(Munro, 1948: 7). Upon hearing this, the Baroness launches into a hunting story which she 
claims “isn’t a bit like any you’ve ever heard” (ibid.). She proceeds to tell Clovis how, in 
her youth, herself and Constance Broddle, “one of those strapping florid girls that go so 
well with autumn scenery or Christmas decorations in a church” (ibid.) had got lost from 
the remaining party at a foxhunt whilst in pursuit of the hounds. The Baroness’ opinion of 
Constance is immediately clear to the reader: she is merely ornamental and, 
consequentially, we are led to believe the Baroness does not enjoy her company. 
At the inception of the story, the Baroness prefaces her narrative by digressing 
about her youth: “I wasn’t living apart from my husband then; you see, neither of us could 
afford to make the other a separate allowance. In spite of everything that proverbs may say, 
poverty keeps together more homes than it breaks up” (ibid.) The Baroness’ humorous 
deconstruction of the proverb “when poverty comes in at the door, love flies out of the 
window,” sets the tone of the story even further. Her case, she claims, is the antithesis of 
the proverb – their “love” was only nourished by the fact that they were too poor to live 
apart. The almost Wildean quip is a display of the Baroness’ wit, but also an intimate 
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confession: that hers is a loveless marriage. A confession which, if candid, would perhaps 
have been considered in poor taste – something on which, in “The Way to the  Dairy”, the 
Baroness remarks: “I’m always having depressing experiences […] but I never give them 
outward expression. It’s as bad as looking one’s age” (ibid.: 100). 
In a sense, both foxhunting and marriage are presented here as dull affairs engaged 
in for convenience’s sake. Foxhunting in particular, however, is used as the archetype of 
the pointless social affair, while simultaneously providing a rare chance for the 
protagonists to be placed out of their comfort zones.  The Baroness’ tone as well as Clovis’ 
lack of enthusiasm for foxhunting indicate that they neither find it at all pleasurable, nor do 
they find it useful in any way. The fact that Constance Broddle, who is described as 
thoroughly unremarkable, is referred to as part of “the usual [foxhunting] crowd” evinces 
this.  
During the hunt, the Baroness invariably treats Constance terribly, rewarding what 
she perceives as her frivolousness and lack of intelligence with acerbic remarks. The 
hostilities begin as Constance has “a presentiment that something dreadful is going to 
happen” (ibid.: 7), and asks the Baroness if she looks pale. After reflecting that Constance 
“was looking about as pale as a beetroot that has suddenly heard bad news” (ibid.), the 
Baroness replies: “You’re looking nicer than usual, […] but that’s so easy for you” (ibid.). 
The suggestion is that Constance’s concern with her own paleness is trivial, but also 
unfounded, and the Baroness immediately takes the opportunity to chide her with a veiled 
insult. In a time when paleness was considered a sign of good breeding, the mention of 
Constance’ possible ruddiness may also suggest that she does not truly belong to the 
Baroness’ class, and is instead part of the nouveau riche, which immediately places the 
Baroness at odds with her. The fact that Clovis himself does not seem to be an aristocrat 
may seem to lessen the emphasis of the Baroness’ antipathy towards Constance on class 
and instead lay it on the latter’s demeanour. However, the fact that Constance is part of the 
so-called parvenu so common at that time in England
22
, gives her an element of the novice 
                                                          
22
 “After 1832 the old land-owning aristocracy steadily lost power, but instead of disappearing or becoming a 
fossil they simply intermarried with the merchants, manufacturers and financiers who had replaced them, and 
soon turned them into accurate copies of themselves. The wealthy shipowner or cotton-miller set up for 
himself an alibi as a country gentleman, while his sons learned the right mannerisms at public schools which 
had been designed for just that purpose. England was ruled by an aristocracy constantly recruited from 
parvenus” (Orwell, 1982: 56). Here there is also a particular sense of degeneracy that Saki seemed to agree 
with. His constant depictions of the (at times literally) animalistic, of the ruthless within society calls to mind 
the sentiment behind the continuation of Orwell’s quote: “And considering what energy the self-made men 
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attempting to secure a position akin to The Baroness’ – a struggle towards which the latter 
is not sympathetic. 
Riding ahead, the two women come across a peculiar animal which they had not 
expected to find – a hyena. The discovery is introduced by Constance, who cries: “in 
Heaven’s name, what are they hunting?” (ibid.: 8). As the hounds depart, and having been 
told that they are before an apparently friendly hyena from Lord Pabham’s park, Constance 
follows up with another question: “What are we to do?” which prompts the Baroness to 
reply: “what a person you are for questions,” (ibid.). 
Constance’s questions are annoying to the Baroness precisely because, while 
understandable, they merely echo the obvious. Faced with a similar situation, anyone 
would wonder what to do. However, we are given the impression that instead of attempting 
to provide insight into their situation, Constance is merely asking the Baroness for a 
solution, which gets precisely in the way of finding one.  
The feeling that Constance’s interventions are nettlesome to a degree is aided by 
the way the story itself is constructed. Of all the events that take place in the Baroness’ 
tale, Constance’s presence is certainly the least interesting. Moreover, her observations 
always seem to get in the way of the plot and interrupt and duplicate the Baroness’ 
retelling, which inevitably stalls the delivery of what was promised to be an exciting story 
and becomes predictable to a fault. The timing of Constance’s questions is then calculated 
meticulously. “What are we to do?” is perhaps the prime example. At that moment 
Constance had only spoken to ask two questions, which paved the way for the last element 
of the famous “rule of three”, leaving the reader to expect yet another one. The detailed 
description that follows, however, distracts the reader from Constance’s inability to adapt 
to the situation – both to the hyena’s presence and to the Baroness’ distaste for her 
inquiries. We are instead treated to a very vivid picture of the hounds departing in fright 
and leaving both ladies alone with a strange animal. When the question inevitably comes, 
the expectation has faded to such a point that the reader half-expects it but is 
simultaneously surprised, which strengthens the comic effect and the impression that 
Constance is an annoying, frivolous character. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
possessed, and considering that they were buying their way into a class which at any rate had a tradition of 
public service, one might have expected that able rulers could be produced in some such way. And yet 




When the Baroness, through biting sarcasm, voices her displeasure at the questions, 
Constance insists yet again on stating the obvious: “well, we can’t stay here all night with a 
hyena” (ibid.). The Baroness is fully aware that theirs is a complicated predicament, much 
like virtually everyone would be, and proceeds to tell her so: “I don’t know what your 
ideas of comfort are […] but I shouldn’t think of staying here all night even without a 
hyena” (ibid.). She proceeds to remark that her home “may be an unhappy one, but at least 
it has hot and cold water laid on, and domestic service, and other conveniences which we 
shouldn’t find here” (ibid).  
The motives behind the Baroness’ use of humour are intricate, at best. One will of 
course do well not to forget that she is telling this story to Clovis Sangrail, somewhat of a 
kindred spirit when it comes to disenchantment and humour. On one level, then, the 
Baroness intends to avoid being dull and to amuse Clovis, which may demand that she 
resort to comic exaggeration. However, embedded in some of her quips are unsettling 
statements about the Baroness’ own unhappiness – such as references to her unhappy 
marriage. While avoiding at all costs being confessional (and thus risking revealing 
sentiment, which could be a social faux-pas), she is in some way expressing her 
unhappiness both to a kindred spirit (Clovis) and to Constance. In fact, considering the 
story’s tragic contours, one could perhaps argue that the telling of the tale alone is a way of 
coping and achieving some sort of relief through sharing a traumatic story by making it 
light-hearted and comic – in short, by placing herself above and untouched by it. 
 In her relation to Constance, however, the situation is more complicated: on some 
level, we are led to understand that the Baroness is also making use of sarcasm and irony in 
order to insult Constance and vent her frustration with the latter’s behaviour. This is 
because Constance either cannot understand the (not so) veiled insults, or because they are 
subtle enough for Constance not to be able to protest overtly – which would have been a 
breach of social etiquette, especially if she happened not to be the Baroness’ equal, socially 
speaking. 
Not knowing what else to do, the two ladies are left to find their way back to 
familiar ground in the hyena’s company. Amid Constance’s unnerving questions, the 
Baroness herself, though having devised a simple course of action to solve their 
predicament, seems at a momentary loss when she realises that, not knowing the hyena’s 
sex, she cannot name her, before eventually deciding on Esmé: “If we even knew its sex 
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we might give it a name. Perhaps we might call it Esmé. That would do in either case” 
(ibid.: 9). The preoccupation is absurd, and seems to both illustrate how ill-equipped to 
deal with these matters the two women are and signal the Baroness’ determination to 
remain on top of things. Her need to name the hyena can perhaps initially be ascribed to 
cluelessness – maybe the Baroness, who surely interacts mostly with people of her own 
social class, is so unused to dealing with animals, with savages, that in a stressful situation 
she can think of nothing but to dignify it with a name. However, the act of naming the 
hyena may just be more complex than that. By naming the hyena, she is appropriating it. In 
a way, this is a stepping stone for the Baroness to take control of the situation by dwelling 
on something irrelevant instead of expressing her concern, but also indicates, much like her 
earlier description of the hyena as friendly, that she is fond of it. In that sense, worrying 
about finding it an appropriate name also indicates a bond of mutual recognition is formed 
between the hyena and the Baroness – like Vonnegut’s eight Dresdeners, she need not fear. 
Making their way through the looming darkness, the women and the hyena come 
across what the Baroness describes as “a small half-naked gipsy brat picking blackberries” 
(ibid.: 9) whose frightened scream gives the party an “upward perk” (ibid.). While 
Constance wonders “what the child was doing there” (ibid.), prompting another dry reply, 
the child is, unbeknownst to them, attacked by the hyena. Both ladies hear the screams, and 
Constance expresses her unease about them: “I don’t like the way it cried, […] somehow 
its wail keeps ringing in my ears” (ibid.). The Baroness then describes the moment of the 
realization: 
 
I did not chide Constance for her morbid fancies; as a matter of fact the same 
sensation, of being pursued by a persistent fretful wail, had been forcing itself on my 
rather over-tired nerves. For company’s sake I hulloed to Esmé, who had lagged 
somewhat behind. With a few springy bounds he drew up level, and then shot past us. 
(ibid.) 
 
It never seems to occur to Constance that the child may still be screaming – Esmé 
being the obvious culprit. She instead draws attention to her own vulnerability, 
conjecturing that the cry was so terrible that it is still ringing in her ears. The Baroness’ 
own reaction, however, is not much different. She claims she “did not chide Constance for 
her morbid fancies” (ibid.), revealing that she had a similar feeling. A reference to her own 
sensation of being “pursued by a persistent fretful wail” (ibid.), and her “over-tired nerves” 
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(ibid.), seem to suggest that she too assumed herself distressed to the point of imagining 
things. However, instead of indicating any kind of similarity between Constance and the 
Baroness, this only seems to signal that the situation that will immediately follow is grave 
enough to warrant Constance’s “morbid fancies” and “presentiments”. 
As it so happens it is, and the circumstances quickly become obvious to both ladies: 
“The wailing accompaniment was explained. The gipsy child was firmly, and I expect 
painfully, held in her jaws” (ibid.). While the matter is described with absolute detachment, 
and while Constance’s intervention was merely, as expected, to scream “Merciful Heaven! 
[…] what on earth shall we do? What are we to do?” (ibid.) – which prompts the Baroness 
to say: “I am perfectly certain that at the Last Judgment Constance will ask more questions 
than any of the examining Seraphs” (ibid.: 10), the events seem to cause both distress, and 
the Baroness tries to help the child: 
 
Personally I was doing everything that occurred to me at the moment. I 
stormed and scolded and coaxed in English and French and gamekeeper language; I 
made absurd ineffectual cuts in the air with my thongless hunting-crop, I hurled my 
sandwich case at the brute; in fact, I really don’t know what more I could have done. 
And still we lumbered on through the deepening dusk, with that dark uncouth shape 
lumbering ahead of us, and a drone of lugubrious music floating in our ears. (ibid.) 
 
The outcome betrays a particular sense of powerlessness. The Baroness seems 
unable to think what else she could have done, which considering the futility of what she 
actually did, seems strange. A faint suggestion that these are faults of her class begins to 
arise. We are perhaps also left with the feeling that she is too quick to forgive herself, 
despite the fact that hyenas are dangerous animals and attempting to wrestle with Esmé 
would have neither helped the child nor have boded well for the Baroness. While the 
Baroness’ slightly Machiavellian turn may yet again imply she is manipulating the tale in 
her favour, the fact that she reportedly resorted to “gamekeeper-language” seems to 
suggest that she lost her composure at the time, which to someone of her status is 
everything. This may indicate that a certain veiled concern for the child’s life is present. 
The mention of a “drone of lugubrious music” (ibid.) further evinces this, but the most 
relevant detail is perhaps that, for the first time, the Baroness refers to Esmé in a negative 
light, as a “dark, uncouth shape” (ibid.).  
The hyena carries the child off to some bushes where we are led to understand it is 
killed, which prompts the Baroness to say: “This part of the story I always hurry over, 
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because it is really rather horrible” (ibid.)
23
. One of the reasons for the omission is 
relatively clear: the actual details of the child’s death can hardly provide for a fun, 
humorous tale. However, it also suggests that the Baroness’ ennui and detachment do not 
reach the heights of cruelty or complete indifference, and that the child’s death may have 
affected her ability to be light-hearted. To some extent, the event was traumatic for the 
Baroness, and retelling it in such detail would be reliving the traumatic event entirely, 
instead of treating it with comic detachment. By voicing the narrative in such a way that 
presents it as a trifle, she is reaching for Freud’s narcissistic self-preservation. When she 
shrinks from making light of the child’s death, deeming it “really rather horrible”, it 
becomes clear that the Baroness is not sadistic; on a subtler level, it seems that she cannot 
bring herself to completely detach herself from the situation and make light of it. 
When the hyena returns, the Baroness observes that “there was an air of patient 
understanding about him, as though he knew that he had done something of which we 
disapproved, but which he felt to be thoroughly justifiable” (ibid.). It is worthy of note that, 
despite the ambiguity of the name, the Baroness refers to Esmé as a “he”, although why 
remains unclear – perhaps only as a neutral pronoun. Constance, on the other hand, is 
shocked, and asks how the Baroness can “let that ravening beast trot by [her] side” (ibid.).  
Again, Constance’s intervention comes off as a needless distraction. At this 
particular junction, Constance thinks that the hyena deserves moral reproach, failing to 
understand, as the Baroness does, that it is an animal, that there is no safe way to get rid of 
it and that it is now largely harmless, having been fed: “‘In the first place, I can’t prevent 
it,’ I said; ‘and in the second place, whatever else he may be, I doubt if he’s ravening at the 
present moment’” (ibid.). 
Having been somewhat appeased, and with a shudder, Constance asks “another of 
her futile questions: “Do you think the poor little thing suffered much?” (ibid.) The 
Baroness is quick to reply: “The indications were all that way […] on the other hand of 
course, it may have been crying from sheer temper. Children sometimes do” (ibid.). The 
statement is steeped in a deep ambiguity. On the one hand, it is glaringly insensitive – the 
death and suffering of a child is spoken of as if it were the growth of a distant plant, and 
ultimately dismissed as a possible case of “sheer temper.” On the other hand, this final 
dismissal is provocative – the Baroness is also replying to the futility of Constance’s 
                                                          
23
 This suggests the Baroness tells the story often to amuse herself and others. 
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question with an inane contraption of her own, thus pointing out how obvious it is that the 
child suffered as it was being eaten to death. The Baroness seems to boast, in spite of 
everything, a greater sense of reality than Constance’s. In this respect, the Baroness’ 
attitude could be defined as world-weary. While she is of course mostly unequipped with 
the ability to deal with difficulties beyond those of her own privileged social milieu, she is 
aware that they live in a world where the occasional child will be killed by a hyena. 
Constance, on the other hand, lives entirely in the world of fiction – she is a part of the 
“usual crowd”, who bumble around mindlessly from foxhunt to foxhunt, which makes her 
reaction to anything remotely “dangerous” absurdly exaggerated. Perhaps her own 
participation in the foxhunt can be used in order to further explore this. A foxhunt, despite 
all its aristocratic veneer, is at bottom the killing of an animal for sport
24
. The presence of 
someone so sensitive and easily impressed at a hunt can only mean a handful of things: 
they have attended somewhat unenthusiastically but are nevertheless aware of what it 
entails (similarly to the Baroness’ case); they have attended with only the vaguest notion of 
what actually goes on, not really taking part; they are aware of it all and their sensitivity is 
dubious. There is of course no comparison between passively engaging in a foxhunt and 
witnessing the death of a child, but a certain irony still seems to arise from the fact that two 
women who were taking part in a foxhunt are instead led to witness a child being hunted 
by a wild animal. If one is to take Constance for a member of the nouveau riche who is 
attempting to edge her way into the Baroness’ class, the foxhunt and this tragedy may very 
well symbolize the gruesome, predatory side of the aristocracy, which the Baroness 
tolerates and engages in, but which Constance ignores. The fact that Constance perhaps 
aspires to be in the Baroness’ position but is unaware of what it entails is what seems to 
grate on the latter the most. 
A while after the child-incident, Esmé is run over by a man riding a car. “You have 
killed my Esmé”, the Baroness “exclaims bitterly” (ibid.: 11). Again, she seems to have 
become fond of the murderous hyena. The remark, however, seems to bear a degree of 
facetiousness, calling to mind the mock-sentimentality of Vivian in Oscar Wilde’s The 
Decay of Lying: “One of the greatest tragedies of my life is the death of Lucien de 
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 In “The Bag”, a Russian youth sojourning in England sends a community into despair because, due to a 
misunderstanding, they assume he has shot a fox while out hunting, leaving him wondering why such a fuss 
was being made around the death of a polecat. Through the youth’s perspective one is made to feel that the 





. It is a grief from which I have never been able completely to rid myself. I 
remember it when I laugh” (Wilde, 1997: 927). While both Vivian and the Baroness 
clearly shared a degree of disappointment and sadness at the passing of Lucien and Esmé 
respectively, the degree to which they express it seems maudlin and insincere, considering 
their disdain for all things sentimental, and seems on a certain level to be meant as a joke. 
The humour would then lie in the overtly exaggerated concern and fondness for the well-
being of a fictional character versus real people, and for a wild animal versus a gipsy child. 
The man, clearly concerned, immediately sympathises with the Baroness’ loss: 
“I’m so awfully sorry, […] I keep dogs myself so I know what you must feel about it” 
(Munro, 1948: 11). The Baroness asks him to bury Esmé, who is treated to a ceremony to 
which the “gipsy brat” never was. The man’s concern, juxtaposed with the previous tragic 
events, is both undeniably funny and revealing of the Baroness’ guile. The fact that she 
was able to recognise Esmé as a hyena almost immediately, while the man thinks it is a 
large dog, seems to give her the upper hand. Realising the man’s mistake, and noticing he 
has offered to do “anything [he] can in reparations” (ibid.), the Baroness immediately takes 
advantage of the tragic situation. A slightly disturbing detail lies in the promptness with 
which Esmé is buried: the man and his motorist carry a spade in the boot of the car, which 
prompts the Baroness to remark to Clovis that “evidently hasty roadside interments were 
contingencies that had been provided against” (ibid.). The takeaway is clear: unhappy 
accidents such as these were regular events in these men’s lives. The Baroness’ remark 
reads much like: “I’m sure they kill things like this all the time”, an attitude to which she is 
also familiar with. 
The chirpy matter-of-factness of both the man and his motorist are made to contrast 
with the expected gravity of the animal’s death even further by the following excerpt: “’I 
say, what a magnificent fellow’, said the motorist as the corpse was rolled over into the 
trench” (ibid.). The contrast is striking to the point of hilarity, and the Baroness again 
doubles down on the inadequateness, this time in pursuit of her own ends: “he took second 
in the puppy class at Birmingham last year,” (ibid.) which prompts a loud snort from 
Constance. Hearing this, the owner of the car insists he must do something for her by way 
of reparation, which the Baroness agrees to, allegedly finding him persistent.  
In the end, the death of the child and of the hyena has little effect on the world: 
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Of course, we kept our own counsel as to the earlier episodes of the evening. Lord 
Pabham never advertised the loss of his hyena; when a strictly fruit-eating animal 
strayed from his park a year or two previously he was called upon to give 
compensation in eleven cases of sheep-worrying and practically to re-stock his 
neighbours’ poultry-yards, and an escaped hyena would have mounted up to 
something on the scale of a Government grant. The gypsies were equally unobtrusive 
over their missing offspring. I don’t suppose in large encampments they really know 
to a child or two how many they’ve got. (ibid.) 
 
Lord Pabham suffers no consequences or distress for the unsafe way he keeps 
dangerous wild animals that continuously cause trouble; and the “gypsies” seem largely 
unperturbed by the loss of the child, their living conditions so dire that they may have 
failed to notice that one of their own is missing
26
.  
 As for the Baroness, she receives “a charming little diamond brooch, with the name 
Esmé set in a sprig of rosemary” (ibid.: 12), and loses the friendship of Constance Broodle, 
but only because “when I sold the brooch I quite properly refused to give her any share of 
the proceeds” (ibid.). 
 In “Esmé”, Saki’s greatest achievement is to draw humour from the tragic on 
multiple levels. Clovis’ opening remark suggests that foxhunting is merely a tedious affair 
– a gathering of foppish dullards which inevitably ends with a fox in some gorse-bushes. 
The statement is tinged with a pervading sense of ennui. The Baroness objects, however. In 
her story, foxhunting is never a dull moment. Instead, a child is devoured by a hyena which 
is in turn killed by a passing motorist, and the only redeeming aspect of the ordeal is that 
she happens to have profited from it. In a sense, the literal takeaway could be Gaultier’s “la 
barbarie plutôt que l'ennui”: the Baroness and Clovis’ main purpose is to amuse 
themselves, even at the cost of a tragedy. However, this is hardly a sadistic tale – the 
Baroness took no pleasure in the death of the child or the hyena, but merely decided to 
make the best of it at the cost of people she found just as amoral: first by duping them into 
increasing her wealth, and second by spinning the tale into a humorous one. While the 
subject matter of the story is grim, it is the light-heartedness and comic timing with which 
the affair is described that allows for the humour and makes the story amusing, while 
                                                          
26
 A theme one can find in other Saki stories, such as “The Baker’s Dozen”, where a prospective couple is 
about to abandon their efforts to be together because they have too many children between them, before 
realising that one of them had mistakenly counted five children instead of four; and “Gabriel-Ernest”, where 
the mother of a child, who is killed by a werewolf, is referred to as “decently resigned to her bereavement” 
(Munro, 1922: 149) because she had eleven other children. 
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simultaneously revealing a particular outlook on life. It can be said that Freud’s assertion 
that humour is the triumph of narcissism is here taken to its utmost limit: the Baroness, 
realizing the futility and the inevitable horror of the world around her, chooses instead to 
pursue her own gains. But we must not forget what else the Baroness’ use of humour 
betrays: ambiguity. The fact that we can laugh at her comment about how the child may 
have cried from sheer temper puts us in a difficult spot – hers. We are amused by the levity 
with which the matter is approached, distressed by its literality, and amused again by how 
she seems to be taunting Constance whilst simultaneously admitting to her own aloofness. 
The plot itself can be discussed as an exercise in ambiguity and hypocrisy, since the 
Baroness, who constantly criticises Constance for her superficiality and lack of 
intelligence, revealing a deeper understanding of reality, is content with obtaining a certain 
degree of comfort in a world full of boredom and pain: “My home may be an unhappy one, 
but at least it has hot and cold water laid on, and domestic service, and other conveniences 
which we shouldn’t find here” (ibid.: 8). The need to name the hyena, the comment on the 
child’s suffering, the mock-sentimentality are all amusing because they are absurd, but 
they are also a way for the Baroness to regain control over her surroundings and express 
her own feelings. Her constant abuse of Constance is only acceptable to us because it is 
both an accurate response to her inanity and because it rises above mere invective in its art, 
which coincides with Freud’s assessment of the motives behind “Herr N’s” repartee:  
Let us look, for example, at the witticisms made by Herr N. which were scattered over 
the previous pages. They are all of them insults. It is as if Herr N. wanted to shout out 
loud: ‘But the Minister of Agriculture is an ass himself!’  […] ‘Don’t talk to me about 
***; he’s bursting with vanity!’ […] I’ve never read anything more boring than this 
historian’s essays on Napoleon in Austria! […]. But his high degree of personal 
cultivation makes it impossible for him to vent to these judgements of his in this form. 
That is why they have recourse to jokes, for jokes will ensure them a reception they 
would never have found in an unjoking form. (Freud, 2002: 101) 
 
 In this case, as previously observed, the Baroness is frustrated at Constance’s 
behaviour and, like Herr N., finds relief in expressing her invective through humour, which 
both amuses Clovis and allows her to check Constance without breeching the rules of 
etiquette. When it comes to the gruesome events themselves, the Baroness’ use of humour 
is different: she is aware of the gravity of it all but refuses to let it disturb her, using 
humour as a tool for saving face whilst simultaneously acknowledging the dire reality – a 
reality which she is nevertheless not able, nor perhaps even willing, to change. 
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 The more disturbing aspect of the story, perhaps, is the purported reaction of the 
gypsies. We must not forget the story is not being told by an omniscient narrator. With this 
realization come a few more details: the Baroness only knows the gypsies were 
unobtrusive, she cannot possibly know how they felt about the child’s death. Her comment, 
then, becomes pregnant with ambiguous meaning: maybe she is convinced her observation 
is accurate, which reveals a stunningly pessimistic approach to humanity whose origin lies 
in the behaviour of her own acquaintances; perhaps it is simply self-deceit, in order to 
shield her from the painful aspects of the event; and finally, perhaps it is, rather than 
condemnatory, imbued instead with the same sense of humour that her comment about the 
child’s suffering was. If the last option is true, it both evinces the gypsies’ strife, offering 
some degree of sympathy, and allows her to move on, conscious of the inevitable aspects 
of a bygone tragedy.  
The Baroness’ coldness, wit and disdain for conventional society render her 
entertaining to the reader, who subsequently sympathises with her. However, they are also 
what allow her to profit and thrive from the very thing she despises. Her use of humour 
showcases this very dilemma – she despises the world around her, yet she must deal with it 
constantly in order to survive on her terms, thus becoming just as much of a disdainful part 
of it. 
The matter of Constance remains intricate. By the end of the tale, it is not only her 
inopportune remarks that we find frustrating, but chiefly her hypocrisy. In hindsight one 
gains the impression that, to the Baroness, each of Constance’s winces and worries reek of 
a false assertion of moral superiority: a superiority which, it is revealed – if the Baroness’s 
account is to be trusted –, she does not possess, her presence at the foxhunt alone already 
hinting at this, because if Constance truly is a parvenu, it shows that she merely desires 
what the Baroness has, and is thus no better, but instead more ignorant, for it. In a general 
way, the Baroness’ attitude towards Constance is hostile to the latter’s vanity. 
In a great deal of his works, Saki mingles human beings with animals: likening the 
one to the other, transforming one into another and evincing their differences. In “Esmé”, 
the Baroness seems to feel a degree of understanding for Esmé – an understanding of the 
necessity of cruelty in order to survive on one’s terms. Like Esmé, she is aware of this 
dreadfulness. Unlike Esmé, she is forced to deal with the ill-feeling through humour. The 
choice of animal, the hyena, is never exactly clear in its symbolism. However, the hyena 
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carries its own symbolism in the world of fiction: it is usually represented as a cruel, 
conniving animal. Furthermore, its call is frequently equated to laughter. While, again, the 
hyena does little in the story that would differentiate it from any other predator of its size, 
this last characteristic further helps to establish a slight parallel between it and the 
Baroness as laughing, calculating predators. In “The Peace Offering” the Baroness claims: 
“When one lives among greyhounds one should avoid giving lifelike imitations of a rabbit, 
unless one wants one’s head snapped off” (ibid.: 109). This seems to sum up her attitude 
towards the society around her – among the greyhounds she must be a hyena. 
We are thus left with an abrasive comment on Edwardian, early Georgian society 
and humanity in general which suggests little in the way of a solution: with a Baroness 
who is charming due to her wit and intelligence, but whose cruel one-upmanship and 
disregard for justice leaves us wary of her actions, even when those around her are just as 
amoral as she. 
 
2.2.2 “Tobermory”  
 
“Tobermory”, part of the Chronicles of Clovis collection, is yet another of Saki’s 
forays into the animalesque. The story develops as follows: at a house-party at Lady 
Blemley’s, a number of guests gathers around the tea table. One of them, Mr. Cornelius 
Appin, is a newcomer who was invited because “some one had said he was ‘clever’” (ibid.: 
16). Despite the “blankness of the season and the triteness of the occasion,” the guests are 
“fixed on the homely negative personality of Mr. Cornelius Appin” (ibid.: 16). As they 
wonder why exactly this man was said to be clever, since he had yet to show anything in 
the way of qualities, Mr. Appin announces that he has “launched on the world a discovery 
beside which the invention of gunpowder, the printing press, and of steam locomotion 
were inconsiderable trifles” (ibid.). This discovery, it is revealed, consists in teaching 
animals human speech, and Mr Appin claims that his first successful pupil is Tobermory, 
one of Lady Blemley’s cats. In fact, he explains, he had lately been experimenting solely 
on cats, “those wonderful creatures which have assimilated themselves so marvellously 
with our civilization while retaining all their highly developed feral instincts” (ibid.: 17).  
 He then goes on to claim that Tobermory now speaks English perfectly, at which 
point Clovis, who is also present, expresses his disbelief. In order to set matters straight, 
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the guests decide to find Tobermory and see for themselves, while Clovis melts into the 
background, observing. In a minute, Sir Wilfrid, who had gone to find the cat, comes back 
and announces that it is true: he found Tobermory and, asking him to come along quickly, 
heard him say distinctly that “he’d come when he dashed well pleased” (ibid.: 18). 
 The guests are immediately convinced, and a little while later Tobermory enters the 
room with “velvet tread and studied unconcern” (ibid.) He proceeds to reply “I don’t mind 
if I do” (ibid.), when offered some milk, to deliver a caustic remark, and to ignore Miss 
Resker’s request to hear if it was difficult to learn “the human language” (ibid.), because 
“it was obvious that boring questions lay outside his scheme of life” (ibid.: 19). When 
Mavis Pellington asks what Tobermory thinks of human intelligence (and hers in 
particular) he replies that she has put him in an awkward position, and then reveals what he 
has overheard the surrounding guests say about her behind her back: namely that she is 
“the most brainless woman” (ibid.) of Sir Wilfrid’s acquaintance, and that she may be the 
only person idiotic enough to buy Lady Blemley’s old car: “[y]ou know, the one they call 
‘The Envy of Sisyphus,’ because it goes quite nicely up-hill if you push it” (ibid.). He then, 
after being provoked by the Major, who mentions his “carryings-on wit the tortoiseshell 
puss up at the stables” (ibid.) proceeds to reveal a number of harmful secrets and embarrass 
several of the guests, who immediately panic.  
The cat, due to his privileged position as the household pet of a home where many 
parties are thrown, knows every bit of gossip possible. The people present are immediately 
nervous for their reputation: Mrs Cornett “who spent much time at her toilet table, and 
whose complexion was reputed to be of a nomadic though punctual disposition, looked as 
ill at ease as the Major” (ibid.: 20); Miss Scrawen “who wrote fiercely sensuous poetry and 
led a blameless life, merely displayed irritation” (ibid.) (because one’s virtue need not be 
known to all); Bertie van Than, “who was so depraved at seventeen that he had long ago 
given up trying to be any worse, turned a dull shade of gardenia white”(ibid.); Odo 
Finsberry, who was “reading for the Church and who was possibly disturbed at the thought 
of scandals he might hear concerning other people” (ibid.) dashed out of the room; and 
Clovis kept a cool exterior, while “calculating how long it would take to procure a box of 




 After more of these actions and reactions, Tobermory catches a “glimpse of the big 
yellow Tom from the Rectory” (ibid.: 21) and escapes the room. While he is gone, the 
party immediately decides Tobermory is an inconvenience: “[m]y husband and I are very 
fond of Tobermory – at least we were before this horrible accomplishment was infused into 
him; but now of course, the only thing is to have him destroyed as soon as possible “ (ibid.: 
21-22). Sir Wilfrid complies without a second thought: “we can put some strychnine in the 
scraps he always gets at dinnertime (…) and I’ll go and drown the stable cat myself” (ibid.: 
22); the stable cat being Tobermory’s companion, whom they fear may have learned the 
same skill: “a very catching form of mange (ibid.)  
 Mr. Appin is immediately distressed, displeased at the thought of losing the only 
proof of his great discovery, but he is advised to try to come up with something less 
harmful next time; for instance, to “experiment on the (…) elephants at the Zoological 
Gardens” (ibid.). 
 The rest of the day, while Sir Wilfrid busies himself with attempting to deal with 
both cats, is spent lugubriously. At two o’clock in the morning, the guests are still waiting 
for Tobermory to show up dead after eating the poisoned scraps, and Clovis breaks the 
silence: “[h]e won’t turn up tonight. He’s probably in the local newspaper office at the 
present moment, dictating the first instalment of his reminiscences. Lady What’s-her-
name’s book won’t be in it. It will be the event of the day” (ibid.: 23). While fearful of 
what Tobermory may reveal about him (some mischief or the other), Clovis finds his 
revealing nature appealing and entertaining – a rupture with the constant dullness of these 
social affairs. 
 The following morning, after breakfast, Tobermory’s corpse is discovered in the 
shrubbery, his throat covered in bites and his claws coated with yellow fur, evidence that 
he had fallen “in unequal combat with the big yellow Tom from the Rectory” (ibid.). The 
guests abandon the house (relieved, surely), and Lady Blemley “sufficiently [recovers] her 
spirits to write an extremely nasty letter to the Rectory about the loss of her valuable pet” 
(ibid.). A few weeks later, news arrives that Cornelius Appin was killed by an elephant, 
which he had apparently been teasing. Learning of the news, Clovis remarks: “[i]f he was 
trying German irregular verbs on the poor beast (…) he deserved all he got” (ibid.24). 
On the subject of characters such as Clovis and Reginald, George James Spears 




Here is where we detect a fundamental flaw in ‘Saki’s’ understanding of human 
nature. For, although we may tolerate the Falstaffs of the world simply because they 
amuse us and help while away our idle moments, we do not hesitate for a moment in 
rejecting them when expediency demands it. (…) There is something Munro simply 
couldn’t grasp; namely, the fact that a Reginald or Clovis has no place in a serious and 
realistic portrayal of life. (Spears, 1953: 85) 
 
The idea, of course, is that Clovis’ constant sang-froid and biting cleverness are not 
realistic, nor do they make him amiable. Much like Reginald, Clovis is almost omniscient. 
In that sense, of course, he is “unrealistic.” However, Tobermory is the chief testament to 
the fact that Saki is painfully aware of this. Clovis only succeeds in his antics because he is 
always very entertaining. Were he to express his most corrosive thoughts or expose his 
peers as freely as Tobermory, no one would hesitate to arrange his death, as they did the 
cat’s. This is of course a startling indictment of a hypocritical society which, bound tightly 
by rules of etiquette, is nevertheless no more morally superior for it, but instead reveals its 
true nature by reacting in the cruellest way possible to a crack in its moralistic façade, 
while privately indulging in gossip and abuse. 
A more difficult point comes with Tobermory’s actual death at the hands of the big 
Tom from the Rectory.  Exactly when Tobermory died is unclear – he escapes the party to 
chase the big Tom. It is only after that moment that his scraps are poisoned by Sir Wilfrid. 
This leaves us in the dark as to whether Tobermory easily outsmarted the humans but was 
felled by a stronger cat, or was immediately killed in a fight after he left the room. In either 
case, it exposes the party’s incompetence and Tobermory’s essential flaw – he refused to 
play games. It is by playing games that Clovis both keeps himself from getting bored and 
avoids becoming useless. Saki knows that, no matter how clever one might be, there will 
always be a big Tom from the Rectory – this shows in Clovis, who noticing he himself 
may be in danger after Tobermory begins his revelations, immediately begins to hatch a 
scheme that will get Tobermory on his side. 
Saki’s writing has been described as Darwinistic before
27
, and in this sense it is – if 
one is not careful about picking one’s adversaries (because there is always someone 
stronger) death will soon follow. However, Clovis expresses some sympathy and 
                                                          
27
“Saki had read Darwin, and under Darwin's influence his fiction shows man as not morally superior to 
animal” (Elahipanah, 2006: 10); “The story also indicates that Saki's view of nature is not a beneficent or 
Romantic view; it is the Darwinian view of struggle” (Elahipanah, 2006: 319). 
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admiration for Tobermory instead of just scoffing at his folly. It can be argued that, like the 
Baroness in Esmé, he admires animals as beings who do not stoop to disguising their 
instincts, their id – Tobermory, who launched unthinkingly into battle, and the elephant, 
who immediately killed the dull Cornelius Appin. Even Appin’s words on the adaptability 
of cats and his praise of their feral instincts seem to point in this direction. In this case, 
however, the cat’s adaptability was compromised by the “gift” of human speech, which 
showcases a perceived lingering difference between humans and animals: a need to 
compromise and to dull one’s violent instincts in order to survive. The cat adapted 
perfectly because it was entirely amusing and did not have the facility of speech to 
compromise it. When it gained that skill, it was exposed. When Clovis remarks that 
Appin’s death was deserved if he had been trying German irregular verbs on the elephant, 
he seems to be saying that it is cruel to force the restrictive, ceremonial side of human 
social life on animals – here represented by language. 
In a way, this transformation is the opposite of the one in “Laura”, in which a dying 
woman who hasn’t “been very good” in life (Munro, 1940: 46) looks forward to 
reincarnating into an otter so she can wreak havoc at her leisure. When it happens, she 
finally gets a proper revenge on a man she disliked when she was human. However, 
because of their ways, both Tobermory and “otter-Laura” perish violently, the latter at the 
hands of her human rival
28
. 
The true, “catching form of mange”, in the end, is not necessarily human speech, but 
being bluntly honest. In “Reginald on Besetting Sins”, Saki begins his tale with: “[t]here 
was once (said Reginald) a woman who told the truth. Not all at once, of course, but the 
habit grew upon her gradually, like lichen on an apparently healthy tree” (Munro, 1922 
53). The woman then proceeds to alienate her friends and sister with her blunt, truthful 
habits: “[i]t was unfortunate, every one agreed, that she had no family; with a child or two 
in the house, there is an unconscious check upon too free better emotions. That is why the 
stage, with all its efforts, can never be as artificial as life” (ibid.: 54-55). Wanting to tell the 
truth, Reginald seems to suggest, is one of our “better emotions”. However, it is also an 
impossible practice in both polite society and practical life, to the point of being just as 
hypocritical as, and perhaps more harmful than, mendacity: “[f]or instance, she told 
Miriam Klopstock exactly how she looked at the Ilexes’ ball. Certainly Miriam had asked 
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 Laura later reincarnates into a Nubian boy who continues to give said rival trouble, which suggests that not 
even death will get in the way of her impish, prankster nature. 
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for her candid opinion, but the Woman prayed in church every Sunday for peace in our 
time, and it was not consistent” (ibid.: 54). 
Clovis is above this, having mastered the medium. Here there is a parallel with 
Freud’s idea of relief – Clovis uses humour, somewhat like Freud’s Herr N. and the 
Baroness, to express his desire to insult the society he inhabits whilst guaranteeing he stays 
alive. He consequently feels sympathy towards the ones who simply voice blunt criticism – 
whether or not it is a less clever strategy. There is perhaps a sense of a Bergsonian 
correction gone wrong in Tobermory: his criticism is far too candid, far too clear-cut. If it 
were not for the savagery of Nature, he would have nevertheless been killed by the equally 
savage house party guests. 
For the reader, the effect is similar: we are amused by Tobermory’s blunt disruption 
of the age-old vapid house party and by Clovis’ carefully crafted humour – his escape from 
the permeating tediousness. While Clovis plays the part of the untouchable wit, instead of 
the tragic one, this is hardly a fault in Saki’s writing – it is in fact his intention. When it 
comes to Tobermory, however, it is hard to think of something more realistic than his 
tragic demise, so it seems absurd to accuse Saki’s understanding of human nature of being 
fundamentally flawed. In his fiction he creates the perpetually amusing and juxtaposes it 
with reality – revealing the tragic side of its impossibility and ending on a comedic note. 
 
2.2.3 “The Unrest-Cure” 
 
During a train ride, a man called J. P. Huddle, described as “a solid, sedate 
individual, sedately dressed, sedately conversational” (Munro, 1948: 40), and as the 
“human embodiment of [his travelling bag’s] label” (ibid.) discusses things such as “the 
backwardness of Roman hyacinths and the prevalence of measles at the Rectory” (ibid.) 
before his chatter, which seems “unwilling to leave anything to the imagination of a casual 
observer” (ibid.) becomes introspective, and he complains about his sudden descent into 
sedentary middle-age: 
 
I’m not much over forty, but I seem to have settled down into a deep groove of elderly 
middle-age. My sister shows the same tendency. We like everything to be exactly in 
its accustomed place; we like things to happen exactly at their appointed times; we 
like everything to be usual, orderly, punctual, methodical, to a hair’s breadth, to a 




His friend immediately suggests he try an Unrest-cure: “[y]ou’ve heard of Rest-cures 
for people who’ve broken down under stress of too much worry and strenuous living; well, 
you’re suffering from overmuch repose and placidity, and you need the opposite kind of 
treatment” (ibid.: 41). He then proceeds to give anecdotal advice on the various places 
where J. P. Huddle might go for a rest cure – ending by suggesting that in order for it to be 
the most effective it should be tried at home. Clovis, who is sitting nearby, overhears the 
conversation and becomes “galvanised into alert attention” (ibid.) taking note of the man’s 
address from the label on his briefcase, the prospect of visiting a neighbouring relative 
having now become more appealing. 
Two days later, the man interrupts his sister’s allotted time for reading Country Life 
with a telegram reading: “Bishop examining confirmation class in neighbourhood unable 
stay rectory on account measles invokes your hospitality sending secretary arrange” (ibid.) 
Huddle’s sister immediately, and out of character, reacts by suggesting they curry the duck, 
since “the little orange envelope involved a certain departure from rule and custom” (ibid.: 
42). Her brother “said nothing, but his eyes thanked her for being brave” (ibid.). Shortly 
afterwards, Clovis enters the house pretending to be the Bishop’s “confidential secretary”, 
“Stanislaus.” He announces that “the Bishop and Colonel Alberti may be [there] to lunch” 
(ibid.) He then asks for a large-scale map of the locality and proceeds to puzzle his two 
victims during luncheon, prompting Miss Huddle to have a headache, although “it was not 
her day for having a headache” (ibid.: 43). Sometime later he announces the Bishop and 
Alberti are in the library, that he should on no account be disturbed and that no one should 
know they have come. Slightly outraged, Huddle questions why the Bishop should not be 
disturbed in the library, failing to see how he can have his tea otherwise: “what is all this 
mystery about? And who is Alberti? And isn’t the Bishop going to have tea?” (ibid.) Even 
in the face of the absolutely unordinary, Huddle seems to be more distressed by someone 
(the Bishop in particular) not having his tea. His imagination, it seems, is lacking in a few 
respects. Clovis is quick to put this in check, replying: “[t]he Bishop is out for blood, not 
tea,” then explaining that “[t]onight is going to be a great night in the history of 
Christendom (…) we are going to massacre every Jew in the neighbourhood” (ibid.). 
Huddle asks if there is a general rising against them, and is immediately assured that it is 
“the Bishop’s own idea” (ibid.) and that “[a] motor is waiting to carry him to the coast, 
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where a steam yacht is in readiness” (ibid.: 44). Huddle protests the ludicrousness of the 
idea, claiming it will be a blot on the twentieth century, that there are barely any Jews in 
the neighbourhood, and that some of them, like Sir Leon Birberry, are highly respected. 
The Bishop, however, seems adamant, and Clovis informs Mr. Huddle that Boy-scouts are 
also helping as auxiliaries: “when they understood there was real killing to be done they 
were even keener than the men” (ibid.). 
When Mr. Huddle decides to rebel and threatens to call the police, Clovis tells him 
he has men posted in the shrubbery who will kill anyone who exits the house without his 
permission, while “the Boy-scouts watch the back premises” (ibid.: 45). Beckoned by a car 
horn, Mr. Huddle goes to his hall door and finds Sir Leon Birberry (ibid.) in the driveway, 
who reports having received a telegram telling him to come over immediately. Defeated, 
Huddle cries: “I see it all!” (ibid.) and leads Birberry to momentary shelter in the upper 
floor. While everyone hides upstairs, Clovis helps himself to a nice tea, and admits more 
distinguished Jewish neighbours to the house, who join the hosts upstairs. 
After a while, Clovis announces that the Boy-scouts have killed the postman by 
mistake, sending the housemaid, to whom he was engaged, into clamorous grief, which 
prompts Mr. Huddle to say: “[r]emember that your mistress has a headache” (ibid.: 46). 
After a mock visit to the Bishop, Clovis returns: “[t]he Bishop is sorry to hear that Miss 
Huddle has a headache. He is issuing orders that as far as possible no firearms shall be 
used near the house; any killing that is necessary on the premises will be done with cold 
steel. The Bishop does not see why a man should not be a gentleman as well as a 
Christian” (ibid.). 
After this last remark, Clovis disappears into the night, because “his elderly relative 
liked him to dress for dinner” (ibid.); the “lurking suggestion of his presence” (ibid.) 
however: 
 
Haunted the lower regions of the house during the long hours of the wakeful night, 
and every creak of the stairway, every rustle of wind through the shrubbery, was 
fraught with horrible meaning. At about seven next morning the gardener’s boy and 
the early postman finally convinced the watchers that the Twentieth Century was still 
unblotted. (ibid.) 
 
 As he rides the train back to town, Clovis muses: “I don’t suppose (…) that they 
will be in the least bit grateful for the Unrest-cure” (ibid.). 
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It is somewhat clear that Clovis’ purpose in performing “pranks” such as these is 
mainly to amuse himself. However, while outrageously shaking up the lives of the two 
Huddle siblings, he also evinces a number of issues. Indeed, some of the elements of the 
story have become difficult to read without bearing in mind the events of the Holocaust 
and the rise of totalitarianism throughout Europe, a mere twenty-odd-years after “The 
Unrest-Cure” was published. The general sentiment towards Jewish people in both Europe 
and the United States was, at the time, balefully negative. Britain was, unfortunately, not 
an exception to this rule: 
 
Britain in the 1900s was by modern standards an ethnically homogeneous society. 
Even immigration from Ireland had dwindled to the point at which the Irish-born 
numbered only 1 per cent of the entire population. Alien immigrants did not quite 
reach this figure. The largest group among them was Jewish, driven by persecution 
from Eastern Europe. They had, however, settled in the cities, concentrated in small 
inner districts, in a pattern which foreshadowed later waves of immigration, not only 
through overcrowded housing and competition with older residents for already poorly 
paid work, but also in their uneven path towards social integration, marked by 
considerable social prejudice and political protest […] Even the socialist Sidney 
Webb’s Fabian pamphlet on The Declining Birthrate complained of the danger of 
‘freely-breeding alien immigrants’ so that the country would be ‘gradually falling to 
the Irish and the Jews’ (Thompson, 2005: 17, 141). 
 
In this sense, Munro was not beyond his time. In “Reginald at the Theatre” he 
remarks, for instance, that the Anglo-Saxon Empire is “rapidly becoming a suburb of 
Jerusalem” (Munro, 1922: 19); and other references to the Jewish people, while mostly 
humorous, betray a certain amount of prejudice. However, and contrary to Byrne, who 
detects true Anti-Semitism in “The Unrest-Cure”, I believe this is hardly a clear-cut 
example of it. The idea of the massacre of Jews seems instead to be foisted by Clovis on 
the unsuspecting Huddles as 1) an atrocity; 2) a plausible atrocity. If anything Saki is 
exploiting the unfortunately common feelings of ill-will towards the Jewish people in order 
to lend a shockingly believable element to his tale, which makes his intervention all the 
more savage. The fact that the Huddles in particular seem not to bear any anti-Semitic 
prejudice only reinforces how absurd their eventual passive complicity is. Beyond this, the 
farce of the massacre also evinces the bubbling tensions lurking beneath the gelid 
Edwardian surface that Steiner spoke of, as illustrated by the Boy-Scouts, who are helping 
in the effort as auxiliaries because: “when they understood there was real killing to be done 
they were even keener than the men” (ibid.: 44). The Boy-Scouts, who were then a recent 
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organization which had sprouted out of Lord Robert Baden-Powell’s book Scouting for 
Boys, were of course never officially intended to prepare boys for military life, but 
nevertheless had certain paramilitary overtones (such as the uniform), owing to Baden-
Powell having been a Lieutenant General in the British Army. This is of course what Saki, 
through Clovis, is spoofing by suggesting that beneath the façade of peaceful scouting and 
outdoors life lurks a degree of bloodlust, which also echoes the disturbing (but not 
unpredictable) sentiment that Munro was to later share with much of the youth who 
enlisted: that of the war as one’s duty, but also as “great fun”. 
The fact that in Saki’s last work, When William Came (1913) – an invasion novel 
which imagined an England under German occupation –, the country is ultimately saved by 
boy-scouts, adds to the contradiction between it and Saki’s previous works, which have led 
some to remark that When William Came: “seems to renounce [Saki’s] earlier work and to 
denounce his characters” (Byrne, 2007: 7).  
At the apparition of Clovis as “Stanislaus”, the Bishop’s secretary, the Huddles are 
so dumbfounded by an unexpected disruption brought about by a false authority figure that 
they barely question his orders. Their unparalleled descent into placid sedentariness has 
rendered them unable to adapt, in Bergson’s terminology, and with only some degree of 
protest they fall prey to Clovis’ rigmarole, ready to partake in one of the greatest atrocities 
they can imagine only because it will be easier to cope with – because they are numb and 
unable to react. 
Clovis’ assuming air of matter-of-factness thoroughly convinces the Huddles, who 
seem almost too embarrassed to protest. Even when faced with the possibility of a “blot on 
the Twentieth Century,” both Huddles seem to be more or at least equally preoccupied 
with avoiding distress at all costs, to the point of telling someone who is screaming out of 
intense grief to stop, because Miss Huddle had a headache. This last point is particularly 
sensitive. It eviscerates an English tradition of sedateness very easily made comic – the 
idea of the stiff upper lip, and that “one mustn’t grumble.” The Huddles find the maid’s 
desperate cries distasteful and maudlin, but are shown to be dismissing the maid’s grief 
and instead focusing on the relatively minor affliction of Miss Huddle’s headache. 
While, again, Clovis is an amoral force, adamant to amuse himself in a world of 
people dulled by conventionality, it is his sense of amusement and humour that ends up 
shedding light on the dangers of tediousness, morality and routine. The Huddles are, in a 
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certain respect, the embodiment of sheltered sedentariness – their very name a suggestion 
of cowering in the face of adversity. Clovis’ Unrest-cure causes them deep distress, amuses 
him, but also eventually breaks them out of the slumbering activity which led to their 
unwilling cooperation in what they considered a “blot on the Twentieth Century.” 
Bergson claimed that laughter corrects men’s manners. As we have seen, this 
association is perhaps more complicated than it seems. However, Clovis, while not directly 
laughing at the Huddles, is indeed toying with them, and Saki is clearly inviting us to laugh 
at their rigidity. Is this truly corrective, however? Saki, like many authors of so-called 
“dark humour” is often accused, contrary to most satirists, of providing no solution or 
hope. One could reply with the Unrest-cure: perhaps it is Saki’s recommendation, his 
solution. But here lies another complicated snag in Saki’s story: it was not Clovis who 
suggested the Unrest-cure. In fact, Clovis seems to be toying with the very idea of the 
Unrest-cure itself by taking it to its diabolical and literal extreme. His very last remark on 
the situation seems to betray a certain “be careful what you wish for” tone: “I don’t 
suppose (…) that they will be in the least bit grateful for the Unrest-cure” (Munro, 1922: 
46). 
Saki then seems to be tearing into the idea of conventionality while simultaneously 
eviscerating such a pathetic solution as an “Unrest-cure” – defiantly choosing to take no 
side at all, but instead to point out a general absurdity, which seems to be the most valuable 
thing in his oeuvre: his savagely funny attacks on both the disease and the cure. He both 
diagnoses excessive seriousness and pickiness as the passive fuel of cruelty and chides the 
victim for complaining about it. In this respect, Saki duly performs Bergson’s task of 
fighting absent-mindedness, providing insight which does not urge to action, but instead 




2.3 Monty Python’s Life of Brian 
 
Life’s a piece of shit, 
When you look at it 
Life’s a laugh and death’s a joke, it’s true 
You’ll see it’s all a show, 
Keep ‘em laughing as you go, 
Just remember that the last laugh is on you. 
 (Jones, 1979: 01:25:12-01:28:20) 
 
 Monty Python’s Life of Brian is a 1979 British film directed by Terry Jones and 
written by the members of Monty Python, the famous British comedy troupe composed of: 
Eric Idle, Graham Chapman, John Cleese, Michael Palin, Terry Gilliam and Terry Jones. 
The story follows the life of Brian, a man who was born on the same day as, and only a 
few doors away from, Jesus. The film caused remarkable uproar at the time, and was 
banned in several countries such as Norway and Ireland on the grounds of blasphemy due 
to, among other things, its purported ridicule of Christ through the figure of Brian. Brian, 
as we quickly see, has little in common with Christ, even in the Pythons’ understanding. 
He is instead a figure parallel to Christ (cf. Crossley, 2011), built in contrast to him. During 
the famous 1979 debate between John Cleese, Michael Palin, conservative Roman Catholic 
journalist Malcolm Muggeridge and Bishop Mervyn Stockwood on Friday Night, Saturday 
Morning, when asked by Tim Rice, the host, “[w]hy the name Brian?”, Palin replies: 
“Well, I don’t know, we’ve always used Brian in Python to portray a certain sort of 
character, fairly anonymous and […] a touch dim, […] slow to catch on” (Rice, 2011: 
4:31-4:49). Contrary to Jesus, Brian has a touch of the (perhaps less-than) everyman to him 
– he is scarcely ever pictured as expressing anything other than fear, worry or 
befuddlement. Very early on in the film we are led to believe that Brian has very little 
choice in his life – not necessarily because the Pythons believe in the ideas of God or fate, 
but because his surroundings chafe and bound him and he lacks the ability to understand 
them. 
 
2.3.1 The Beginning: The Three Wise Men and Brian’s Journey to Adulthood 
 
 The film begins with a pitch-black sky in which multiple stars begin to appear, in 
what scans as a visual metaphor for the creation of the Universe. One of these stars begins 
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to move rapidly, and as the silhouettes of three men riding camels appear in the distance, 
we realise that this is the Star of Bethlehem, which is naturally leading the Three Wise 
Men to the birthplace of Jesus. When the Three Wise Men surprise Brian’s mother Mandy 
(a clear play on Mary), played by Terry Jones, who immediately proceeds to fall off her 
chair, it becomes clear that something may be amiss – namely, that they have got the 
wrong address. Mandy may be atypical: she is rude, irascible and has a penchant for 
stonings. However, both the Wise Men’s mistake and her reaction are “plausible 
incongruent outcomes” in ordinary life – just not so in the context of the Bible. From the 
beginning of Life of Brian, Python imbue the New Testament with commonplace human 
frailty, thus dispelling the liturgical solemnity built around it. The absence of awkwardness 
and aura of holiness that typically provide for religious pathos are derailed by the 
clumsiness and inattentiveness of the people involved. We are almost made to think that in 
the “real world”, the Magi, who are merely human, would have had to knock on a few 




That kind of approach is absolutely automatic to us, that we don’t look at these events 
in order to mythologise them more, we’re kind of looking at them saying ‘hey, wait a 
moment, what was it really like, folks? What were people really thinking? Could 
everyone at the Sermon on the Mount really hear every word? Supposing someone 
misunderstood something and actually wrote it down wrong’ (Jones, 1979: 0:36:16-
0:36:42). 
 
 To Mandy, the Magi are simply three flamboyantly dressed men who barged into 
her cow-shed; they lack a superior aura of wisdom: “well what are you doing creeping out 
in the cow-shed at 3 o’clock in the morning? It doesn’t sound very wise to me” (ibid.: 
00:02:23-00:02:29) When told that they are astrologers come from the East, she replies: “Is 
this a joke?” Seen from a distance, the situation is so out of the ordinary that it very much 
looks like one, but we are so acquainted with the narrative that it takes Mandy to show us. 
As the Magi step out, having praised Brian and given Mandy their gifts, they stumble into 
the real Messiah just a short distance away. They promptly turn around, take their gifts 
back and throw Mandy to the floor. We are thus introduced to Brian as a man who is most 
definitely not Jesus. More than that – he seems genuinely unremarkable. 
                                                          
29
 In the film commentary of the 2008 Immaculate Edition DVD. 
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 The animation that follows further drives the point home by depicting a baby Brian 
falling helplessly through the sky into the depths of Roman civilization, to the sound of an 
epic song detailing his voyage to adulthood. This is clearly a wonderful parody of the 
initial credits of films from the James Bond franchise – specifically, the theme song is a 
clear parody of the Goldfinger theme, as sung by Shirley Basset. While the Goldfinger 
theme is a rollicking, boisterous power ballad which tells of the many qualities of the 
remarkable Goldfinger, “the man with the Midas touch” whose mellifluous words get him 
everything and everyone he wants, the “Brian Song” is about a boy who “had arms, and 
legs, and hands, and feet” who became a teenager whose “face became spotty”, whose 
“voice dropped down low”, who “started to shave/And have one off the wrist/And want to 
see girls/And go out and get pissed” and who ultimately became a “ man called Brian.” At 
one point the singer seems to be at such a loss to mention something relevant about Brian 
other than that he is male, that she sings he “was certainly no,/No girl named ‘Brian’,/Not a 
girl named ‘Brian’” (ibid.: 00:04:40-00:07:04). The point is clear: Brian is no more than 
anyone else. He is not Jesus, nor is he a hero (James Bond) or a villain (Goldfinger). 
 
2.3.2 The Sermon on the Mount 
  
 Brian’s second appearance is as an adult man in the crowd at the Sermon on the 
Mount. The focus begins on Jesus, who is delivering the sermon, but the camera quickly 
pans out to reveal the extent of the large crowd listening to the sermon, and ultimately 
focuses on a group who is at the back of the crowd. This shift of focus yet again derails the 
pathos of the sermon in order to focus on the inevitable incongruities of a real story – 
namely that those who were rather far away, seeing as there were no PA systems at the 
time, would have been hard pressed to hear anything at all. As Palin claims in the 1979 
debate, it is not the words of Jesus that are being mocked in this scene, but his followers’ 
misinterpretation of them: sometimes due to having misheard them, others due to their own 
stupidity and pettiness (Rice, 2011: 46:00-46:27). Phrases like “Blessed are the meek” are 
misinterpreted as “Blessed are the Greek”, before a woman finally exclaims “Oh, it’s the 
meek! Blessed are the meek! Oh that’s nice, innit. I’m glad they’re getting something, ‘cos 
they have a hell of a time” (Jones, 1979: 00:09:49-00:09:57). Eventually a fight breaks out 
between them after a woman, who is telling her husband not to pick his nose, is told by 
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another man to be quiet. They tease each other until the scuffle begins, and ultimately miss 
the rest of the sermon. During the debate, Cleese comments that the group had toyed with 
the idea of a character who arrived five minutes late to one of the miracles performed by 
Jesus – the point being that five minutes late and two thousand years late are not that 
different (Rice, 2011: 8:20-8:30). The idea here is similar: these people are present at one 
of most monumental events in the history of Christianity and they did not hear a word 
because one of them decided to pick his nose and his wife would not have it. Whether or 
not Christ’s teachings were valid or valuable is beside the point – the point is that even if 
they were, it is only plausible that some may have misheard his word and that others 
should have been far too distracted with their own issues to notice. More than that, the 
scene showcases an inherent quarrelsomeness to humanity that cannot be magically 
dispelled and will rear its head wherever people flock together. 
  
2.3.3 The Stoning 
 
 Tellingly, Mandy and Brian leave the Mount directly to go watch a form of 
execution, which is depicted as capital punishment but also popular entertainment. On the 
way there, Brian asks his mother, who is wearing a fake beard, why women are not 
allowed to watch stonings, to which she replies: “it’s written, that’s why!” (Jones, 1979: 
00:10:55-00:11:00) revealing an inability to question the rules, yet an ability to break them. 
She nevertheless proceeds to buy two rocks to take part in the stoning. At the stoning, we 
see that the same disregard for established rules is truly widespread – the crowd is entirely 
composed of women in fake beards. A Jewish official announces that the man about to be 
stoned has uttered the name of the Lord – an instance of blasphemy within the Jewish faith. 
The Roman guards look on in a display of befuddlement and spite. As the scene unfurls, 
the crowd of disguised women shows itself unbearably eager to stone the man, Matthias, 
for its own amusement. When Matthias explains that he had only said “that bit of halibut 
was good enough for Jehovah” and that saying Jehovah should not be blasphemy, the 
official tells him not to make matters worse for himself. Matthias, who was already going 
to be stoned to death, then begins taunting the official and the crowd by saying Jehovah 
multiple times. The official reacts by warning him that if he says Jehovah one more time – 
and is immediately pelted by a rock. Confusion ensues when the woman who had pelted 
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the clergyman with a rock says she did so because he “did say Jehovah”, and is 
immediately stoned by the crowd. In an attempt to re-establish order, the official warns 
everyone to only stone someone when he blows a whistle – even if they do say Jehovah. 
He is then immediately stoned and buried beneath a gigantic rock (ibid.: 00:11:33-
00:14:00). 
 The technique behind this joke would have been familiar to Freud – he would 
perhaps have likened it to some of the Schadchen jokes. The absolute coherence of the 
official’s desire to punish someone for saying Jehovah leads him to, inadvertently, and 
without much of a choice, say Jehovah twice – the last time proving fatal. Bergson would 
perhaps claim that he was unsuccessful at adapting to his situation – distracted by his 
position to the point of forgetting that saying Jehovah is blasphemy and punishable by 
death. But the clergyman is not necessarily the butt of the joke. Part of the humour 
certainly lies in the hypocritical aspects of his slip of the tongue, of course. But the 
overarching joke is that saying Jehovah is a remarkably stupid reason over which to kill 
someone: not only because the punishment seems disproportionate, but also because it can 
be particularly hard not to say Jehovah. Had the official not made the mistake of saying it 
twice, because the occasion demanded it and because it is such an easy slip of the tongue, 
the humour could have resided in how cumbersome it would have been to get his point 
across clearly without saying Jehovah. The result is multi-faceted: a parody of the silly 
particulars of organised religion and a satirical depiction of the hypocrisy behind most of 
its followers, who delight in stoning a blasphemer but forgo the rule about women’s 
presence at a stoning; a depiction of the all too common inability of individuals to abide 
strictly by rigid rules. In short, the rule is absurd and humanity will err.  
  
2.3.4 Nortius Maximus and the People’s Front of Judea 
 
When Brian and Mandy return home, a Roman officer is waiting for her. Brian is 
confused, but the officer’s bashful demeanour, holding his helm on his knees, leads us to 
assume that Mandy occasionally works as a prostitute. When Brian asks her what the 
Roman is doing there, Mandy reacts as if ranting against the Romans is typical of Brian: 
“now don’t start that Brian,” adding: “now look Brian, if it wasn’t for him we wouldn’t 
have all of this, and don’t you forget it” (ibid.: 00:16:19-00:16:28). When Brian replies that 
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he does not owe the Romans anything, Mandy confesses that Brian’s father was a 
centurion in the Roman army by the name of Nortius Maximus, who had had a liaison with 
Mandy and then left her. Finally, she tells Brian that whenever he thinks ill of the Romans, 
he should remember that he is one himself. Brian is reviled and storms off, denying that he 
is anything like a Roman, while Mandy proceeds to cater to the needs of the Roman 
officer. The fact that Brian is a Roman renders his situation less morally clear. He hates the 
Romans, but both he and his mother are indebted to the Nortius Maximus: without him 
they would not have all they do. This will later also apply to the PFJ as well, who hate the 
Romans but have simultaneously benefited a great deal from the occupation, in a further 
suggestion that nothing is quite as simple as it seems. 
The following scene begins with the aftermath of a fight at the Jerusalem 
Colosseum. We see an image of the colosseum with dead bodies and loose bits of armour 
strewn in the sand, followed by a caption that reads “Children’s Matinee”.  Cleaners are 
scooping up body parts and scavenging for valuables before a fight between “the 
Macedonian Baby Smasher” and “Boris Mineburg” begins. Brian is selling his odd 
delicacies to the crowd, among which are the members of the People’s Front of Judea 
(PFJ). While clearly indulging in watching the carnage, they are discussing the anti-
imperialist nature of their group, and Judith is defending that it should reflect a divergence 
of interests in its power base. As Francis is about to suggest that the group should never 
forget the one unalienable right of any man, he is interrupted by Stan, who adds “or 
women.” Stan proceeds to add “or women” to every instance of “man” or “brother” in 
Francis’s speech. The latter eventually loses his train of thought, and forgets what he was 
going to say.  
The PFJ is of course one of the clearest instances of the chief mechanism behind 
Life of Brian and much of the Pythons’ work. In the words of Michael Palin during the 
1979 debate: “we have taken a certain group of people which are generally sort of England 
in the present day and put them in a historical context” (Rice, 2011: 34:35-34:4). This ties 
into Terry Jones’ comment on the documentary The Story of Brian to the effect that in all 
the old Hollywood Biblical films the Pythons watched to prepare for writing Life of Brian, 
the actors spoke with the ethereal otherworldly voice of one who knows he is living in a 
holy time where wonderful holy things are happening. Jones then comments that, at the 
time, he had told the other Pythons people would be shocked by Life of Brian because it 
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would possibly be the first “Biblical” film where people spoke “in normal voices” (Yapp, 
0:04:45-0:05:15). This measure of normalcy is of course based on the standards of modern 
Britain – the Britain of Jones’ lifetime. The incongruity inherent in someone saying 
“blessed are the meek! Oh that’s nice innit” in the Roman province of Judea provides for a 
great deal of the humour, as the incongruities of a past age are exposed to modern eyes, 
much like the incongruities of modern behaviour when placed out of its proper context. 
But Jones is assuming something else: that the best approximation to what people would 
have talked like back then would be how people talk now – aggressively, jokingly, kindly, 
nervously, etc. and not solely in the stereotypically enlightened and holy way of 
Hollywood Biblical films. More than that: he is assuming that people have always been 
more or less the same, and that the speech and folly of 1979 Brits would be the best 
approximation to the speech and folly of 1 BC Romans and Jews
30
. The film’s insistence 
on parodying mid-20
th
 century British political and cultural discourse and artefacts 
emphasises the idea that the concept of congruity or normality essential to humour varies 
from culture to culture
31
, but also the fact that there is a deeply transversal aspect to 
humanity: our flaws. The Pythons seem to observe that the incongruities of 1979, mid-oil 
crisis, Thatcherite Britain, cannot possibly have been much different from the incongruities 
of a “holiest of times.” They seem to admit that they can never have immediate access to 
what Raymond Williams referred to as the “structure of feeling”
32
 of Roman Judea – but 
they do have access to their own structure of feeling, and suggest that the only thing that 
has changed is the setting.  
                                                          
30
 Michael Palin, in the Life of Brian 2008 Immaculate Edition DVD commentary, adds: “Bearing in mind, as 
we did with Holy Grail, that human nature doesn’t change much you know. People have the same arguments. 
They wind each other up, they get stroppy, they get difficult about the same sort of things throughout history. 
So the same niggly things that make us sort of cross now, when we, you know we, you can’t get a cab for 
half an hour in the street, would have made sort of Pontius Pilate or somebody else cross in another way, you 
know. But it was trying to find parallels in history […]” (Jones, 1979: 0:01:40-0:02:20) 
31
 It also makes clear that, being English, that is the culture the Pythons know best. 
32
 “The term I would suggest to describe it is structure of feeling: it is as firm and definite as 'structure' 
suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate and least tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this 
structure of feeling is the culture of a period: it is the particular living result of all the elements in the general 
organization. […]I think it is a very deep and very wide possession, in all actual communities, precisely 
because it is on it that communication depends. And what is particularly interesting is that it does not seem to 
be, in any formal sense, learned. One generation may train its successor, with reasonable success, in the 
social character or the general cultural pattern, but the new generation will have its own structure of feeling, 
which will not appear to have come ‘from’ anywhere. […] Once the carriers of such a structure die, the 
nearest we can get to this vital clement is in the documentary culture, from poems to buildings and dress-
fashions, and it is this relation that gives significance to the definition of culture in documentary term” 
(Williams, 1965: 64-65). 
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This technique is of course pervasive in the film: Brian acts much like rebellious 
adolescents have been portrayed since the mid-20
th
 century, for instance. But it is much 
more glaring in the case of the PFJ – a parody of 20
th
 century post-modern left-wing 
political movements, as confirmed by John Cleese: 
 
There were an enormous number of them and they were all Leninist or Trotskyite or 
they sort of were Maoist or they were Leninist/Maoist or they were Maoist/Trotskyite 
and they all had these extraordinarily precise labels and they all fought with each other 
and hated each other – it seemed to everyone else – much more than they actually 
hated the Parties on the Right. You would think being on the Left there would’ve been 
a kind of coalition… but no, they hated each other – much more strongly than the real 
opposition because it was so necessary for them to be doctrinally pure. (Jones, 1979: 
0:20:20- 0:20:56) 
 
 John Cleese points out the hypocrisy behind these groups’ selfish desire to remain 
above all ideologically pure rather than attempt to make a difference, even if at the cost of 
prioritising. The PFJ is portrayed as largely inept and inefficient
33
 – they cannot even 
engage in a discussion on the basic principles of their movement without getting entangled 
in the particular political interests of each of its members. Stan is a feminist with little 
interest in the PFJ’s revolutionary agenda, while Reg has little interest in the feminist 
agenda and chooses instead to focus on the anti-imperialistic one. Both Judith and Francis 
are conciliatory elements in the discussion, bent on fostering a diverse movement. The 
conversation we witness
34
, which began as a discussion on the fundamental ideology of the 
PFJ, ends with Stan proclaiming he wants to be a woman and will henceforth be called 
Loretta, because he wishes carry children. While most of the group are relatively 
dumbfounded but supportive, Reg finds this idiotic because it simply is not possible. 
Loretta claims Reg is oppressing her, to which he replies: “I’m not oppressing you, Stan! 
You haven’t got a womb! Where’s the fetus gonna gestate, you’re gonna keep it in a box?” 
Loretta seems unaware of the limitations of her body. When Francis and Judith agree that, 
while Loretta cannot have children, they can at least fight for her right to, claiming that it 
will be “symbolic of [their] struggle against oppression”, Reg says that it is “symbolic of  
[Loretta’s] struggle against reality” (Jones, 1979: 00:19:40-00:20:23) 
                                                          
33
 At the beginning of the film the group is portrayed as walking past the Sermon on the Mount and 
dismissing the words of Jesus, in a way that not only foreshadows their foolishness, but seems to portray the 
latter in a positive light. 
34
 The fact that this conversation is taking place at a Colosseum is particularly relevant as it foreshadows the 
contradictions inherent in the group itself. 
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What is chiefly comic about Loretta is her absolute detachment from the reality of 
her body’s limitations. While in the present day, and even in 1979, some of those 
limitations have become surmountable, the idea that Loretta wants, through sheer social 
agreement, to be able to do something her body naturally cannot, is evidence of a deeply 
funny fundamental unawareness. Perhaps one can even detect hints of Spencer’s 
descending incongruity in the way that the PFJ gets completely side-tracked from their 
anti-imperialistic mission by literally everything else: Loretta’s quest, their hatred of all the 
other Judean rebel groups, etc. The PFJ seems to be far too occupied with their divisive, 
all-encompassing, all-pleasing agenda to ever take real and effective action. Reg’s point 
about Loretta is that it is hardly worth letting her indulge in the fiction that she can give 
birth to a child if it is a physical impossibility. He is not oppressing her because 
acknowledging reality is not oppression. He is, however, grounding Loretta by pointing out 
the absurdity of her demands. 
When Brian approaches the PFJ, he mistakes them for the Judean People’s Front, 
causing an outrage: “the only people we hate more than the Romans are the fucking Judean 
People’s Front”, Reg says. “And the Judean Popular People’s Front”, Francis adds. “And 
the People’s Front of Judea”, Loretta concludes, prompting an all-around agreement which 
is only cut short by the general realisation that they are the People’s Front of Judea – once 
again, they get tripped up by the particulars (ibid.: 00:22:02-00:22:22:20). 
Brian decides to ask to join the PFJ, but the close-up of Judith that immediately 
precedes his request suggests that his attraction to her is the main reason why he decided to 
join. The PFJ immediately requests that Brian perform a mission – a mission that lands him 
in trouble instantly
35
. As Brian flees from Roman guards, he is rescued by Judith and taken 
to the headquarters of the PFJ, where the members are planning a kidnapping of Pontius 
Pilate’s wife, in order to blackmail him into dismantling “the entire apparatus of the 
Roman Imperialist State”. If Pilate should fail to comply, the PFJ’s plan is to execute his 
wife, by “cutting all her bits up”. Reg proceeds to declare that they should “point out that 
[the Romans] bear full responsibility when we chop her up, and that we shall not submit to 
                                                          
35
 A mission whereby he is to write “Romans go home” in Latin on a large wall in graffiti. He is immediately 
caught by a centurion however, who, in a blatant case of inattention, is so distracted by Brian’s poor grammar 
that, instead of punishing him for his interference, makes him write the same thing all over the wall one-
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blackmail!” (ibid.: 00:27:00-00:27:22). The fact that the PFJ is a group which plans to, 
through violence, end the Roman’s violent oppression and which, while blackmailing the 
Romans, claims that it will not submit to blackmail, makes the entire movement risible – 
not necessarily because what they are attempting to do is inherently wrong or laughable, 
but because they simply cannot see the hypocritical nature of their statements. When Reg 
claims that the Romans have “taken everything [they] have”, and asks what they have 
given in return, someone replies: “the aqueduct?” Then other members proceed to mention 
the sanitation, the roads, irrigation, medicine, education, wine, public baths and public 
safety, with Francis commenting: “they certainly know how to keep order; let’s face it, the 
only ones who could in a place like this”. Reg, however, is defiant: “Alright, but apart from 
the sanitation, the medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, the freshwater 
system and public health, what have the Romans ever done for us?” When someone 
replies: “brought peace?” Reg says “Oh, Peace! Shut up!” (ibid.: 00:27:24-00:28:42) The 
fact that the group cannot simply admit that, no matter what good or evil the Romans have 
done, what they want is to be freed of their rule, makes Reg just as much of a broken 
record as Loretta in the previous scene. Providing all the true details of the Roman 
occupation would not, and ultimately does not make up for a rousing speech. The members 
who point out that the Romans may have contributed much more than Reg is claiming are 
robbing the scene of its action-oriented pathos – until they are eventually repressed by Reg 
who, lacking any further arguments, tells them to shut up. 
The frailties of the PFJ are exposed when, attempting to carry out their plan, they 
bump into another rebel group, the Company for Free Galilee, and enter a scuffle in which 
everyone dies but Brian (and Francis, we later find out), who had been trying to convince 
them to unite against the Romans and is eventually captured in the aftermath. As the rebel 
groups kill each other, the Roman guards yet again look on in a mixture of amazement and 
disapprobation. Theirs is a distant, detached look at events similar to ours: they are 
watching motion without substance – a masquerade –, and cannot possibly understand why 
two groups of Jews are murdering each other inside Roman facilities.  
 




As Brian is thrown into a dungeon, he is berated by a man (Ben
36
) chained to the 
wall who claims Brian is lucky for his treatment. When Brian complains that he has been 
spat at in the face, the man replies: “Oh, what wouldn’t I give to be spat at in the face! I 
sometimes lay awake at night dreaming of being spat at in the face” (ibid.: 00:34:50-
00:34:58) When Brian asks him what will probably happen to him, Ben replies: “Oh you’ll 
probably get away with crucifixion,” seeing as it is Brian’s first offense, later calling it “the 
best thing the Romans ever did for us!” and saying “if we didn’t have crucifixion, this 
country would be in a right bloody mess! Nail them up! Nail some sense into ‘em!” (ibid.: 
00:35:30-00:35:48) Ben is essentially portrayed as a parody of subservient conservatism. 
He has been thoroughly mistreated by the Romans, but instead of sympathising with his 
fellow convict, he accuses him of being the teacher’s pet and refuses to acknowledge he is 
also being mistreated. He eventually tells Brian:  
 
They hung me up here five years ago. Every night, they take me down for twenty 
minutes, then they hang me up again, which I regard as very fair, in view of what I 
done, and, if nothing else, it's taught me to respect the Romans, and it's taught me that 
you'll never get anywhere in this life, unless you're prepared to do a fair day's work for 
a fair day's… (ibid. 00:36:04-00:36:24) 
  
 When the Centurion announces that Pilate wants to see Brian and jokes that he 
must want to “know which way up [Brian wants] to be crucified”, Ben makes an 
ingratiating effort to laugh and says: “nice one, Centurion. Like it!”, and is immediately 
told to shut up. As Brian leaves the cell, Ben muses: “terrific race, the Romans. Terrific” 
(ibid. 00:36:34-00:36:48) It seems to be Ben’s opinion that everything the Romans do is 
right – including their treatment of him, and naturally their treatment of others. His 
conservative narrative seems idiotic: it is hard to understand how being chained to the wall 
for doing whatever he has done has helped him understand the idea of fair work for fair 
pay. In that sense, Ben is the opposite of Reg – he considers himself perennially below the 
Romans, but seemingly above his countrymen who, like Brian, do not seem to want to fall 
on the Romans’ good graces. Ben’s attitude is somewhat reminiscent of one spoofed in 
another Monty Python sketch: “The Four Yorkshiremen” (cf. Monty Python, 2017). In it, 
four self-made-men claim that the youngsters of the time do not understand the hard times 
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they were put through when they were their age. As they listen to each other’s accounts of 
an impoverished childhood, they begin to exaggerate their own strife in an attempt to outdo 
each other. Compared to what they went through, of course, the younger generations have 
no troubles at all (cf. Monty Python, 2017). Ben shares this sentiment when it comes to 
Brian: he was lucky to be spat at in the face – had he been (fairly) chained to the wall for 
five years, he would not be complaining about some spittle on his brow. The culmination 
of Ben’s comical insistence in the same narrative arrives with the idea that even the 
conceivably worst possible sentence – crucifixion – is somehow a walk in the park for 
“lucky-lucky” Brian. As we laugh at Ben, however, we cannot help but wonder if there 
may be something to his twisted logic: perhaps being crucified is better than a lifetime of 
torture. 
 When Brian is brought before Pontius Pilate, it is immediately apparent that the 
latter has a severe case of rhotacism: he cannot say his r’s. He also seems completely 
unaware of this inability and devoid of a sense of humour. Brian does not seem to 
understand Pilate has a speech defect either, and thus proceeds to correct him at each turn, 
not realising how pointless – and dangerous – this may be for him. When Brian mentions 
that his father is called Nortius Maximus, the guards begin to laugh. Pilate does not 
understand why, and one of the guards must explain to him that it is a joke name: it sounds 
a lot like Naughtius Maximus – a joke name like Sillius Soddus or Biggus Dickus. Pilate 
sees nothing odd in the name Biggus Dickus, claiming he has a very good friend in Rome 
whose name is Biggus Dickus. The guards immediately begin to snigger, making a genuine 
effort to suppress laughter. Pilate is livid, and confronts one of the guards, who eventually 
cannot resist laughing at Biggus Dickus and burst into open laughter. He cries that he “will 
not have [his] friends ridiculed by the common soldiery!” (ibid. 00:39:26-00:39:31) and 
has the guard arrested. He then proceeds to test the remaining soldiers. His method is 
particularly illustrative of the difficulties inherent in explaining humour to the humourless. 
The joke seems obvious enough, yet the only thing Pilate seems to understand is that the 
soldiers find his friends’ names funny, so he tries to see if they will laugh at Biggus 
Dickus's wife’s name: Incontinentia. The guards do not react. Pilate seems to give up, and 
then utters the full name: “Incontinentia Buttocks”, prompting uproarious laughter from the 
guards, who keel over, clutching their stomachs. Pilate then shouts that he’s had “enough 
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of this webel, sniggewing behaviour!” and Brian escapes amidst the confusion (ibid. 
00:40:22-00:40:43) 
 Pilate sees the guard’s laughter as unacceptable insubordination: by laughing at him 
they are disrupting the solemn, respectful demeanour which, as praetorian guards, they 
owe him and his friends in Rome. One can hardly blame them, however, for laughing at an 
authority figure with a severe speech defect whose friends all have ludicrous names that 
sound as if they were conjured by Latin students at an English public school. In fact, the 
upper echelons of Roman society in Judea are portrayed as foppish, detached from reality 
and inherently ridiculous in the film – worthy, perhaps, of the Gussie Fink-Nottles and the 
Pongo Twistletons of Wodehouse’s novels. The guards’ explosive laughter showcases the 
fickle nature of power structures – they are not holy institutions, but human ones, based on 
convention and perpetuated by habit and force. It is the perception of Pilate and his class’s 
glaring defects that dispels the reverential aura around him and allows the guards to see an 
authority figure as just another fool like them – a figure whom habit, and not the 
unforgiving mechanisms of meritocracy, has put in power. 
 On the other hand, fits of uncontrollable laughter did provide for a big enough 
distraction for Brian to escape – an argument towards Chafe’s concept of a laughter that 
paralyses.  
 
2.3.6 The Prophets and the Haggling 
 
 As Brian flees from the Romans, he finds himself forced to pretend he is a mere 
customer at the nearby market. We immediately realise that Brian, who simply wants to 
buy a fake beard in order to disguise himself, has absolutely no grasp on the concept of 
haggling. For a grown man, at the time, this would be absurd. Brian then comes off as 
particularly clueless and sheltered: a stranger to human communication, a man who does 
not know the basic rules of human carrying-ons. It seems logical to Brian that he should 
pay twenty shekels for something which the salesman is selling for twenty shekels: no 
more, no less. He does not understand the theatrical aspects of salesmanship – the 
complicated game of wit and expectations. To cultures such as ours, where the practice of 
haggling is all but gone, it seems as absurd as it does to Brian. The difference is that Brian 
is supposed to be a part of that culture, yet he is as removed from it as we are – here Brian 
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is most obviously a 20
th
 century British man inserted in a historical context which is 
absolutely foreign to him. At one point, while the salesman tries to coach him haggling-
wise, Brian cries “oh tell me what to say, please!” When he seems to finally get the hang of 
it, he relapses into ineptitude when the salesman gives him a gourd for free and he attempts 
to pay four shekels (the change the salesman owed him) for it, in order to get away 
quickly. The scene points to the ridiculousness of the ceremonial from Brian and our points 
of view – not only is it an obscure practice, but the salesman cannot seem to forgo it in 
order to expedite things when Brian is clearly in a hurry. Haggling becomes, like 
Bergson’s customs officers after a shipwreck, a needless ceremonial obstacle to natural 
life. However, the scene also suggests that there is method to its madness: that haggling 
has its use and Brian is unable to understand how or why – that Brian is too sheltered to 
understand this primeval form of selling which is perhaps more natural than it seems. 
 Eventually, Brian makes it back to the PFJ, who refuse to help him and chastise 
him for leading the Romans to their HQ. When the Romans arrive to search the premises, 
the old man who harbours the PFJ in his home, Matthias (who had escaped the stoning 
before), seems little moved by the one of the guard’s threats. The exchange is as follows: 
 





CENTURION: Nasty, eh? 
MATTHIAS: Hm. Could be worse. 
CENTURION: What do you mean, 'could be worse'? 
MATTHIAS: Well, you could be stabbed. 
CENTURION: Stabbed? (Takes a second.) Crucifixion lasts hours! It's a slow, horrible 
death! 
MATTHIAS: Well, at least it gets you out in the open air. 
CENTURION: You're weird. (ibid.: 00:48:11-00:48:40) 
  
 Afterwards, when the Centurion asks if Matthias has ever seen anyone crucified 
Matthias, with a provocative smile, replies: “crucifixion’s a doddle.” It seems clear that 
Matthias is using humour to confuse the Centurion and rob him of his authority, thus 
engaging in the self-preservation that Freud called the “triumph of narcissism.” The 
greatest evidence of Matthias’ success is that the Centurion finds him “weird” and tells him 
not to “keep saying that” when Matthias derides crucifixion as a doddle. The Centurion 
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cannot put his finger on what is going on in Matthias’ mind, and therefore holds – or has 
that impression – little power over him. 
 Behind and below the PFJ’s quarters, we had seen a long line of would-be prophets, 
caked in mud, covered in ominous rags and holding staves: doomsayers, all of them. Each 
of the scarier ones, such as the one played by Terry Gilliam, has a sizable crowd before 
him. It is only the inept one, who cannot for the life of him come up with an interesting 
account of the apocalypse, that has barely attracted an audience:  
 
There shall, in that time, be rumors of things going astray, erm, and there shall be a 
great confusion as to where things really are, and nobody will really know where lieth 
those little things wi-- with the sort of raffia work base that has an attachment. At this 
time, a friend shall lose his friend's hammer, and the young shall not know where lieth 
the things possessed by their fathers that their fathers put there only just the night 
before, about eight o'clock (ibid.: 00:43:33-00:44:05) 
  
 The point made is that these prophets are mostly entertainers – the duller one is the 
only one making plausible predictions, yet he is barely being listened to. It is this prophet 
that Brian knocks over into a barrel as he falls from the window of the PFJ headquarters – 
the crowd applauds. Brian notices the Roman guard’s suspicious look and decides to 
pretend he is a prophet himself in order to blend in. His first attempt is: “don’t pass 
judgement on other people, or you might get judged yourself” (ibid. 00:50:30-00:50:34). In 
this sense he is echoing Jesus, but the crowd is not impressed. As he begins to make further 
points through analogies with birds and flowers, the crowd begins to pick apart at his 
words, rendering his message ridiculous. This could perhaps be an instance of the uglier 
side of humour: Brian’s message is becoming lost in the midst of the crowd’s attacks on 
his analogies. However, the crowd is not making fun of Brian: they are just being 
excessively literal minded. This is what is funny. When Brian asks them if the birds have 
got jobs, one of the members of the crowd reacts: “have the birds got jobs?!” and another 
says “he says the birds are scrounging!” (ibid. 00:51:07-00:51:11) 
Brian’s subsequent attempts continue to fall on deaf ears. As he speaks, one of the 
men covets the gourd he had obtained from the haggler earlier, and asks him how much he 
wants for it. When Brian gives it to him and subsequently refuses to haggle, the man 
suspects something must be wrong with the gourd, and begins to analyse it. Much in the 
same fashion, the crowd only begins to pay attention to Brian when he, noticing the 




BRIAN:  Ooh! Eh, uh, b-- b-- now-- now hear this! Blessed are they... 
DENNIS: Three. 
BRIAN: ...who convert their neighbour's ox, for they shall inhibit their girth,... 
MAN: Rubbish! 
BRIAN: ...and to them only shall be given-- to them only... shall... be... given... (ibid. 
00:52:10-00:52:30). 
 
 When Brian was giving the crowd spontaneous and straightforward bits of 
information, the latter was combative and suspicious, much like the man who attempts to 
haggle for the gourd when Brian is giving it away for free. When Brian accidentally begins 
to haggle himself, by creating suspense, the crowd is immediately curious – he must be 
hiding something from them. In this case, what those who convert their neighbour’s ox will 
be given. The crowd immediately mobs him, asking him what the “secret is”. When Brian 
does not tell them, they begin to hail Brian as their master, worshiping the objects that he 
accidentally leaves behind, such as the gourd or one of his shoes. In an instant, a thousand 
different sects are formed: the ones who worship the gourd, the ones who worship the 
shoe, the ones who worship the shoe but claim it is a sandal instead, the ones who take the 
shoe as a sign that the things of the body do not matter, the ones who think all should cast 
away one shoe, and the ones who think that Brian’s message is that they should all gather 
shoes. This is of course a parody of the difficulties inherent in the interpretation of the holy 
word, and namely of the numerous schisms which have affected the Christian faith (and 
others) through time. Each individual’s thirst for protagonism and eagerness to believe in 
anything that might promise them a fuller life is shown to illustrate the impossibility of the 
worldwide consensus that most religions seem to demand.  
The crowd’s haste to follow someone and to know the “secret” which Brian is 
hiding – a chiefly selfish motive
37
 –, make for another instance of hard-headed, clueless 
insistence on labouring a point. The extent of the crowd’s unawareness reaches the point of 
barefaced absurdity when a blind man who claims he has been cured by Brian wanders into 
a hole. When Brian denies his Messiah status one of the followers claims that Brian must 
be the messiah, and that he should know – he has followed a few. A woman, a parody of 
the American Hippies of the 1960s, begins to say that only the true Messiah denies his 
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 A selfishness paralleled by the ungratefulness of the “ex-leper” whom Brian meets on the streets, 
complaining that now that Jesus has cured him, he is out of a job. 
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divinity. When Brian says that in that case he is the Messiah, the crowd takes his word for 
it. Once more, it becomes clear that Brian has no choice but to surrender.  
 When a hermit begins to attack Brian for having made him break his vow of silence 
and led the crowd to destroy his juniper bush, the crowd rushes him in order to please 
Brian, finally leaving him alone and revealing that Judith had been there the entire time. 
The following morning, Brian and Judith, having spent the night together, awake to find a 
gigantic crowd at Brian’s door. Judith reveals herself just as much of a believer as the rest 
of them: the only one who is sceptical is Brian’s mother. In order to attempt to dispel the 
crowd, Brian begins yet again to preach 20
th
 century Britain common-sense, such as: “you 
don’t need to follow me, you don’t need to follow anybody! You’ve got to think for 
yourselves! You’re all individuals!” He adds: “you’re all different!” and “you’ve all got to 
work it out for yourselves!” The crowd proceeds to echo his words: “yes, we’re all 
individuals” and “yes, we’re all different” – they have entirely missed the point. Amid the 
crowd, one man screams “I’m not!” (ibid.: 01:03:51-01:04:14). He seems to have 
paradoxically understood the point, but is immediately hushed by the others, in a collective 
effort to suppress independent thought. 
  
2.3.7 Brian’s Capture, Pilate’s Speech 
 
 As Brian leaves his home, he discovers that the PFJ have decided to take advantage 
of his status as the Messiah. He meets Judith at the back, but she is far too concentrated on 
Brian’s purported anarchic speech against Reg and for the revolution – she does not seem 
to acknowledge that Brian is infatuated with her. Brian is then captured by the Romans and 
sentenced to crucifixion. The PFJ, after producing a rousing speech about the need for 
action instead of talk, upon hearing of Brian’s fate, claim: “right, this calls for immediate 
discussion!” and call for a motion for immediate action (ibid.: 01:06:42-01:09:04). They do 
not help Brian, and are seemingly stuck in a perpetual loop of pointless rituals such as 
calling for new motions and voting, instead of taking direct action.  
 After sending Brian to his death, Pontius Pilate and Biggus Dickus, whom it is 
revealed has his own amazing speech defect, make a speech announcing that they will 
release one wrongdoer from their prison. Instead of making a genuine request, the crowd 
suggests various names which neither of them can pronounce. Pilate and Biggus do not 
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understand. Judith finally shouts for them to release Brian, which the crowd interprets as 
another joke, but which the Romans decide to carry out as a genuine request.  
 This scene in particular showcases a less than benign form of ridicule – here the 
crowd indulges in teasing Pilate, simultaneously neglecting to make a genuine request 
which can save someone’s life.  
 
2.3.8 The Crucifixion 
  
 In the Roman jails, the convicts queue up for their crucifixion much like the 
patients at the waiting room of a doctor’s office. An amenable official with a notebook 
keeps tabs on all the prisoners, sending them to their deaths with a sympathetic smile. As 
each convict passes, he asks: “crucifixion? Good. Out of the door, line on the left, one 
cross each.” One of the men, “Mr. Cheeky”, ultimately replies: “uh, no, freedom.” He 
almost convinces the official, who is about to send him on his way, before he ultimately 
confesses “no, I’m only pulling your leg, it’s crucifixion, really!” (ibid.: 01:10:06-
01:10:34) Both men share a hearty laugh before Mr. Cheeky goes on his way to the cross.  
 Just before tending to Brian, the official reflects: “it’s such a senseless waste of 
human life, isn’t it?” As Brian attempts to get out of his mess, asking for such 20
th
 century 
standards as the right to a lawyer, Mr. Cheeky shouts “come on big nose, there’s people 
waiting to be crucified out here!” and “how about a retrial, we’ve got plenty of time!” 
When one of the guards tells him to shut up, he cries: “miserable bloody Romans, no sense 
of humour!” (ibid.: 01:14:03-01:15:05) 
 The character of Mr. Cheeky, whom we had seen before at the Sermon on the 
Mount making fun of Brian and another man’s noses, scans much like a classic, cartoon 
prankster type – a Bugs Bunny or a Roadrunner. They are forces of perpetual flippancy and 
seem to be endowed with a strange immortality – perhaps because they take nothing 
seriously – and thus, like Freud’s condemned man, convey the image of being perpetually 
above their constraints. These prankster types have, like Saki’s pranksters, an impish side 
to them which comes to fruition at the expense of others and which upsets the social order, 
challenging bureaucrats and forcing the rest of us to strict attention. 
As Mr. Cheeky finally takes part in the crucifixion party, marching on its way to 
the crucifixion site, it seems his luck is over. As the men carry their crosses, Ben, the 
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prisoner, cries out “lucky bastards!” from the dungeon. A man offers to shoulder another 
man’s burden, and the latter flees, leaving him to be crucified -- behind him, Mr. Cheeky 
laughs: “he had you there mate, didn’t he? That’ll teach you a lesson!” (ibid.: 01:16:35-
01:16:52) 
 Arriving at the crucifixion site, one of the guards chides Mr. Cheeky to no avail: 
 
PARVUS: Get a move on, there! 
MR. CHEEKY: Or what? 
PARVUS: Or you'll be in trouble. 
MR. CHEEKY: Oh, dear. You mean I might have to give up being crucified in the 
afternoons? 
PARVUS: Shut up! 
MR. CHEEKY: That would be a blow. Wouldn't it? I wouldn't have nothing to do. Oh, 
thank you (ibid.: 01:17:44-01:17:56) 
 
At the mount, the same men who were quarrelling at the Sermon on the Mount are 
being crucified. When Parvus, the guard, calls one of the men, Mr. Big Nose, a “Jewish 
turd”, the latter is outraged and replies he is a Samaritan. Gregory, the upper class Jewish 
man who had been in the previous altercation with Mr. Big Nose, immediately complains 
that they are in a Jewish section, and that Samaritans should be crucified separate from 
Jews. Other voices immediately add: “Pharisees separate from Sadducees” and “Swedish 
separate from Welsh.” Not even the prospect of coming death seems to be an equalizer for 
these men, who cling to their prejudices and petty squabbles up to the very end (ibid. 
01:19:19-01:19:44) 
 As Brian is tied to the cross, he tells Parvus: “you don’t have to do this, you don’t 
have to take orders!” Parvus simply tells him he likes orders, which seems to suggest that 
Brian’s hopes for mankind have little chance. As they raise the cross, Mr. Cheeky 
addresses Brian (ibid.: 01:20:19-01:20.24): 
 
MR. CHEEKY: See? Not so bad, once you're up. You being rescued, then? Are you? 
BRIAN: It's a bit late for that now, isn't it? 
MR. CHEEKY: Oh, now, now. We've got a couple of days up here. Plenty of time. Lots 
of people get rescued. 
BRIAN: Ohh? 
MR. CHEEKY: Oh, yeah. My brother usually rescues me, if he can keep off the tail for 
more than twenty minutes. Huh. 
BRIAN: Ahhh? 
MR. CHEEKY: Randy little bugger. Up and down like the Assyrian Empire. Heh heh heh 




Brian is subsequently visited by the PFJ, who thank him for his martyrdom and 
refuse to rescue him. When the guards finally arrive to carry out the orders of releasing 
Brian of Nazareth, Brian is still blindingly cursing the PFJ to infinity and Mr. Cheeky 
decides to say he is Brian of Nazareth. This causes an immediate uproar during which 
everyone claims they are Brian in order to be set free, in an inversion of the famous scene 
from the 1960 film Spartacus, where the rebels put their lives at stake by crying they are 
Spartacus in order to shield him from punishment and demonstrate their allegiance. The 
guards proceed to get Mr. Cheeky down and untie him, while he cries: 
 
MR. CHEEKY: No, I'm only joking. I'm not really Brian. No, I'm not Brian. I was only-- 
It was a joke. I'm only pulling your leg! It's a joke! I'm not him! I'm just having you on! Put 
me back! Bloody Romans! Can't take a joke! (ibid.: 01:23:05-01:23:20) 
 
 Due to his joke, Mr. Cheeky is ultimately saved and Brian is left at the cross, where 
he finally witnesses the doings of the Judean People’s Front – their crack suicide squad 
kills itself in front of Brian –, is thanked by Judith for his sacrifice, who says she 
understands everything now that Reg has explained things to her, and is disowned by his 
own mother: “if that’s how you treat your poor old mother in the autumn years of her life, 
all I can say is go ahead, be crucified, see if I care” (ibid.: 01:24:52-01:25:00). 
 Brian looks dejected and defeated, having lost all hope and been abandoned by 
everyone he cared for to be sentenced to death by a people he despises, yet partially 
belongs to. However, suddenly, the camera pans out to reveal a man to his right, also tied 
to a cross. He addresses Brian: “cheer up Brian, you know what they say!” and bursts into 
a rendition of the famous “Always Look on the Bright Side of Life”, which Malcom 
Muggeridge dismissively described as a “music-hall song” (Rice, 2011: 48:50): 
 
Some things in life are bad, 
They can really make you mad 
Other things just make you swear and curse 
When you’re chewing on life’s gristle 
Don’t grumble, give a whistle, 
And this’ll help things turn out for the best. 
 
And always look on the bright side of life, 




If life feels jolly rotten,  
There’s something you’ve forgotten 
And that’s to laugh and smile and dance and sing 
When you’re feeling in the dumps, don’t be silly chumps 
Just purse your lips and whistle, that’s the thing! 
 
Always look on the bright side of life 
Always look on the light side of life 
 
For life is quite absurd, 
And death’s the final word 
Forget about your sin 
Give the audience a grin 
Enjoy it, it’s your last chance anyhow! 
 
Always look on the light side of death 
Just before you draw your terminal breath 
 
Life’s a piece of shit, 
When you look at it 
Life’s a laugh and death’s a joke, it’s true 
You’ll see it’s all a show, 
Keep ‘em laughing as you go, 
Just remember that the last laugh is on you. (Jones, 1979: 01:25:12-01:28:20) 
 
As the man begins the song, Brian looks at him with a desperate, unbelieving look. 
He cannot quite believe that he is being told to be optimistic at a moment when there is 
nothing to look forward to but a slow, painful death. As he looks about bemusedly, the 
piano, bass and drums kick in. The song grows more ornate as guitar flourishes and a string 
section begin to play over the melody and the men join in the song’s trademark, carefree 
whistle. Finally, the men sing the melody in a chorus while the swooning, rollicking 
baritone horns kick in, giving the song its bawdy, music-hall feel. We are shown 
panoramic shots of the men at their crosses, their synchronised bobbing of the heads 
resembling a Busby Berkeley choreography, and towards the end Brian has already begun 
to dance and sing, which is perhaps the only moment of the entire film where Brian finally 
fits in – where he finally joins the human masquerade. 
 In a way, Monty Python’s Life of Brian has a simple message: life is nothing but a 
show, but an absurd and painful joke, so we might as well laugh at it – it is what saved Mr. 
Cheeky, after all (for a little while). This is of course not the only conclusion one can take 
from the film: John Cleese famously claimed that Life of Brian is a film “about closed 
systems of thought” (Rice, 2011: 34:50-34:52). This is what we see among the religious 
Jews, the revolutionary groups, the Romans, Brian’s followers, and even Brian himself on 
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occasion – a fundamental sloth which boils down to a complete inability to think for 
oneself. When Brian, in a hurry and failing to understand the haggler, asks him to “please 
tell [him] what to say!” he is echoing a much larger sentiment that the Pythons seem to 
think adds to the lunacy of social life. By urging people to think for themselves, the film is 
fighting for awareness and against mechanic, rigid, bureaucratic behaviour, as well as 
unthinking acceptance of authority.  
The ideas of thinking for oneself and finding no inherent meaning in life also seem to 
owe a lot to nihilism. In fact, the relentless tugging and pulling that occurs in Brian’s life, 
with little of his voluntary intervention in the mixture, suggests a certain agreement with 
Nietzsche’s thoughts on the inexistence of true free will. Tellingly, in his The Gay Science, 
Nietzsche refers to “the comedy of existence” (Nietzsche, 2001: 28) when claiming that 
whether one wants to or not, one is always contributing to the fundamental goal of 
preserving humanity. On the subject, Nietzsche writes: “[p]erhaps even laughter still has a 
future – when the proposition ‘The species is everything, an individual is always nothing’ 
has become part of humanity and this ultimate liberation and irresponsibility is accessible 
to everyone at all times” (ibid.: 27). The realization that we have no real free will, 
Nietzsche seems to claim, should liberate us to the pleasures of laughter – laughing at our 
condition. Laughing, Nietzsche claims, out of wisdom: “[p]erhaps laughter will then have 
formed an alliance with wisdom; perhaps only ‘gay science’ will remain” (ibid.: 28). To 
use Bergson’s terminology, laughter could then, for Nietzsche, also be the consequence of 
an ultimate awareness. In fact, Nietzsche himself used the concept of “corrective laughter” 
before Bergson:  
 
There is no denying that in the long run each of these great teachers of a purpose was 
vanquished by laughter, reason and nature: the brief tragedy always changed and 
returned into the eternal comedy of existence, and the ‘waves of uncountable laughter’ 
– to cite Aeschylus – must in the end also come crashing down on the greatest of these 
tragedians. Despite all this corrective laughter, human nature on the whole has surely 
been altered by the recurring emergence of such teachers of the purpose of existence – 
it has acquired one additional need, the need for the repeated appearance of such 
teachers and such teaching of a ‘purpose’. (ibid.: 29) 
 
 In this, the Pythons were also drawing near to Nietzsche when observing 
humanity’s desperate need to search for a purpose – best exemplified by the ludicrous 
religious fervour of Brian’s ready-made followers.  No matter how much Brian told them 
94 
 
to think for themselves, they completely missed the point by instead embracing whatever it 
is he told them unquestioningly. In this, the Romans are shown to be the same: their 
purpose, as exemplified by the guard who seems to be merely “following orders” – the 
perpetuation of human existence. Nietzsche seems to suggest that both the tragic and the 
comic, like the Dionysian and the Apollonian, need to exist on some level. Our very 
existence, Nietzsche seems to say, is tragic: our free will is an illusion. Realising this, 
however, we should not despair, but instead rise above it – through laughter.    
The life of Brian is perhaps as relevant a story as the life of Jesus in the sense that, 
contrary to the latter, it is the life of an everyman
38
 – of a Brian: a wispy-haired, shorts-
wearing, foolish, lust-addled, lovelorn, oppressed man who is flung into life’s steaming 
bowl of soup – clinging to his crouton for dear life. His life is the exaggerated, pantomimic 
version of all our lives. It is the story of humanity and its perennial failings: fostered yet 
bound by Bergson’s masquerade society and obliged to the iron-willed intervention of their 
desires. 
  
                                                          
38
 Michael Palin, in the Life of Brian 1008 Immaculate Edition DVD commentary, comments: “[w]e all 
recognise the sort of people that are being portrayed here, you know: misguided idealism, dogmatic 
bureaucracy, sheer sort of pig-headedness of power in the case of the Romans or whatever. You know, we all 
recognise these people, it’s very important to keep that going throughout, that we should believe in all these 
situations, because whereas the Bible story was all about what happened to one man in history that was 
different from anything that had ever happened to anyone else in history, this is all about things that 
happened all the time to everyone. In a sense Graham is everyman there. He is a figure who merely just 
wants to carry on living life in a reasonably decent, honourable way, minding his own business, and he can’t 




2.4 The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy 
 
In Hitchhiker’s Guide and its sequels, a trilogy (in five parts), Douglas Adams 
presents us with what can easily be seen as an extended philosophical 
meditation on absurdity. (Kind, 2012: 76) 
 
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy (HGTG), originally a radio show created by 
Douglas Adams in 1978 (cf. Gaiman: 2009), is the title of a 1979 novel and the first 
volume of the five that comprise the so-called Trilogy of Five written by Adams
39
. While 
the length of this dissertation cannot allow for a full analysis of each of the five volumes, 
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy’s self-titled first volume will provide us with the 
fundamental characters and themes developed throughout the rest of the trilogy. It is these 
themes which, rendered in Adams’s characteristically comic way, are worthy of analysis 
from a Culture Studies standpoint. 
The book begins with the following introduction:  
 
Far out in the uncharted backwaters of the unfashionable end of the Western 
Spiral Arm of the Galaxy lies a small unregarded yellow Sun. 
Orbiting this at a distance of roughly ninety-two million miles is an utterly 
insignificant little blue-green planet whose ape-descended life forms are so amazingly 
primitive that they still think digital watches are a pretty neat idea. (Adams, 2002: 5, 
italics in the original) 
   
 From this point on it becomes clear that the Earth and Humanity itself will be 
examined within the much larger context of the Galaxy. Within the first two paragraphs of 
the novel it has already been stated that our Sun is small, our planet is insignificant and 
human beings are nothing but primitive ape descendants, unaware of the unremarkable 
nature of digital watches. This degree of detachment in dealing with matters such as the 
whole of humanity is an appropriate indication of what quickly follows: namely, the 
destruction of the entire planet Earth; a planet, the narrator claims, riddled with 
unhappiness and greed, whose primitive population had “nailed [a man] to a tree for saying 
how great it would be to be nice to people for a change” (ibid.), and was now quite 
convinced that “they’d all made a big mistake in coming down from the trees in the first 
placed. And some said that even the trees had been a bad move, and that no one should 
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ever have left the oceans” (ibid.). One begins to suspect a certain degree of pessimism and 
disappointment is afoot. 
 The story about to be told, we are quickly informed, is of the “terrible, stupid 
catastrophe” (ibid.) that occurred exactly on the day that “a girl sitting on her own in a 
small café in Rickmansworth suddenly realized what it was that had been wrong all [that] 
time, and she knew how the world could be made a good and happy place” (ibid.). The 




On that day, Arthur Dent, a British man of “about thirty, tall, dark haired, never 
quite at ease with himself” (ibid.: 7) who had moved from London to the depths of rural 
West Country because the city made him “nervous and irritable” (ibid.) and who is 
generally perceived as looking worried, awakes to the startling realisation that his house is 
about to be demolished. The decision is revealed to be the result of an obscure and slightly 
authoritarian decision made by a highly bureaucratic local entity bent on constructing a 
bypass. Arthur vehemently opposes the demolition and lays down in front of the bulldozer 
in protest. Moments later however, Ford Prefect, a close friend of Arthur’s, whisks him 
away to a nearby pub in order to tell him two very important things: one, that he is actually 
an alien from Betelgeuse who has been stuck on Earth for fifteen years while working as a 
researcher for the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy – a budget travel-guide and 
encyclopaedia; and two, that the entire Planet Earth and its population are about to be 
obliterated by a race of bureaucratic aliens – the Vogons – to allow for the construction of 
a hyperspace highway. Prefect plans to escape before this happens, and subsequently 
sneaks a bewildered Arthur and himself into a Vogon spaceship, where they are both 
eventually captured. After being cast into outer space and left to die, the pair is 
miraculously rescued by a passing ship. There, Ford Prefect is reunited with his childhood 
friend Zaphod Beeblebrox, now President of the Galactic Empire, who had just stolen the 
Heart of Gold, a spaceship powered by the Improbability Drive. Put simply, the latter is a 
device powered by improbability – the possibilities of which are virtually endless. Zaphod, 
accompanied by his human girlfriend Trillian and their clinically depressed robot, Marvin, 
the Paranoid Android, intends to use the Heart of Gold to find the legendary planet of 
Magrathea, for reasons unclear, and Arthur, having lost everything he has ever known, is 
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tossed into the widest reaches of the Galaxy without any possibility of going back – forced 
to adapt himself to Zaphod and Prefect’s manic, adrenaline-fueled personas. By virtue of a 
series of extremely improbable events, the group eventually finds its way to Magrathea, 
where legend had it planets used to be custom built for the richest inhabitants of the 
Galaxy. In Magrathea, Arthur Dent is accosted by a Magrathean called Slartibarfast, who 
reveals he was part of the team that originally created the Earth. He tells Dent that the latter 
was an incredibly sophisticated computer designed by a previous computer, Deep Thought, 
to run a 10 million-year-old programme. Deep Thought had formerly, in a distant 
dimension, been created to answer The Question of the Meaning of Life, the Universe, and 
Everything. After seven-thousand million years of waiting, Deep Thought finally gave its 
answer to the great question: “Forty-two”. A dismayed group of aliens protested, and Deep 
Thought finally claimed that what needed ascertaining was what exactly the question was. 
The Earth would eventually fill in this gap, and the alien race responsible for Deep 
Thought would operate it under a new guise: that of mice. Unfortunately, the bureaucratic 
Vogons destroyed the Earth just before the programme was completed, and, after failing to 
retrieve the information they wanted from Arthur Dent’s brain, the surviving mice 
eventually decide that it is not worth the trouble to wait another 10 million years, and that 
they will instead craft their own cryptic answer in order to tour their home dimension’s 
“5D chat-show and lecture circuit” (ibid.:  175): “how many roads must a man walk down? 
Forty-two” (ibid.). Thus left without much in the way of an answer or purpose, Arthur and 
his companions drift off to have a meal at the Restaurant at the End of the Universe. 
For the entire duration of the novel, Adams lampoons Humanity’s blatant stupidity, 
voicing a comic misanthropy that echoes Saki’s in its mercilessness. It is the narrator’s 
clear contention that if there were alien life in the Galaxy, human beings would certainly 
not be amongst the brightest and the best – in fact, it is revealed that they were never even 
the brightest species in their planet; the omniscient narrator famously claims that humanity 
was only the third most intelligent species on Earth: the first were the mice and the second 
the dolphins, who escaped just before the Earth’s destruction amid cries of “[s]o long, and 
thanks for all the fish” (ibid.: 136). In this sense Adams provides us with an interesting 
take on the Bergsonian view that we must be more than just flesh: the narrator’s 
disenchanted depiction of humanity as mere ape-descendants suggests disappointment. It 
suggests that, by being no more than ape descendants, humanity is falling short of his (and 
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its own) expectations. However, unlike Bergson, the narrator does not necessarily see 
humour as a corrective, redemptive force. Humanity’s faultiness seems undeniable to him. 
HGTG’s comedy bears traces of bitterness and pain; it is the comedy of purposelessness, of 
frustrated hopes, of mindless bureaucracy. We should be better, but we are not – this is our 
perpetual incongruity.  
The revelation that there is an entire Universe of sentient beings beyond Earth 
seems, for a moment, to promise the existence of much more advanced civilizations than 
humanity; the narrator writes that during the fifteen years Ford Prefect spent stuck on Earth 
he grew to like his human neighbours but “he always remained desperately worried about 
the terrible number of things they didn’t know about” (ibid.: 46). Indeed, we are quickly 
shown that the other characters, such as Prefect and Zaphod, are leagues above Dent and 
humanity in general in the scientific sense. It subsequently becomes obvious, however, that 
they are just as clueless. The fact that Ford Prefect, whose real name is said to be 
unpronounceable, named himself after a car model before visiting Earth is an immediate 
red flag: “[h]e had made one careless blunder, though, because he had skimped a bit on his 
preparatory research. The information he had gathered had led him to choose the name 
‘Ford Prefect’ as being nicely inconspicuous” (ibid.: 13). The mice too, which are 
ultimately revealed to be highly intelligent trans-dimensional beings, have their flaws: they 
have failed in their million-year-old search for the meaning of life and are just as cruel and 
money-obsessed. In fact, in HGTG, many of the characters seem to be driven by a wanton 
and haphazard quest for meaning. Zaphod Beeblebrox is perhaps the most obvious 
example of this: he is resolute in his quest for the discovery of the ancient planet of 
Magrathea, for reasons unknown even to him
41
; Trillian, having no prospects on Earth and 
seeing her grasp on mathematics and astrophysics bulldozed by meeting Zaphod at a 
fancy-dress party on Earth, wanders along at his side; Ford Prefect, before his Earth 
predicament, travelled the Galaxy on the back of a destroyed home-planet with only a 
towel to his name and an edition of the HGTG to do research for; Arthur Dent is 
unwillingly thrown into his own galaxy-wide search for meaning, having previously 
sheltered himself in his West Country home. Ultimately, none of these characters differ 
much from Dent in their progress towards achieving happiness or discovering the meaning 
of life – they have only been searching for longer, while Dent has been hiding in the 
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comforts of his West Country home, oblivious of the Universe around him, but more 
importantly, of even the parish councils beyond his. 
Other characters, however, are shown to be of a different nature: the Vogons are 
entirely uninterested in anything other than shouting and following orders, especially if 
they do others harm; they are oblivious to any other purpose:  
 
…when the first rays of the bright young Vogsol sun had shone across them that 
morning, it was as if the forces of evolution had simply given up on them there and 
then, had turned aside in disgust and written them off as an ugly and unfortunate 
mistake. They never evolved again: they should never have survived. (ibid.: 43) 
 
The destruction of the entire planet Earth at their hands is perhaps the first clear sign 
that things are as arbitrary and mistake-prone in the whole Galaxy as they are in Arthur’s 
parish council. The Vogons are presented as creatures that defy evolution in the sense that 
they indulge only in the worst primeval instincts, are entirely unable to think for 
themselves and have absolutely no aesthetic sense
42
. It is for that reason that they are the 
backbone of the Galaxy’s civil service, which means they are the backbone of Society on a 
galactic level. The narrator completely eviscerates both the Vogons and Earth’s civil 
services precisely because they are entirely unaware of either the meaning of life or the 
lack thereof, and are instead totally and unquestioningly devoted to upholding something 
which seems to matter very little in the great scheme of things – the very opposite of 
Bergson’s “vivante flexibilité d’une personne” (Bergson, 1969: 8): 
 
[The Vogons] are one of the most unpleasant races in the Galaxy – not actually evil, 
but bad-tempered, bureaucratic, officious and callous. They wouldn’t even lift a finger 
to save their own grandmother from the Ravenous Bugblatter Beast of Trall without 
orders signed in triplicate, sent in, sent back, queried, lost, found, subjected to public 
inquiry, lost again, and finally buried in soft peat for three months and recycled as 
firelighters. (ibid.: 50, italics in the original) 
 
 
The implication is, of course, that if the Vogons were not such absolutely lazy 
sticklers for the most inane of rules, perhaps their grandmothers would be safer – 
metaphorically, that the ceremonial aspects of society should exist for the benefit of all, 
instead of being a hindrance to life itself. Indeed, bureaucracy was more than an apt target 
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for Adams to satirise, due to its meteoric rise during the 20
th
 century, as civil services 
increased in size and importance throughout Western Europe. To drive the point of the 
Vogons’ inanity home even further, it later comes to light that with the invention of the 
Heart of Gold, hyperspatial express routes would soon become useless, which makes the 
destruction of Earth and the death of its billions of inhabitants an entirely purposeless 
tragedy. Here, the Vogons’ rigidity is shown quite literally to be inimical to life. 
Oddly, Arthur Dent seems to share an iota of the Vogons’ unthinking, almost 
automated bureaucratic nature: he has taken refuge in the country from actually dealing 
with life and its issues. The destruction of his home, both literally and on a planetary scale, 
forces Arthur out of his self-involvement and comfort zone, as exemplified by his 
befuddled comment as Ford Prefect takes him into the pub to prepare for the end of the 
Earth: “’[d]id I do anything wrong today,’ he asked, ‘or has the world always been like this 
and I’ve been to wrapped up in myself to notice?’” (ibid.: 23-24). The HGTG may be the 
story of the guide and the destruction of the Earth, but it is also the beginning of a 
Bildungsroman in the sense that it is the story of a man who is torn from everything he has 
ever known and plunged into a Universe where he is forced to learn and adapt to vastly 
different circumstances. In Arthur Dent, much like in Brian (to a lesser extent) there is a 
quintessential Englishness that manifests itself through his unwavering love of tea and his 
voluntarily sheltered life. It is in part this cultural side of things that Adams is lampooning 
and upsetting by sending Arthur off on an unwilling adventure that he cannot come back 
from, and that Saki also parodied through Clovis’ pranking of the Huddles – a tendency 
towards insularity and peaceful mediocrity. 
Marvin the Paranoid Android is a peculiar case – he boasts awe-inspiring cognitive 
abilities and his constant verdict is that everything is awful: “’[l]ife,’ said Marvin dolefully, 
‘loathe it or ignore it, you can’t like it’” (ibid.: 123). The fact that he does not search for 
meaning nor seems to have any glimmer of hope is not due to brute ignorance and rigidity, 
as is the Vogons’s case. Instead, it would at first seem that his conclusion is merely the 
natural conclusion anyone with such astounding intelligence would reach – life could 
easily prove a simple and dull affair to an all-encompassing mind. However, Marvin seems 
to ascribe his outlook on life to his manufacturer’s attempt to create robots with Genuine 
People Personalities. Another example of such a prototype would be the doors of the Heart 
of Gold, which are thus described in the sales brochure: “[a]ll the doors in this spaceship 
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have a cheerful and sunny disposition. It is their pleasure to open for you, and their 
satisfaction to close again with the knowledge of a job well done” (ibid.: 85). These doors 
have no will of their own: they were programmed to be cheerful. Likewise, although to a 
lesser extent since Marvin does have volition, Marvin is “a manically depressed robot” 
(ibid.: 119) because he was programmed that way: “Let’s build robots with genuine people 
personalities,” they said. So they tried it on me. I’m a personality prototype. You can tell, 
can’t you?” (ibid.: 86) The humour intrinsic to Marvin stems exactly from how 
stereotypical he is – from the fact that he is a parody of depression and thus is constantly 
repeating that everything is awful, while simultaneously being safe from the life-
threatening effects of true depression, being a fictional robot. Marvin’s programming 
distorts, not his ability to perceive and gather information, but his ability to react to it in 
any way other than being depressed: 
 
‘Night’s falling,’ [Arthur] said. ‘Look, robot, the stars are coming out.’ 
From the heart of a dark nebula it is possible to see very few stars, and only very faintly, but 
they were there to be seen. 
The robot obediently looked at them, then looked back. 
‘I know,’ he said. ‘Wretched, isn’t it?’ 
‘But that sunset! I’ve never seen anything like it in my wildest dreams…the two suns! It was 
like mountains of fire boiling into space.’ 
‘I’ve seen it,’ said Marvin. ‘It’s rubbish’. (ibid.: 130) 
 
Here the suggestion seems to be that things are not quite as clear-cut as they seem: 
neither absolute cheerfulness nor stalwart negativity are the appropriate, ultimate responses 
to the tragedy of existence – both are rigid, and thus potentially comic, in their own way. 
The other character whose search for meaning seems to have ended is Slartibartfast, 
the Magrathean:  
 
’Perhaps I’m old and tired,’ he continued, ‘but I always think that the chances of 
finding what really is going on are so absurdly remote that the only thing to do is to 
say hang the sense of it and just keep yourself occupied. Look at me: I design 
coastlines. I got an award for Norway’. (ibid.: 165) 
 
If there is such a thing as the meaning of life, Slartibarfast, like Kierkegaard, doubts 
that it is within our abilities to discover it objectively. Instead of wasting our time with 
potential answers, he prefers to, like Candide, keep himself busy: “Cela est bien dit […] 
mais il faut cultiver notre jardin” (Voltaire, 1983: 125). Even his outlook, however, is 
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revealed to have something of the humorous to it when, as he is discussing the creation of 
Earth Mark II, he observes that he has been tasked with rebuilding Africa and insists on 
doing it entirely in fjords:  
 
’I’m doing it with fjords again because I like them, and I’m old-fashioned enough to 
think that they give a lovely baroque feel to a continent, And they tell me it’s not 
Equatorial enough. Equatorial!’ He gave a hollow laugh. ‘What does it matter? 
Science has achieved some wonderful things, of course, but I’d far rather be happy 
than right any day’. (Adams, 2002: 165) 
 
 Slartibartfast’s refusal to adapt his method to different objects is also revealing of a 
certain Bergsonian rigidity – and is thus humorous. No matter what he is tasked with, he 
will unfalteringly apply the fjord formula. But Slartibartfast is not interested in the fact that 
fjords may be considered an inappropriate way to rebuild the African coastline – he is 
interested in being happy. His voluntary rigidity is rooted in an unwillingness to conform 
to Society’s (his Magrathean colleagues’, in this case) conceptions of right and wrong. In 
the face of an existence with no discernible meaning or purpose to it, Slartibartfast chose to 
stop wasting his time figuring things out or to cater to convention and instead to be happy. 
When Arthur asks him if he is happy, however, Slartibartfast replies: “no. That’s where it 
all falls down, of course” (ibid.), revealing that his solution too is not final – or even 
entirely logical. It is only a tentative approach at living a bearable life: humorous in its 
inadequacy, but deep in its acceptance of the absurd.  
Indeed, the HGTG’s Universe seems barefacedly absurd – it is a Universe 
unsupported by any traditional, religious conception of a meaningful life, or perhaps even 
of metaphysical knowledge; a Universe where the actual answer to the question of the 
meaning of life (Forty-two) is incomprehensible, which suggests that even if there is such a 
thing, no one will ever understand it. At times, however, the novel’s startling number of 
coincidences seems to be animated by a taunting, mischievous force: the Improbability 
Drive provides for a number of felicitous (or disastrous) and meaningful encounters that 
further the plot along towards an indefinite conclusion. When the trans-dimensional mice 
point out to Arthur and the rest of the gang that they need to know more than “Forty-two” 
and preferably something that “sounds good” (ibid.: 171), they seem to be endorsing 
selfishness as a response to existential nihilism – to the possibility that there is no such 




Well, I mean, yes idealism, yes the dignity of pure research, yes the pursuit of truth in 
all its forms, but there comes a point I’m afraid where you begin to suspect that if 
there’s any real truth, it’s that the entire multi-dimensional infinity of the Universe is 
almost certainly being run by a bunch of maniacs. And if it comes to a choice between 
spending yet another ten million years finding that out, and on the other hand just 
taking the money and running, then I for one could do with the exercise,’ said Frankie. 
(ibid.: 172) 
 
The two mice are reacting to the void in a way vastly different from Nietzsche’s gay 
science: when they say “yes idealism, yes the dignity of pure research” they clearly mean 
“no idealism, no the dignity of pure research” in such a way that, in this case, entails either 
attempting to remove Arthur’s brain surgically against his will
43
, or conning their entire 
dimension with a made-up Ultimate Question to match Forty-two. Their amorality does not 
give way to a defence of laughter and cheerfulness in the face of an either indifferent or 
intentionally mischievous Universe – it is merely the politics of self-gain. But it is not only 
to purposelessness that the mice are reacting: they are also reacting to the possibility that 
their purpose is merely to be toyed with by a sadistic, omnipotent force. Their rationale 
seems to be that, if that is the case, then they will try to make the best out of their lives by 
in turn proceeding to toy with other people’s need for meaning to their gain. 
The idea that humanity is either stuck between the cruelty of an absurd and senseless 
world or at the hands of a perverse deity seems to be considered the mainstay of much of 
what is typically dubbed “black humour”: two suitable examples would perhaps be the 
Louie promo and The Crying of Lot 49 excerpt mentioned above. In both of those 
situations the suggestion seems to be that there is either no reigning logic to the Universe, a 
logic which our hopeful, pattern-seeking nature seems to presume; or that if there is any 
logic to be found, it is a cruel, mocking one that toys with us mercilessly. It is also our 
expectations of logic or of a benevolent deity that Adams is toying with, matching them at 
each turn with an extreme bout of undeserved cruelty. But again, the Improbability Drive 
seems to evoke the suspicion that a certain amount of synchronicity is at play – that some 
sort of ordaining force is at work. In his essay “A Comedy of Enthropy: the Contexts of 
Black Humour,” Patrick O’Neill writes, apropos M. F. Schulz’s Black Humor Fiction of 
the Sixties: 
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The literary black humourist, for Schulz, is a post-existentialist for whom the 
condition of universal absurdity no longer needs to be demonstrated. All versions of 
reality are only mental constructs; no principle is necessarily truer than any other, 
morally or intellectually, and nothing has any intrinsic value. Life is a labyrinth, 
multiple, meaningless, and endless, and the black humourist reacts variously with such 
all-embracing encyclopedic endgames as John Barth’s Sot-weed Factor or Giles Goat-
boy, with the programmatic scepticism of a  Kurt Vonnegut, or with the parody of all 
systems, as in Thomas Pynchon […]. (O’Neill, 1983: 148) 
 
I do not mean to claim that HGTG is a work of black humour – the length of this 
dissertation cannot allow for such an exploration of genre. However, it can be argued that 
all of the works analysed in the second half of the dissertation share the aforementioned 
characteristic which Schulz attributes to the “literary black humourist”: they operate within 
the context of absurdity – a context in which traditional structures are immediately called 
into question. However, and especially if one is to take a slightly Bergsonian approach
44
 to 
the concept, then all humour may just operate on the basis of a fundamental absurdity, 
even at its most innocuous. One of the most innocent jokes to be found in HGTG comes 
apropos the meaning of the fictitious word “sass”. It is described as meaning: “know, be 
aware of, meet, have sex with” (Adams, 2002: 27). Like Freud’s kalauer, this is an 
innocuous joke that truly only seems to betray playfulness. However, observing that one 
word can have such disparate meanings as “knowing” and “having sex with” points to a 
fundamental flaw in language
45
, in what also seems to be a reference to the Biblical usage 
of the word. The undeniable prominence of language in human affairs then suggests that a 
deeply flawed language is, in that sense, a deeply flawed existence. It may suffice realising 
that we cannot even prevent woeful misunderstandings on the scale of one single word to 
assume that the Galaxy is run entirely on the principle of insanity. In other words, even in 
the most harmless of puns one can find evidence of the “multiple, meaningless and endless 
labyrinth”.  
 In HGTG, this is perhaps more than evident. A paradigmatic example of the novel’s 
outlook on life arises when Arthur turns on the Improbability Drive in order to avoid a 
disastrous fate at the hands of two thermonuclear missiles, inadvertently turning them into 
“a bowl of petunias and a very surprised looking sperm-whale” (ibid.: 116). The narrator 
                                                          
44
 An approach adapted to a post-modernity in which belief in God and the concepts of spirit or soul are 
outwardly waning. 
45
 If one is to take the narrow view that language is merely a tool for direct, unequivocal communication. 
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then relates what went through the whale’s mind as it journeyed from “several miles above 
the surface of an alien planet,” (ibid.: 117) directly into the ground below, quickly 
explaining that: “[that] poor innocent creature had very little time to come to terms with its 
identity as a whale before it then had to come to terms with not being a whale any more”, 
(ibid.). As it gains consciousness, the whale immediately proceeds to ask questions: 
  
Ah…! What’s happening? It thought. 
Er, excuse me, who am I? 
Hello? 
Why am I here? What’s my purpose in life? 
What do I mean by who am I? (ibid.) 
 
 In its quest for getting to the bottom of things, the whale decides it must begin to 
find names for things, such as “world”, “head”, “wind” and “tail”. After some of this it 
asks itself: “Now – have I built up any coherent picture of things yet? No” (ibid.: 118), 
before finally coming up with the name “ground”, thinking “I wonder if it will be best 
friends with me?” [ibid], and crashing to its death. In a sense the whale’s journey is 
entirely akin to Arthur, Prefect, Zaphod and all other sentient beings’ lives, but compressed 
into a matter of seconds. If one were to fast-forward through any one’s life, the apparent 
result would probably be a curious, frightened, hectic journey from birth to death, during 
which nothing close to a “coherent picture of things” is achieved
46
. The prospect of our 
journey being equivalent to a whale created on a whim out of thin air that immediately 
plops into the ground below and dies is humorous for a few different reasons: a dangerous 
missile was just turned into a harmless whale, the whale apparently thinks and talks, it is 
surprisingly nonchalant, its life was but an irrelevant instant and it still entirely resembles 
our own. The scene blatantly exploits the fundamental incongruity of life – the incongruity 
between our desire for dignity and godliness and the reality of death in the form of a 
gelatinous, cetaceous heap on dry land. This last element possibly makes for a descending 
incongruity and a metaphor that thusly provides us with bathos, not pathos. The only thing 
that seems to somewhat redeem the whale’s journey is that the way down must have been 
beautiful. On the other hand, the journey of the bowl of petunias seems to have been 
slightly different: 
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 “When it comes to the absurdity of our existence, we’re really no different from the poor sperm whale 
plummeting towards a collision with the hard surface of the planet Magrathea (although we might have a 




Curiously enough, the only thing that went through the mind of the bowl of petunias 
as it fell was: Oh no, not again. Many people have speculated that if we knew exactly 
why the bowl of petunias had thought that we would know a lot more about the nature 
of the universe than we do now. (ibid.) 
 
 Here the humour derives, of course, from the prospect that a bowl of petunias may 
have a more experienced grasp on the nature of the Universe than we (humans or aliens) 
do. The idea that the petunias had somehow been through that extremely specific situation 
before is particularly interesting, because it also suggests that a bowl of petunias is wise to 
the ancient concept of eternal recurrence. The comic effect is perhaps best demonstrated by 
explaining that, among those most familiar with this concept are: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, 
Camus and a bowl of petunias. The incongruity inherent in the depiction of a scene 
wherein both a whale and a bowl of petunias are falling through the sky is built on by the 
suggestion that not only the petunias, like the whale, are surprisingly sentient – they are 
possibly wiser and more experienced than the whale.  Considering the fact that the whale is 
supposed to echo humanity’s confused journey from birth to death, the underlying 
suggestion is that a bowl of petunias has a degree of consciousness and wisdom much 
greater than the average man. 
In his first exploration of the concept of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche describes the 
concept in the form of a hypothetical question: 
 
What if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say 
to you: ‘This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again 
and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and 
every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in 
your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence […]’. (Nietzsche, 
2001: 194) 
  
Nietzsche then observes that one would either curse or praise such a demon, and that 
knowing such a thing would weigh heavily on every decision, prompting the question 
“[d]o you want this again and innumerable times again?” (ibid.) Nietzsche concludes: “[o]r 
how well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing 
more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” (ibid.: 194-195, italics 
in the original). The suggestion, in HGTG, is that the bowl of petunias had not really had a 
very nice time – over and over again. It also seems to be that most of us would be hard 
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pressed to. The possibility that everything one does will be experienced again and again 
forever seems to, at first, add drastic importance to whatever one decides to do with one’s 
life, and great alarm to the prospect that it may be an unpleasant experience – as the bowl 
of petunias seems to suggest. However, the fact that such a cycle is infinite, and thus has 
neither beginning nor end, adds to the meaninglessness of our existence – a 
meaninglessness which brings comfort even in death, a comfort here exemplified by the 
understated reaction of the bowl of petunias: “oh no, not again.” In such a meaningless, 
helpless situation, all that is left for one to do is detach oneself from one’s troubles and 
enjoy the harmless farce. Here, Amy Kind’s comment on the HGTG’s outlook seems 
particularly astute: “in many ways, Adams’s assessment of the absurdity of the human 
condition is similar to Ford Prefect’s assessment of Earth and its occupants: it’s mostly 
harmless” (Kind, 2012: 77). 
Yet this is a particularly difficult conclusion to reach. Without any particular 
purpose intrinsic to life, society seems to truly become Bergson’s masquerade, and 
existence a mere plunge into death. In the context of such a masquerade, the hassle and 
tyranny of bureaucracy becomes painstakingly obvious – if nothing truly matters and there 
is no purpose to life, things such as “orders signed in triplicate, sent in, sent back, queried, lost, 
found, subjected to public inquiry, lost again, and finally buried in soft peat for three months and 
recycled as firelighters” (ibid.: 50, italics in the original); would seem to immediately lose their 
purported importance. It is at the hands of this self-important bureaucracy that both Arthur 
Dent’s house and planet are destroyed.  
Arthur Dent is told by Mr L. Prosser, which conveniently rhymes with “tosser”, a 
local council worker who is “forty, fat and shabby” (Adams: 2002: 9), and oddly enough 
“a direct male-line descendant of Genghis Khan” (ibid), the genetic remains of whom had 
been watered down to “a pronounced stoutness about the tum and a predilection for little 
fur hats” [ibid], that there is nothing he can do to save his house – it must be demolished 
because a bypass must be built. 
 Prosser is portrayed as the archetype of the bureaucrat. He is unremarkable in every 
aspect except for his biological relation to the ruthless founder of the Mongol Empire, from 
whom he has inherited a penchant for violence and oppression. In fact, an apt descriptor 
for Prosser would be a genetically watered-down tyrant: he lacks the intellect, the strength 
or drive of a true tyrant, so he seems to have settled for council work. This becomes 
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evident when Arthur questions him on why the house must be demolished. Prosser can 
only reply that it must be demolished because the bypass must be built, and the bypass 
must be built because “you’ve got to build bypasses” (ibid.: 10), showing just as much of 
an ability for questioning orders as Parvus in The Life of Brian. The arbitrary injustice of 
the demolition becomes obvious when Prosser tells Dent he should have complained at the 
appropriate time, but we quickly realise that news of the demolition were absolutely 
inaccessible: 
 
 ‘But the plans were on display…’ 
 ‘On display? I eventually had to go down to the cellar to find them.’ 
 ‘That’s the display department.’ 
 ‘With a torch.’  
 ‘Ah, well the lights had probably gone.’ 
 ‘So had the stairs.’ 
 ‘But look, you found the notice, didn’t you?’ 
‘Yes,’ said Arthur, ‘yes I did. It was on display in the bottom of a locked filing cabinet 
stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying Beware of the Leopard.’ (ibid.: 
11) 
 
 When Arthur refuses to get out of the bulldozer’s way, Prosser is haunted by 
“inexplicable but terribly attractive visions of Arthur Dent’s house being consumed with 
fire and Arthur himself running screaming from the blazing ruin with at least tree hefty 
spears protruding from his back” (ibid.: 12), but only manages to stutter a vague threat and 
storm off. Moments later, the Vogons announce their intention to destroy the entire planet 
Earth in order to build a hyperspatial express route. When the planet’s population naturally 
complains, Prostetnic Vogon Jeltz of the Galactic Hyperspace Planning Council – 
Prosser’s Vogon counterpart – delivers a familiar speech: 
 
There’s no point in acting all surprised about it. All the planning charts and demolition 
orders have been on display in your local planning department in Alpha Centauri for 
fifty of your Earth years, so you’ve had plenty of time to lodge any formal complaint 
and it’s far too late to start making a fuss about it now. (ibid.:  33) 
 
The parallel between the Vogons and Prosser, and consequently the bureaucratic 
civil services of the 20
th
 century, is obvious. Through their characterisation, bureaucracy is, 
among other things, shown to be a lawful passive-aggressive outlet for those with a lurking 
strain of sadism, such as the Vogons, who delight in berating others, and Prosser, with his 
secret love of axes and violent fantasies. But the fact that their incompetence and 
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inadaptability are what force Dent out of his comfort zone, places the Prosser and the 
Vogons in a very particular position: firstly, one that has already been established – that of 
the worthy victims of Bergson’s “correction”; secondly, however, that of having a pivotal 
role in the grand, maniacal scheme of things. Were it not for Prosser or the Vogons’s 
extreme incompetence and fussiness, Arthur would have carried on living a sheltered life, 
clueless as to his surroundings yet vaguely pestered by disappointment and the feeling that 
something sinister is afoot: “’[a]ll through my life I’ve had this strange unaccountable 
feeling that something was going on in the world, something big, even sinister, and no one 
would tell me what it was’” (ibid.: 164). Ultimately, Arthur will never find out what is 
going on in the Universe, and Slartibartfast immediately explains to him that that strange 
feeling is “’just perfectly normal paranoia. Everyone in the Universe has that’” (ibid.); but 
he did find out what was going on in his home-world and broke out of his shell of placid 
insularity – a necessity also echoed by Brian when he says that his followers have to “all 
work it out for [them]selves” (Jones, 1979: 01:03:51-01:04:14). 
Lastly, in his journey, Arthur is guided by Prefect and the rest of the group, but also 
by the overarching mechanism of the guide. The guide becomes, in and of itself, a 
substitute for the meaning of life: a pragmatic manual for navigating an absurd existence, 
full of practical, sometimes prejudiced, and erroneous advice and information which caters 
shamelessly to indulgent tendencies:  
 
[The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy] has many omissions and contains much 
that is apocryphal, or at least wildly inaccurate, it scores over the older, more 
pedestrian work in two important respects. 
 First, it is slightly cheaper; and secondly, it has the words DON’T PANIC 
inscribed in large friendly letters on its cover. (ibid.:  6) 
 
 This becomes evident when we are shown the difference between the prestigious 
Encyclopaedia Galactica and The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy through their entries on 
alcohol:  
 
Here’s what The Encyclopaedia Galatica has to say about alcohol. It says that 
alcohol is a colourless volatile liquid formed by the fermentation of sugars and also 
notes its intoxicating effect on certain carbon-based life forms. 
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy also mentions alcohol. It says the best drink in 




 The Guide goes on to describe the effects of drinking a Pan Galactic Gargle Blaster 
as “like having your brains smashed out by a slice of lemon wrapped round a large gold 
brick” (ibid.: 21) before explaining in detail how one can prepare said drink. The narrator 
concludes by observing that: “The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy sells rather better 
than The Encyclopaedia Galactica” (ibid.: 22, italics in the original). While the conclusion 
seems to be that The Encyclopaedia Galactica is certainly a better source of knowledge, it 
also seems like it is useless when it comes to explaining the meaning of life or helping 
people navigate through existence. This seems like another nod to Kierkegaard’s criticism 
of objective, scientific knowledge as a means to discovering the purpose of our existence. 
This is not to imply that the novel is somehow against science and formal logic – it is quite 
enthusiastically the opposite – but there is a certain despair with its ability to achieve some 
sort of meaningful answer, as demonstrated by the parody of formal logic in the Guide’s 
entry on the Babel Fish, a fish that is otherwise normal but which, when placed in one’s 
ear, renders every language immediately understandable:  
 
‘Now it is such a bizarrely improbable coincidence that anything so mindboggingly 
useful could have evolved purely by chance that some thinkers have chosen to see it as 
a final and clinching proof of the non-existence of God. 
‘The argument goes something like this: “I refuse to prove that I exist,” says God, 
“for proof denies faith, and without faith I am nothing.” 
 ‘”But, says Man, “the Babel fish is a dead giveaway, isn’t it? It could not have 
evolved by chance. It proves you exist, and so therefore, by your own arguments, you 
don’t. QED.” 
 ‘”Oh dear,” says God, “I hadn’t thought of that,” and promptly vanishes in a puff of 
logic. 
 ‘”Oh, that was easy,” says Man, and for an encore goes on to prove that black is 
white and gets himself killed on the next zebra crossing”. (ibid.:  56) 
 
 Notwithstanding the clear amount of pessimism in HGTG; the amount of 
descending that the reader does from ideal to reality, there is a certain glimmer of hope 
throughout. While on the fifth book of the series the ending is certainly grim and hopeless 
– death – along the way the characters never stop trying to live their lives meaningfully, 
nor is the quest of discovering The Question truly abandoned, while Arthur’s adventures 
continue to be animated by an obscure, coincidental force bringing unlikely events 
together. Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the novel’s attitude towards the tragedy of 
existence, however, is that it is funny. Comedy, even when at its most cynical is still, 
hopefully, funny. Things such as words which mean simultaneously “to know” and “to 
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have sex with” may be considered flaws if we, above all, hope to avoid misunderstandings 
at all costs, but they are also part of the richness of life and communication – a richness 
which humour exploits to our knowledge and enjoyment. HGTG may be at its root bleak 
and absurd, but it also conveys a feeling of extreme comfort – perhaps a triumph of 
narcissism which tells us that if we can understand and diagnose all of this Galactic folly, 
and most of all laugh at it, there is no reason to panic; not because there is an answer, not 
because there is a question, but because our whale-like journey from the sky to the ground 
is extremely funny. 
 
3. Conclusion  
 
 When it comes to humour, there are very few certainties to be found. The prospect 
that a single, unified theory will one day provide an answer to all its intricacies seems 
unlikely. However, the works of comic authors and scholars from Classical Antiquity to 
the present day, many of which I was not able to survey for this dissertation, have provided 
us with a wealth of information and opinions which, to a large extent, have allowed for a 
very well-rounded understanding of the ways in which humour works: its effects, its 
tentative origins, its mechanisms. While there is much more to be accomplished, I hope to 
have achieved an adequate portrait of the wealth of information that the works covered 
contain.  
From this portrait, it arises that humour is deeply related to the frustration of a 
common expectation of congruence. This frustration can be either accidental or intentional. 
Especially when intentional, it seems to have elements of play to it, of a desire (on behalf 
of the humourist) to derive fun from whatever topic or situation, as well as being an 
indirect way to express other desires which, if done so openly, may be frowned upon, such 
as hostility, sexuality and, in the case of Saki’s Baroness’, a possible expression of 
unhappiness. Here, as well as in the biological aspects of laughter itself, which seems 
undeniably related to humour and to the “feeling” it produces – comic amusement –, there 
seems to be a palpable element of relief to humour, whether due to the fact that laughter 
breaks down the rigidity of the torso, that it allows one to express one’s desires, to release 
the energy needed to withstand the solemnity of certain situations, or to allay our fears of 
inferiority. The latter aspect is related to what seems like yet another relevant characteristic 
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– superiority; it too seems to be a key element of humour, whether it expresses an 
individual’s attempt to remain above his circumstances, is truly the expression of one’s 
feeling of superiority over another, or is merely the recognition that all of humanity is 
subject to the flaws and imperfections that each individual suffers from. The idea of 
emotional detachment also seems to have great relevance – whether it is induced by the 
make-believe aspects of play or fiction, or by simply adopting a distanced, birds’ eye 
perspective over human affairs.  
 The combination of this information, but especially the idea of social incongruity, 
led me to explore the idea that humour is deeply rooted in what Schopenhauer described as 
the vanity of existence: the fundamental incongruity between humanity’s lofty aspirations 
and the limited reality of its existence – the physical restrictions of the body and the social 
constraints to behaviour. To illustrate this, I enlisted the aid of several of Saki’s short 
stories which provide a comedic, ambiguous perspective on the farcical yet necessary 
elements of the ceremonial in society; of Monty Python’s Life of Brian, which explores the 
discrepancy between the everyman-reality of someone such as Brian and the ideal of Jesus, 
as well as the idea that a haphazard journey to death is inimical to the existence of a 
purpose, and of The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, which explores the seemingly 
purposeless ruthlessness of life in the face of either an inexistent meaning of life or of an 
impish deity that toys with us, pushing us into a continuous, relentless search, the end of 
which arrives only with death. 
 These works share not only the fact that they deal with these themes, but mainly the 
fact that they are works of humour – that they derive enjoyment from this incongruity by, 
among other things, making us look at ourselves and others from a distance. In the words 
of Patrick O’Neill: 
 
All humour, like all art and all literature, is Janus-faced, looking in one direction 
towards cosmos and in the other towards chaos. All humour […] must ultimately be 
affirmative of life and a celebration of the victory of the embattled spirit over the 
void”. (O’Neill, 1983: 166) 
 
 
 The comic treatment of any subject seems to be both imply a recognition and 
criticism of its intricacies, and the deriving of enjoyment from them. Applied to themes 
such as existential angst and death, it more than ever becomes a refusal to let bleakness 
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